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Abstract
This dissertation examines the British naval blockade imposed on Imperial Germany
between the outbreak of war in August 1914 and the ratification of the Treaty of
Versailles in July 1919. The blockade has received modest attention in the
historiography of the First World War, despite the assertion in the British official history
that extreme privation and hunger resulted in more than 750,000 German civilian deaths.
This revelation of a humanitarian disaster may be the main reason why the British
government delayed public release of the history for nearly thirty years after its
completion in the 1930s. Yet scholarship has focused on the initial establishment of the
blockade, and the complex legal, economic, and diplomatic issues that made it ineffective
during the first part of the war. Much less has been written about its subsequent
evolution into a powerful weapon, and less still on the Allies’ continuation of the
blockade after the Armistice to compel German acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles.
Britain first implemented the naval blockade of Germany not as a merciless
hunger blockade, but rather as a time-honoured maritime strategy intended to weaken the
enemy’s military resources and thereby assist the Allied land war on the Continent.
However, its function changed over the course of the war, as Britain broadened the
classes of goods subject to interdiction, from a traditional naval strategy focused on
military supplies, into a much broader “weapon of starvation,” in the words of Winston
Churchill, the British Secretary of State for War, by 1918-1919. The aim of this
dissertation is to illuminate how and why this military transformation occurred and detail
some of the political and moral consequences of the blockade’s expansion and its
prolongation in full force through the whole of the treaty negotiations at Versailles.
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CHAPTER 1
FOOD AS A WEAPON, 1914-1919
Introduction
“All is fair,” remarked Admiral John Fisher in an April 1904 naval document on the
tactics and strategies that Britain’s Royal Navy would employ in the event of war. The
soon-to-be-appointed First Sea Lord qualified his remarks by asserting rather matter-offactly “[that] moderation in war is imbecility.”1 This statement was certainly indicative
of the Admiralty’s blockade policy of Imperial Germany throughout the First World War.
Indeed, Great Britain, France and, later, the United States maintained a rigorous naval
blockade of Germany from August 1914 to July 1919 when the Treaty of Versailles was
eventually ratified. The blockade has received relatively little attention in the
historiography of the First World War, despite the assertion in the British official history
that extreme privation and hunger resulted in more than 750,000 German civilian deaths2
– a third of which occurred after 11 November 1918.3 While past scholarship has
emphasized the blockade’s early imposition and its complex legal and economic
framework, it has yet to sufficiently detail its use as an instrument of war and, equally,
potent bargaining chip at the Paris peace table.
This doctoral dissertation has three primary objectives. Firstly, it will assess the
political and military considerations that resulted in Britain’s tightening and prolongation
of the blockade. It will seek to answer to what degree anti-German propaganda

Admiral John Fisher, ‘Submarines,’ 20 April 1904, National Archives, ADM 116/942.
Archibald C. Bell, A History of the Blockade of Germany and the Countries Associated with Her
in the Great War, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, 1914-1918 (London: H. M. Stationery Office,
1937), 672-674.
3
N. P. Howard, “The Social and Political Consequences of the Allied Food Blockade of Germany,
1918-1919,” German History 11, no. 2 (1993): 166.
1
2
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influenced the British public and American official support for the denial of foodstuffs to
Germany. Secondly, it will consider the impact of the blockade’s prolongation after 11
November and the Allies’ ability to ratify the Treaty of Versailles on 12 July 1919.
Lastly, it will briefly explore the postwar legacy of the naval blockade in Britain and
Germany. How did the British government and press, for example, reconcile the
blockade as a “weapon of starvation”4 with the need to rebuild relations with Germany in
the peace process? Does the “retention of the hunger blockade symbolize the great lost
opportunity for postwar Europe... [where] the new reality was founded not upon Wilson’s
high principle but upon unnecessary starvation,” as one historian has suggested?5
The majority of First World War blockade studies have approached the topic from
a strictly economic perspective, on the one hand, or as operational military history, on the
other.6 It is my intention to redress the historiographical imbalance by focusing on
British civil-military relations in the latter war years and immediate post-Armistice
period. These “politics of hunger”7 not only governed the British decision to employ a
commercial blockade of the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and,
after October 1915, Bulgaria), it also informed Allied and German naval policy
throughout the conflict and conditioned the uneasy peace settlement that was to follow.8
Thus, by limiting the study of British economic warfare to the early war years, the history
4

This phrase was first employed by Winston Churchill as British Secretary of State for War in
March 1919 and it is from here that I derived the title of the dissertation. See, Suda Lorena Bane and Ralph
Haswell Lutz, The Blockade of Germany After the Armistice, 1918-1919 (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1942), 744.
5
C. Paul Vincent, The Politics of Hunger: The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1915-1919 (Ohio:
University of Ohio Press, 1985), 164.
6
The works of S. N. Broadberry and Mark Harrison, The Economics of World War I (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005) and Eric W. Osborne, Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany, 19141919 (New York: Frank Cass, 2004) are an example of this economic approach, whereas Bell’s official
history is indicative of more traditional military history.
7
Vincent.
8
Bane and Lutz, esp. 430-495.
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of the naval blockade has been written in a piecemeal fashion.
This thesis ultimately addresses the post-1915 period of the blockade’s imposition
and offers new insights on the Anglo-American and German war effort and peace
negotiations in 1918-1919, as well as the morality of democratic states targeting civilians
in war. I anticipate this work with its interdisciplinary focus and politically relevant
discussions on propaganda and morality will be of interest to scholars in security studies
and international relations, and, more significantly, to military and naval historians given
the centenary of the First World War.
Historiography
Much of the early scholarship prior to the Second World War focused on the blockade’s
limited effectiveness from August 1914 until early 1916. The British government’s twodecade-long suppression of its official histories only served to prolong the interwar
assertion of inefficacy, which fitted the period’s focus on the Treaty of Versailles as a
failed and unjust peace.9 But the question as to whether Germany faced starvation in the
latter war years has occupied much of the post-1945 scholarship. These works were
influenced by the broader Sonderweg or “special path” trend in German historiography,
which viewed 1914-1918 through the lens of the Second World War and the Third Reich.
For example, Fritz Fischer’s Germany’s Aims in the First World War (1961) refuted the
National Socialist charge that the Kaiserreich was defeated on the home front in 1918.10
A similar consensus prevailed among German economic historians in the late 1960s and
1970s, who rejected the notion that Imperial Germany experienced mass food shortages
9
Michael Graham Fry, “British Revisionism,” in The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after
75 Years, edited by Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Gläser (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 565-602.
10
Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York: W. W. Norton and
Company, 1967), 27-30.
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and chronic malnourishment. More recently, historians and political scientists have again
extended the discussion to Germany’s home front. These works shed light on the
political and economic dislocation that accompanied the Allied naval blockade. This
recent scholarship has shown that to minimize the blockade’s effectiveness would be to
bypass a vital chapter of the First World War and postwar peace negotiations.
Three British official histories on the blockade were commissioned
immediately following the Armistice; each was written by different historians and treated
not as separate volumes but as companion pieces to James E. Edmonds’ official history
of the British Expeditionary Force, Military Operations: France and Belgium.11
Lieutenant Commander William Arnold-Forster’s The Economic Blockade, 1914-1919:
Before the Armistice and After and H. W. C. Davis’ History of the Blockade both
appeared in 1920. Neither discussed the peace negotiations and instead concerned their
analyses with the functioning of the blockade on a day-to-day basis throughout the First
World War. Success was measured in stark economic terms; detailed charts and graphs
recounted the weight and breakdown of enemy goods seized each month.12 It was even
estimated that the blockade resulted in German casualties equal to the 772,736 war dead
of the British Expeditionary Force.13 One is left to wonder whether the prospect of
having these statistics released was deemed too great a risk to British postwar credibility.
It certainly would have added more grist to the mill of those, like British economist John
Maynard Keynes, who regarded the peace settlement with Germany as overly harsh.

11
Marion C. Siney, “British Official Histories of the Blockade of the Central Powers during the
First World War,” American Historical Review 68, no. 2 (January 1963): 392.
12
These statistics even determined that Germany’s gross domestic product declined over four
years by 75 percent of its prewar level. See, William E. Arnold-Forster, The Economic Blockade, 19141919: Before the Armistice and After (London: Clarendon Press, 1939), 34-35.
13
Bell, 672-674.
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Even after the release of Arnold-Forster’s work in 1942, the book was not
widely available in circulation and rarely was it cited as a primary source in subsequent
blockade literature. Moreover, although a copy of Davis’ History of the Blockade was
given to the British Museum in August 1921, it was not released for public distribution
nor was it entered into the government’s Suppressed Book Catalogue. These attempts to
stall further inquiry have led one prolific scholar on the blockade to conclude that
“apparently the Foreign Office forgot (conveniently or genuinely) that a copy had been
deposited….”14 But the most telling piece of British postwar concealment was in relation
to the third and final official history completed by Archibald C. Bell with the Historical
Section of the Committee on Imperial Defence (C.I.D.) in 1937. Initially, it was
promised to Bell that his A History of the Blockade of Germany would be showcased in
the same manner (i.e. for public distribution) as Archibald Hurd’s The Merchant Navy
(1921-1929) and C. Ernest Fayle’s Seaborne Trade (1924-1929). He was sorely
disappointed to learn, however, that both the British government and military still
deemed any research on the naval blockade suitable for official eyes only. Stuck on a
shelf in the library of the C.I.D. until 1961, the blockade began to fade from academic
interest and popular memory.15 This was an unfortunate end for an extremely well
documented and thought-provoking work.
In place of Bell’s official history, the most widely cited text became Rear Admiral
Montagu W. W. P. Consett’s Triumph of Unarmed Forces (1923). This book placed a
great deal of emphasis on the occasions where goods en route to Germany passed

14

Siney, 392-3.
The book was only discovered in the late 1950s, at which time scholarship had turned its
attention to the foreign and domestic policy of totalitarian governments and the waging of the Second
World War. Ibid., 394
15
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undetected by the Royal Navy. Consett served as a British naval attaché in Stockholm
during the war, but his knowledge of the blockade’s wider impact on the German war
effort and home front was very limited. He did not, for example, have access to the
classified documents from the British Foreign Office and Robert Cecil’s Ministry of the
Blockade.16 Thus the socio-economic and military effects of the blockade would remain
uncharted waters for later historians to navigate.
The political climate in which these post-1945 accounts were produced was no
more conducive for an objective reading of the blockade’s impact. In fact, several
German historians in the 1960s and 1970s sought to dismiss its effectiveness altogether.17
This scholarship unquestioningly accepted Admiral Consett’s view that the Kaiserreich
was able to circumvent Allied measures by trading with the neutral Scandinavian
countries. Gerald Feldman’s Army, Industry, and Labour in Germany, 1914-1918 (1966)
maintained that German food shortages had far more to do with inept food provisioning
and an over-ambitious War Ministry than the Allied imposition of a naval blockade.18
Feldman’s work became a benchmark study in First World War civil-military
relations. His decision to forego even a brief mention of the blockade’s impact
effectively laid the groundwork for subsequent economic interpretations in the 1970s and
1980s. Both Gerd Hardach’s The First World War, 1914-1918 (1977) and Avner Offer’s
The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (1989) were quick to discount the
possibility that Imperial Germany had been defeated on the home front. Accordingly,

16
Marion C. Siney, The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914-1916 (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1957), 249.
17
The latent power of German “illiberalism” preoccupied much of the post-1945 German
scholarship on the First World War.
18
Gerald Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labour in Germany, 1914-1918 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966), 95.
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Hardach and Offer argued that a compromised diet of ersatz goods would not lead to
malnourishment. Both historians acknowledged the issue of hunger, but remained
unconvinced that Germany experienced famine as a result of the naval blockade.19
Conversely, there emerged from the mid-1980s a noticeable shift in the tone and
focus of First World War blockade studies advanced by Anglo-American historians.
These groundbreaking works include C. Paul Vincent’s The Politics of Hunger: The
Allied Blockade of Germany, 1915-1919 (1985) and Belinda J. Davis’ Home Fires
Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin (2000). This newer
scholarship scarcely lingered on the issue of whether the Kaiserreich had faced
starvation. Most post-1980s works on the blockade accepted that Imperial
Germany had become a “beleaguered fortress” in the last years of its existence.20
Influenced by the writings of Peter Loewenberg and S. William Halperin’s
Germany Tried Democracy: A Political History of the Reich from 1918 to 1933 (1963),
Vincent concerned himself less with the illegality of the blockade or the day-to-day
mechanics of how it functioned. He focused instead on the effects of the blockade in
both a physiological and political sense. Vincent’s work succeeds admirably in providing
a closer look at how the Kaiser’s army coped with the challenges of economic warfare.
His work has increased scholarly awareness on the blockade to the point where many
newer monographs on the First World War provide the reader with a brief overview of
the Allies’ trade restrictions.21

19

Gerd Hardach, The First World War, 1914-1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1977), 31. See also, Avner Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989), 53.
20
This phrase was employed disparagingly by Gerd Hardach and like-minded Cold Warriors to
refute the earlier claim of starvation. See Hardach, 31-32.
21
This cursory treatment of the blockade is a vast improvement on the interwar “amnesia” that
plagued the three British official histories upon their release. These post-Vincent scholarly works include:
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So too, Belinda Davis’ Home Fires Burning functions as a valuable companion
piece to Vincent’s work on the cumulative impact of the blockade. Her narrative focuses
on the day-to-day struggle of “women of lesser means” (minderbemittelte Frauen),
specifically their resorting to theft and symbolic acts of violence in the latter war years.
Davis consulted Berlin police and court records from 1913-1920 and noted the
correlation between the number of crimes22 committed by women and the severity of
food shortages on the home front. Theft convictions in Berlin, for example, increased
from 40,000 in 1917 to 50,000 by the war’s end.23 Malnutrition forced many women of
lesser means to steal, beg, and borrow in order to survive the “Turnip Winter” of 19161917 and nationwide food riots of January 1918.24 But does it logically follow that these
women entered the political arena in the process? This claim underpins much of Davis’
work, although she fails to establish how theft convictions in 1918 were associated with
the desire for greater political participation.25
Davis is therefore at her best when she concentrates on the little-known stories of
the minderbemittelte Frauen. This is not to suggest that the average Hausfrau remained
apolitical during the German revolution of 1918-1919. Rather, Davis’ failure to directly
link the struggle for food with women’s receptivity to political extremism sadly undercuts
her thesis. This is one methodological reservation in what is otherwise a perceptive and
Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London: Arnold,
1997); John Keegan, The First World War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999); Gary Sheffield, Forgotten
Victory: The First World War – Myths and Realities; and David Stevenson, Cataclysm: The First World
War as a Political Tragedy (New York: Basic Books, 2004); idem, With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory
and Defeat in 1918 (London: Allen Lane, 2011).
22
Namely, fraud, embezzlement, theft, forgery, and receipt of stolen goods.
23
Belinda J. Davis, Homes Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I
Berlin (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 223.
24
Mass food riots in January 1918 were spurred by the public’s frustration regarding the
exorbitant price of food. By 1918, the power of the black market prevented the average German family
from purchasing what few goods there were left in market stalls and storefronts.
25
Davis, 238-239.
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engaging book. Davis skillfully demonstrates how food shortages on the home front
exacerbated tensions between the haves and the have-nots, even if her discussion of
women’s apathy towards the war effort is often unsatisfying. Her case study of women in
wartime Berlin is proof that scholarship on the blockade is still relevant in the era of
micro-histories and postmodern works. Davis’ and Vincent’s research has influenced my
thesis in that both reject the increasingly anachronistic 1960s and ‘70s notion that
Imperial Germany was not adversely affected by the blockade.
A more recent but controversial trend in the historiography of the naval blockade
has been the counter-factual approach taken by a number of historians and non-historians
alike. For instance, naval scholar Paul G. Halpern suggests in a recent book chapter “…
[that] if one of the many German offensives [in the spring of 1918] had succeeded, and
the tide of the battle shifted in their [Germany’s] favour, then the naval blockade might
not be studied today.”26 For Halpern, this is a purely rhetorical exercise. He does not
provide any evidence to support the claim that a reversal of fortune was even possible for
German troops beyond the opening salvo of Operation Michael (21 March 1918).
Ultimately, counter-factual what-ifs are of little help in assessing the blockade’s wider
significance and, in the case of Patrick J. Buchanan’s Churchill, Hitler, and the
Unnecessary War (2008), they can lead to unfounded generalizations on the origins of the
Second World War.
A journalist by trade, “Pat” Buchanan is known more for his staunch neoconservative politics than historical inquiry. He nevertheless wrote a New York Times
bestseller criticizing Winston Churchill and other British statesmen for needlessly
Paul G. Halpern, “World War I: The Blockade,” in Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies
and Counter-strategies, 1805-2005, edited by Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, (New York:
Routledge, 2006), 91.
26
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entering the First World War against Germany. Buchanan attributes German grievances
and political radicalism in the 1920s and 1930s to the “Carthaginian Peace” imposed by
the Allies at Versailles.27 Here Buchanan is influenced by the fiery writings of John
Maynard Keynes, principally, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1920) and Niall
Ferguson’s “defiantly revisionist work,”28 The Pity of War: Explaining World War I
(1999). Unlike Keynes, however, Buchanan argues that “the success of Churchill’s
starvation blockade” contributed foremost to the postwar chaos that bred “a poisonous
spirit of revenge.”29 It is true that Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty initiated the
blockade at the onset of hostilities. But he did not oversee its imposition after early 1915,
occupying, instead, various other posts unrelated to economic warfare. Furthermore, as
one will see, Churchill was a proponent of lifting the post-Armistice blockade.30
Still more tenuous is Buchanan’s underlying claim that the Second World War
was an unnecessary conflict wrought by British capriciousness:
Had Britain not declared war on Germany in 1914…Germany would have
been victorious, perhaps, in months. There would have been no Lenin, no
Stalin, no Versailles, no Hitler, no Holocaust. Had Britain not given a war
guarantee to Poland in March 1939, then declared war on September 3… a
German-Polish war might never have become a six-year world war in which

27

Patrick J. Buchanan, Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War: How Britain Lost its Empire
and the West Lost the World (New York: Random House, 2008), 75, 98.
28
R. J. Q. Adams, “Review of Niall Ferguson’s The Pity of War,” American History Review 105,
no. 3 (June 2000): 881. This is certainly an apt description of The Pity of War. Each section of Ferguson’s
book is devoted to answering one of ten rhetorical questions posed in the introduction. Questions include:
“why did British leaders decide to intervene when war broke out on the Continent?,” “why did men stop
fighting [in 1918]?,” and “who won the peace?” Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I
(New York: Basic Books, 1999) xxv-xxvi.
29
Buchanan, 78.
30
Bane and Lutz, 721.
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fifty million would perish.31
Buchanan’s work is both provocative and revisionist but it remains speculative “history”
at best. One is likely to agree more with naval expert Peter Padfield’s assessment that “it
is neither possible nor useful to speculate in what different ways the century might have
unraveled had the first war not started when and how it did.”32 Churchill, Hitler, and the
Unnecessary War overstates Britain’s culpability in both conflicts and, as a consequence,
demonstrates firsthand the methodological pitfalls of interpreting history post facto.
The most recent book-length study on the blockade was undertaken by a young
American political scientist at the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia. Eric
W. Osborne’s Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany, 1914-1919 (2004) is an
economic history of the blockade with the aim to offer “a more complete view” by
demonstrating how it became “one of the greatest weapon’s in the Entente’s arsenal
against Germany….”33 He openly criticizes earlier works for their failure to consider the
blockade after America’s intervention in the war. Yet Osborne’s book devotes 152 of its
194 pages to the first two and a half years of the war. Furthermore, the last year of
combat and continuation of the blockade after 11 November 1918 are discussed in a brief
twenty-page chapter.34 Thus, far from providing a more complete view of the blockade,
Osborne’s monograph has taken a step back in terms of focus and periodization.
Methods and Themes
My research differs considerably from these earlier accounts both in terms of
methodology and scope. I argue that the naval blockade of Germany was conceived not
31

Buchanan, xvii-xviii.
Peter Padfield, The Great Naval Race: The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry, 1900-1914
(Edinburgh: Birlinn Ltd., 2005), xiii.
33
Osborne, 3-4.
34
Ibid., 173-193.
32
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as a merciless starvation or hunger blockade, but rather a time-honoured maritime
strategy intended to weaken the enemy’s military resources and assist the Allied land war
on the Continent. However, its nature and function changed over the course of the war
from an accepted naval strategy in 1914 into a weapon of starvation by 1918-1919. The
aim of this study is to illuminate how and why this military transformation occurred and,
finally, detail some of the political and moral consequences of the blockade’s protracted
imposition. In structuring this dissertation, I introduce three interrelated themes or
explanations to account for the blockade’s efficacy after 1915. Broadly, they are:
1. The Streamlining of Civil-Military Bureaucracy, 1916-1917
2. The Role of Lord Northcliffe and British Propaganda, 1917-1918
3. The Blockade as Political Leverage, 1918-1919
I have deliberately eschewed the familiar – 1914-1918 – chronological narrative, weighed
heavily in favour of the first two years of the war, for a more conceptual approach. It is
not my intention to write a “History” of the naval blockade, for that has been competently
done before with the three British official histories35 commissioned immediately
following the Armistice and, again, with Marion C. Siney’s The Allied Blockade of
Germany, 1914-1916 (1957). Nor do I want to suggest that these factors alone account
for the success of Allied economic warfare.36
Rather, this thesis endeavours to provide a more nuanced look at what allowed
35
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Britain and the Allies to cross the moral “Rubicon” and tighten trade restrictions on
Germany in 1916-1919. Initially, British statesmen viewed the blockade’s retention after
the Armistice as a necessary political expedient to ensure peace on Allied terms. But
subsequent army occupation reports of the widespread malnutrition in Germany caused
others, such as Winston Churchill, Herbert Hoover, and General Herbert Plumer, to
denounce the post-Armistice blockade as needless and reprehensible. An international
relief effort to revictual Germany exerted pressure on the Allies to lift the blockade, but
not before the peace treaty was formally signed on 12 July 1919.37
In what follows, I highlight the politics, propaganda, and morality of the
blockade’s wartime and post-Armistice imposition. Chapter 2 traces the evolution of the
blockade from its modest paper origins to an effective hunger blockade by 1916.
Particular attention is given to the 11 March 1915 Order in Council that stipulated the
immediate seizure of all goods (including foodstuffs) bound for Germany. This period in
the blockade’s existence was characterized by legal and political manoeuvring on the part
of Sir Edward Grey’s Foreign Office, which was given the vital task of creating an
international blockade apparatus. The United States, Sweden, and Norway,38 however,
were able to stymie much of the early momentum of the blockade by upholding their
neutral rights at sea and continuing to trade with Germany. Yet the chapter aims to place
this inefficacy and inter-service rivalry of the Foreign Office and Admiralty within the
context of the early war years, a period characterized by ad hoc policies and trial and
error for all belligerent powers.
Chapter 3 explains how and why the British government was able to overcome this
37

Bane and Lutz, 456.
In addition to the neutral northern European countries of Belgium, Denmark, and the
Netherlands.
38

13

international stalemate or, “transatlantic quandary” as I have termed it, to create a potent
weapon of war and bargaining chip for peace. There has been some promising
scholarship on British food exporters in the First World War,39 which suggests that many
continued to trade with their best customer – Imperial Germany – and thus pursued a
clandestine policy of trading with the enemy based on economic self-interest.
This much is axiomatic, but it is the idea articulated in John McDermott’s article
“‘A Needless Sacrifice’: British Businessmen and Business as Usual in the First World
War” (1989) that raises some significant questions for my research. He argues that
attitudes towards the blockade changed only when Britons deemed it necessary to
reconcile their isolationist and liberal capitalist views with the patriotic needs of King and
country:
Both the business community and the Liberal government were imbued
in 1914 with a strong laissez-faire tradition in a state that was dependent
upon exports to pay its way in the world… [But] under the pressure of total
war and growing hatred of Germany the government finally established a
consistent and effective blockade policy in late 1916, and the end of American
neutrality in April 1917 eliminated a major concern for British policymakers.40
Chapter 4 explores the relationship between the tightening of the blockade and the
intensification of anti-German propaganda released under Lord Northcliffe in the last
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year of the war. Northcliffe, as Lloyd George’s Director of Propaganda in Enemy
Countries, was able to reach an unprecedented audience through his ownership of such
popular and widely read newspapers as The Times and the Daily Mail.41 The Times was
particularly critical of Prime Ministers Herbert Henry Asquith’s and Lloyd George’s
governments for their failure to stop British businessmen and neutral countries from
trading with the enemy. How was this growing anti-German sentiment depicted in
British propaganda and the press? To what extent did Northcliffe’s control of print media
influence British and American support for the blockade in the latter war years and, more
significantly, convince Britons to support the denial of foodstuffs to Germany after the
Armistice? These are vital questions that have yet to be asked by historians of the Allied
naval blockade. They are, however, at the core of my discussion in Chapter 4 and will
aid to explain how wartime propaganda coloured Britain’s response to German requests
for food relief in the post-Armistice period.
The final section of the thesis will consider in chapters 5, 6, and 7 the last nine
months of the blockade’s imposition with reference to questions of morality and political
expediency. Ultimately, the British War Cabinet and Allied Supreme Economic Council
deemed that German civil unrest was a valuable tool to ensure peace.42 Chapters 5 and 6
therefore utilize the newly available records of the postwar Supreme Economic Council
and Herbert Hoover’s American Relief Administration. These archival documents offer a
closer look at the controversial Allied decision to prolong the blockade after the ceasefire
agreement of 11 November 1918. Chapter 5 focuses on the period from early November
1918 to late February 1919, paying particular attention to the Supreme Economic
41
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Council’s 31 December 1918 decision to prolong the blockade after official talk of its
relaxation occurred as late as 25 December. What political exigencies arose in this weeklong period to remove all talk of lifting the blockade? Research suggests that this
decision was not unanimously reached. In fact, Winston Churchill as Secretary of State
for War, John Maynard Keynes as a representative of the Treasury Department, and
Robert Anderson as the U.S. Board of Trade liaison were three notable diplomats in
favour of allowing foodstuffs into Germany. Were there other politicians who raised
concern? Was this purely a political consideration in order to stem the tide of
Bolshevism in Germany?43 How did morality figure in their discussion of raising the
blockade and did Lloyd George’s re-election campaign in December 1918 dictate
postwar blockade policy in any way?
Chapter 6 then details the efforts of Herbert Hoover (Allied Food Director) and
Lord Robert Cecil (Chair of the Allied Blockade Committee) to persuade the “Big Four”
Powers to raise the blockade before Germany collapsed further into political and social
dislocation. The signing of the Brussels food agreement on 14 March 1919 marks a vital
signpost in the relaxation of the blockade and will be discussed at length. Henceforth,
Germany could import up to 370,000 tons of food per month from any country.44 These
shipments, however, did not reach German ports until three months after the Brussels
accord. Ultimately, this has led one historian to note that, “German acceptance of the
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Treaty of Versailles came under the shadow of the economic blockade put in place by the
British in 1914. Its final legacy was not as a weapon of war to destroy an enemy, but one
to insure peace under Allied terms.”45
Chapter 7 explores the postwar legacy of the naval blockade in Britain and
Germany. Not since Marion Siney’s 1963 article “British Official Histories of the
Blockade” has a scholar analyzed postwar perceptions of the blockade.46 Thus, I will
seek to answer how the rampant hunger and attendant political instability in Germany
was regarded in a post-Versailles landscape. Was the blockade still seen as a legitimate
wartime strategy or a dubious weapon of starvation, as Churchill claimed? What effects
or implications did these civilian deaths have on Adolf Hitler’s decision to attack the
Soviet Union – the breadbasket of Europe – in the summer of 1941?
Finally, Chapter 8 ends this study with a summary of the dissertation and briefly
addresses Vincent’s question as to whether the blockade symbolized a lost opportunity
for lasting peace in 1919.
A Note on Archival Sources
Archival collections on the First World War are both voluminous and comprehensive in
scope. One could, for example, spend decades mastering the origins of the conflict
without addressing technological innovations, domestic politics, combat on the various
fronts, or how and why the war finally ended. Nevertheless, they would have their choice
of archives from London to Washington, Paris to Vienna, and a host of fine collections in
between. It is, therefore, the challenge of the researcher to locate archival holdings
specific to their topic yet diverse enough to offer an innovative and balanced reading of
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the war years. In the case of Britain’s “hunger blockade” of Germany, research material
is readily available in North America and the United Kingdom, but collections are
scattered geographically.
Stanford University’s Hoover Institution Archives possess vast holdings on Allied
economic warfare, British propaganda, and, of course, the papers of U.S. Food
Administer Herbert Hoover and the American Relief Administration. The Hoover
Archives are a world leader in preserving documents on the First World War and Paris
Peace Conference; well-indexed collections in French, German, and Italian, in addition to
English, make it a formidable research institution. In particular, the Herbert Hoover
Subject Collection and Edward Frederick Willis Papers offer an intimate look at the
decision-making process of the Supreme Economic Council and American Relief
Administration. Hoover was a key liaison between the two organizations in an effort to
streamline the Allies’ postwar reconstruction of Europe. They also provide a muchneeded look at the counter-intuitiveness of using food as a weapon to restore the global
balance of power.
This moral dimension of targeting civilians in war is similarly documented in the
Graham Lusk and Ralph Haswell Lutz Papers. The latter was a prominent Stanford
historian whose papers include the work of American freelance journalist Stephen Miles
Bouton (who reported on the grave food conditions in Berlin c. 1918-1919) and army
intelligence reports from the General Staff of the U.S. Third Army occupying the
Rhineland. Finally, the Mary C. Rixford Papers and British pamphlets from the Director
of Propaganda in Enemy Countries act as a valuable counterpoint to the discussion on the
morality of denying food to the Central Powers.
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Equally comprehensive is the National Archives, formally the Public Records
Office, in Kew, Richmond outside of London, England. The Foreign, War, and Cabinet
Office as well as the Board of Trade, Customs, and Treasury Department papers are held
here. These once confidential records provide a government consensus on the blockade
throughout the war and post-Armistice period. Indeed, one can reconstruct a
department’s opinion of the blockade based on official cables, letters, and heated roundtable discussions concerning its political and military value. Particularly useful were the
Foreign and Cabinet Office documents (FO 6684, 88867 and CAB 23/14, respectively)
that dealt with the political reasons for the continuance of the blockade after 11
November 1918.
In contrast, the Papers of Rear Admiral Dudley De Chair and Private Papers of
H. A. Gwynne at the Imperial War Museum in London provide an earlier assessment of
the blockade c. 1915-1916. Admiral De Chair was the commander of Tenth Cruiser
Squadron – the group in charge of the day-to-day patrolling of the Atlantic and North
Sea. Yet his account is laden with minute details (i.e. the exact shipping tonnage of
Swedish iron ore in May 1915) and, consequently, adds little to the historian’s knowledge
of the complex machinery associated with Allied economic warfare. More useful is
Gwynne’s correspondence with the Minister of the Blockade Lord Robert Cecil. As the
editor of the ultra-Tory mouthpiece The Morning Post, Gwynne’s political connections
were exhaustive. Similar to Northcliffe, Gwynne envisioned himself as a de facto adviser
to prominent cabinet members. His political aspirations are thinly veiled in his letters to
Cecil. But it was his “constructive” criticism of the government’s blockade policy – he
thought it too lax and wrote as much in The Post – that finally caused the Minister of the
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Blockade to rebuke him. Cecil, nevertheless, begrudgingly heeded the press baron’s
advice and carried out a series of reforms in the Foreign Office and the Blockade
Ministry that mirrored Gwynne’s suggestions for a tighter blockade. Ultimately, these
letters highlight the inextricable link between civil and military bureaucracy in the
development of British blockade policy after mid-1916.
Lastly, the collection of blockade related material at the Liddell Hart Centre for
Military Archives at King’s College, University of London, nicely augments the
discussion of morality versus political expediency in war. Sir William Beveridge’s tract
The Blockade and the Civilian Population was written during the lead-up to the Second
World War and published as an Oxford pamphlet in December 1939. In it, he advocates
that Britain employ a naval blockade of Nazi Germany, as it was “one of the strongest
weapons in the British armoury” against Germany in the First World War. Furthermore,
Beveridge addresses the supposed “immorality” of targeting Germans on the home front
by asserting, “that the hardships of the German civilian population in 1914-1918 were the
result, less of the British blockade directly, than of general exhaustion brought on by all
the operations of war, of mismanagement, and of placing military demands before
civilian needs.”47
This is a recurring statement made by several interwar British policymakers.
They tout the blockade’s efficacy in bringing the war to a close, but are reluctant to attach
any wider significance to the complete breakdown of German civilian morale in 1918 or
the issue of deliberate starvation after the Armistice. Instead, Beveridge focuses solely
on the inept food provisioning by the German War Food Office. It is a convenient straw
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man, but the myriad reports of the British and U.S. armies and the American Relief
Administration at the Hoover Institution Archives tell a far different and grimmer story.
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CHAPTER 2
A TRANSATLANTIC QUANDARY: BRITISH IMPLEMENTATION
AND INTERNATIONAL STALEMATE, 1914-1916
The Hunger Blockade Contextualized
When the Dutch navy of Philip William, the Prince of Orange, blockaded Flanders on 27
July 1584 he declared what naval historians and legal scholars have termed the “first
formal naval blockade” in history.48 Numerous coastal cities and ports were subject to
naval sieges throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages, but these earlier attempts were a
means by which land forces would generally invade and occupy a given territory. The
Dutch blockade of Flanders differed markedly because an amphibious invasion was never
the goal. Rather, it was the young Protestant prince’s intention to challenge Catholic
Spain’s control of the Flemish coast and the newly united Seventeen Provinces or
Netherlands. Habsburg trade routes were eventually severed in the southern provinces
(specifically, modern-day Belgium, Luxembourg, and parts of France), causing Spanish
troops to be ill fed and provisioned throughout most of the mid-to-late 1580s. This
episode was part of a wider Dutch and, indeed, Protestant revolt against Habsburg
domination in Europe that culminated in the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) and the
Dutch Golden Age (1580-1670).49
Britain, France, and the Netherlands imposed naval blockades over the next
century and a half with often little regard for the rights of neutral countries or rival
belligerent powers. Admittedly, international law regarding the rules of war at sea was in
48
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its infancy. Yet this did not stop neutrals such as Denmark, Russia, and Sweden from
protesting the “fictitious blockades” erected by the world’s three most powerful navies.
In 1780, for instance, Russia’s Catherine the Great denounced the irksome practice of
“paper blockades,” whereby a naval power like Britain would search and seize a neutral
merchant vessel regardless of the ship’s cargo and without having formally declared war
on a particular country. Catherine claimed that the English Channel and North Sea were
international waters and, therefore, could not be arbitrarily blockaded by one power over
another.50
This tension between the Great Powers made plain the need to establish certain
criteria as to what rendered a naval blockade legal and binding. Here, the Tsarina posited
that in order to be legal a blockade must be “effective” (i.e. imposed with sufficient
military force rather than a mere paper declaration).51 This caveat forced navies to
reconsider the use of a blockade for strictly diplomatic ends. It by no means eradicated
the use of paper blockades, nor did it completely mitigate the grievances of smaller
neutral countries. However, it was an acknowledgement that neutral rights must be
considered in concert with the rights of more powerful belligerent nations. By the midnineteenth century, in fact, Britain routinely championed the cause of freedom of the
seas. Two developments made this stunning reversal possible; a realignment of British
foreign policy followed by an economic consideration that had far-reaching domestic and
global implications.52
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Britain’s foreign policy stance changed from a nation frequently at war (e.g. with
Holland in the late seventeenth century and France and America in the eighteenth and
early nineteenth century) to a more detached arbiter content to preserve the balance of
power in Europe following Napoleon’s defeat in 1815.53 Historians and contemporaries
alike referred to this shift as a period of “splendid isolation” for Great Britain.
Isolationism afforded British statesmen the opportunity to worry less about Continental
entanglements and focus, instead, on domestic concerns and the maintenance of a vast
overseas empire. As George Goschen, the First Lord of the Admiralty, proudly remarked
to a Conservative gathering in February 1896: “Our isolation is not an isolation of
weakness, or of contempt for ourselves; it is deliberately chosen, the freedom to act as we
choose in any circumstance that may arise.”54 The problem with this policy, however,
was that it could not be maintained long term. There were occasions where intervention
was necessary to uphold the existing geopolitical order, but as in the case of the Crimean
(1854-1856) and First World Wars, protracted involvement on the continent irrevocably
altered the alliance system of the Great Powers.
The second development that caused Britain to support freedom of the seas was
equally pragmatic. Access to world markets benefitted the interests of British financiers,
industrialists, and businessmen who traded freely around the globe until the outbreak of
the First World War. Whether it was stocks and bonds being traded in the City of
London or cheaper livestock imported from New Zealand and Argentina, free trade and
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naval supremacy were the twin pillars of nineteenth century Pax Britannica.55 These
factors help to explain Britain’s willingness to sign an international treaty respecting
maritime rights in the wake of the Crimean War in April 1856. This Declaration of Paris
marked a watershed in the development of maritime law, establishing five principles that
must be met for a blockade to be deemed lawful; (1) proper establishment, (2) adequate
notice, (3) effective enforcement, (4) impartial application, and (5) respect for neutral
rights.56
Proper establishment meant that a naval blockade applied only to countries
officially at war with one another. The blockading power then had to issue a formal
declaration to the various countries under blockade, as well as notify any neutral states
known to trade with either belligerent. A general time frame also had to be devised and
communicated to neutrals and the enemy, informing them which ports were blockaded
and for approximately how long.57 Thirdly, effective enforcement sought to end once
and for all the customary practice of paper blockades. To be legally effective was to say
that a blockade “must be maintained by force sufficient really to prevent access to the
enemy coastline… and must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts.”58 The principle of
impartiality was a bitter pill for the Admiralty to swallow given their tendency to let
through merchant vessels favourable to the commercial interests of Britain. Finally,
respect for neutral rights became the most contentious issue of blockade law,
55
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underscoring much of the acrimony between Britain, France and neutrals such as the
United States, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway throughout 1914-1916.
It is the aim of this chapter to detail the strategy behind Britain’s naval blockade
of the Central Powers and examine its use during the first two years of the war. It seeks
to answer why it initially proved so difficult for the Allies to impose an effective
blockade against Germany. Was it a lack of commitment on the Admiralty’s part? How
did the Foreign Office quash allegations of the blockade’s illegality and disregard for the
rights of neutrals? How, for instance, did they reconcile the fact that Britain entered the
war to defend the neutrality of Belgium yet violated daily the concept of freedom of the
seas? To answer these questions it is first necessary to explore the key socio-political and
economic trends influencing military and naval policy in prewar Britain.
Imperialism and Anxiety in Edwardian Britain
In 1904 there was nothing inevitable about a war between Great Britain and Imperial
Germany. The decade to come was punctuated by periods of instability in Morocco
(1905-1906 and 1911) and the Balkans (1912-1913), to be sure. Yet these ethnic and
territorial conflicts were not in themselves a precursor for war, let alone a world war in
which 35 million soldiers and civilians were either killed or wounded.59 It is, therefore,
worth considering the opening sentence in Paul Kennedy’s The Rise of the Anglo-German
Antagonism (1980), which reads: “Why was it that the British and German peoples, who
had never fought each other and whose traditions of political co-operation were
reinforced by dynastic, cultural, religious, and economic ties, drifted steadily apart in the
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late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries?”60 It is Kennedy’s contention that
historians must consider in tandem the economic and ideological constraints (i.e. the
vagaries of the “Official” Minds in London and Berlin) that informed much of the foreign
policy decision-making of late Victorian/Edwardian Britain and Wilhelmine Germany.
He maintains that the surest cause of the rivalry was the decline in Britain’s world power,
precisely at a time when Germany sought to challenge the staid nineteenth century
balance of power via naval construction and the outbreak of war in 1914.61
That Britain was in a position of imperial decline is hardly in doubt. By the early
1890s the empire was dependent on imports for its very economic survival.62 In fact,
trade between Great Britain, continental Europe, North America, and Asia astonishingly
doubled over a twenty-year period from 1870 to 1890.63 This was a level of
unprecedented economic growth and yet it deeply concerned many conservatives who
warned against British dependence on world markets. The journalist and war
correspondent L. S. Amery was one of those men. In 1905, he acknowledged the
sobering fact that “every year the competition for power among the great world states is
getting keener,” while arguing that “unless we continue to hold our own, unless we can
keep our invincible Navy… our Empire and our trade will be taken away from us by
others and we will be starved out, invaded, trampled under foot and utterly ruined.”
Simply put, the policy of isolationism no longer seemed quite as “splendid” as it had
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several decades before.64
This fin-de-siècle anxiety over British decline gave rise to the Tory movement of
tariff reform in the first decade of the twentieth century. Its leader was the charismatic
politician Joseph Chamberlain, a Birmingham manufacturer who entered politics late in
middle age.65 He served first in Liberal cabinets before joining Lord Robert Salisbury’s
Conservative-Unionist government as Colonial Secretary in 1895. Although prone to
ardent speeches denouncing the corruptible and plutocratic nature of Whitehall, he also
won many supporters for his pragmatic views on empire. Chamberlain preached the
necessity of imperial unity at a time when the United States and Germany were
narrowing the gap and, in some cases, almost outproducing Britain in terms of
industrialization and trade with new overseas markets.
Far from being a Germanophobe, Chamberlain admired the sheer scope and
practicality of the German customs union or Zollverein reconstituted by Otto von
Bismarck in 1866-1867.66 Bismarck was then Minister President of Prussia and
Chancellor of twenty-two loosely united provinces known as the North German
Confederation. Prussia was the predominant member of the Confederation and possessed
the last word on economic matters as they affected the entire customs union.67 In
Germany’s Zollverein Chamberlain saw the underpinnings of a viable economic model of
64
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neo-mercantilism, one that Britain ought to emulate with her colonies in order to
safeguard home markets and solidify trade within the empire. Consequently,
Chamberlain formed the Tariff Reform League (TRL) with several leading politicians in
July 1903. The League’s mandate was to promote imperial unity and address directly
what they believed to be the most pressing issue of contemporary geopolitics – staving
off British decline.68 The movement called for the melding of free trade with
protectionist tariffs on essential goods like wheat, sugar, meat, and wool, with Britain
functioning in the role of customs administrator as in Bismarckian Prussia.
Imperial preference lay at the heart of the Chamberlainites’ conviction that
tangible economic solutions could reverse British imperial decline, and, at the same time,
forge closer bonds between colony and metropole. This proposed system of preferential
tariffs was a polarizing topic. Canadian Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier, for example, was
very much in favour of an economic alliance with Britain.69 Yet others closer to home
felt that tariff reform was too cumbersome and intricate to sell to an increasingly working
class electorate more concerned with their immediate standards of living than future gross
domestic product. The tariff movement failed, in part, to translate staunch initial support
for the cause into long-term policy gains. Or, as one historian more candidly put it, “by
the beginning of 1913, the Unionist leadership had given the Tariff Reform League ten
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years of political rope with which to hang itself.”70
The often-overlooked issue of tariff reform clearly illustrates the growing concern
among conservatives that the empire was in jeopardy. Furthermore, it parallels the
unique challenges wartime Britain faced in trying to convince the international
community it was preferable to trade with Anglo-French businesses to the exclusion of
Germany. This remained a perennial topic of contention among Liberals and
Conservatives, free traders and trade protectionists, not least with patriotic politicians and
businessmen from neutral countries. It is in this light that Edwardian Britain’s
preoccupation with imperial defence must be viewed in the lead-up to economic warfare
with the Central Powers.
Strategy and Finance: The Fisher Revolution in Naval Warfare?
Doing more with less. That is exactly what “Jacky” Fisher promised the Admiralty he
would accomplish in the position of First Sea Lord. The Royal Navy faced a lean period
in 1903-1904 stemming from massive spending cuts laid out in the annual budget
expenditure of the Chancellor of the Exchequer two years prior.71 A systematic
redistribution of government funds was called for in the wake of the Second Boer War
(1899-1902). The South African conflict drained both significant financial and material
resources from an over-extended treasury. The cost of the war, for instance, increased
the national debt by more than 25 percent and, when the repayment plan on the war loan
was taken into account, the national debt actually rose 50 percent over three years (c.
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1900-1903).72
One must be mindful not to over-dramatize the decline of the British Empire or
see in these financial constraints a parallel to the austerity measures undertaken by
Western governments in our own time. The last gasp of empire came not in 1914 but in
the late 1940s and 1950s with the violent struggle for Indian independence and rapid
decolonization in Africa, Asia, and the West Indies. The empire was highly profitable at
the turn of the twentieth century and still relatively inexpensive to govern. Britain’s
status as a Great Power in 1914, in fact, cost less to maintain per annum than any rival
nation.73 This is a striking detail that must not be overlooked in the haste to depict
militarism as the inexorable cause of the First World War and handmaiden of Britain’s
imperial decline.74
But it is true that nations do not just “slither into war.” Policy is developed at the
top echelons of government and these decisions are arrived at, in part, because they seek
to ameliorate a specific issue or concern.75 In October 1904, Admiral Fisher was
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appointed first sea lord following the retirement of Admiral Walter Kerr. He was
charged with the task of reducing naval expenditures while simultaneously preparing the
navy for war in the twentieth century. There has been a great deal written on Fisher’s
promotion of small, fast, torpedo armed crafts, including submarines for the economical
“flotilla defence” of British home waters; his preference for fast, lightly armoured battle
cruisers over the slower, heavily armoured “Dreadnought” battleship for high seas
operations; and the conversion of the navy’s modern fuel supply from coal to oil.76 In his
1995 article “British Naval Policy, 1913-1914,” and the books Sir John Fisher’s Naval
Revolution (1999) and Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First
World War (2012), naval scholar Nicholas A. Lambert argues that Britain’s Royal Navy
was in a state of strategic flux on the eve of the First World War. These works challenge
the perception among historians that the Admiralty entered the war “with an outdated
strategic thinking better suited to a navy from the age of sail than the age of steam.”77
This dissertation accepts as axiomatic many of Lambert’s claims regarding
Fisher’s plan to re-conceptualize the cash-strapped navy and the resistance he
encountered from senior naval staff and government officials in trying to do so. This
chapter diverges, however, from Lambert’s thesis in two important ways. Whereas he
treats Fisher as an underappreciated visionary who could have created a stronger fleet if
given the chance, I am fundamentally more concerned with what did happen and how it
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shaped the inefficacy of the Allies’ blockade campaign during the first two years of the
war. Many of Fisher’s reforms were reversed by his traditionalist successor Admiral
Arthur Wilson early in 1910, whose priority was the strengthening of the main battle
fleet. Although in October 1911 the dynamic thirty-six-year-old Winston Churchill
became first lord of the Admiralty, and was sympathetic to Fisher’s balanced fleet theory
(strong torpedo craft and fast battle cruiser forces), prevailing strategic opinion lobbied
for two things: heavily armoured battleships to rival German naval construction and plans
for a comprehensive blockade of Germany.78
It is important to remember also that First Sea Lords did not determine national
policy;79 they were ultimately forced to work within the bounds of a given cabinet’s
purview. By 1907-1908, naval budgets under Liberal Prime Ministers Sir Henry
Campbell-Bannerman and H. H. Asquith, who succeeded Campbell-Bannerman after the
latter’s death in April 1908, were trimmed even more than in the post-Boer War era. In
December 1908 Asquith’s cabinet insisted the Admiralty draft a war plan elucidating the
pros and the cons of waging economic warfare against Germany. This document, entitled
“The Economic Effect of War on German Trade,” argued that Germany’s economy
would be crippled by a stoppage of imports via the North Sea and determined that even a
slight rise in the price of raw materials and foodstuffs would significantly compromise
the German war effort.80 It is therefore counter-intuitive to claim that the Royal Navy
underwent a complete revolution in strategic direction and policy under John Fisher.
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Fisher’s balanced fleet theory was no less visionary, but it took the stalemate of the First
World War at sea, as it did on land, to fully demonstrate the need for better coordination
of the fleet and armed services, as a whole.81
Lambert concludes his new research on economic warfare by asserting that “the
failure to make the blockade effective was not a function of the Royal Navy’s inability to
carry it out, or the consequence of the continued neutral resistance (which admittedly
remained considerable); rather, it was largely a result of the incapacity of the British
system of government to coordinate and integrate departmental action.”82 He is correct to
point out the incapacity of the state to properly manage the blockade, particularly during
the first eighteen months of the war. Regrettably, though, his analysis ends in February
1916 with the appointment of Robert Cecil as Minister of the Blockade. This is precisely
when the British state began to comprehend the international scope and vast
administration required to enforce these strict economic measures. Consequently, this
chapter ends in early 1916, while subsequent chapters (Chapters 3 and 4) explain this
fundamental shift in policy with the growth of an efficient civil-military bureaucracy
under David Lloyd George. In effect, Lambert’s work ends where this present analysis
begins.
Prewar Planning and International Law
Anglo-German tensions reached their apogee in the July Crisis (28 June - 31 July) that
led to the outbreak of war on 4 August 1914. The Royal Navy at once implemented a
blockade of Germany in accordance with a 1909 recommendation from the Committee of
Imperial Defence, which stated: “We are of the opinion that a serious situation would be
Geoffrey Till, “Review of Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution,” Journal of Military History 64,
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created in Germany owing to the blockade of her ports, and that the longer the duration
of the war, the more serious the situation would become.”83 One must remember that
naval blockades were prohibited unless they could be deemed legally “effective” (i.e.
maintained with enough military force – as opposed to a paper declaration – while not
blocking neutral vessels from entering or exiting their ports). This principle was
established with the 1856 Declaration of Paris and reaffirmed in the London Declaration
Concerning the Laws of Naval War in 1909. 84
In late 1908, British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey invited senior diplomats
from France, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Japan,
and the United States to discuss, among other topics, what constituted contraband in
times of war. Sixty-four articles on international maritime law were drawn up in the
British capital on 26 February 1909.85 Ultimately, the London Declaration decided which
goods could be withheld from a belligerent nation on an “absolute” or “conditional”
basis, and those that would have to remain on a “free” list of non-contraband items.
Absolute items were non-negotiable goods that were considered essential to war
production and, therefore, must be denied to the enemy. These included explosives,
guns, warships, armour, and military vehicles. Conditional items, however, could serve
both a military and civilian function – foodstuffs, clothing and fabrics, gold and silver,

‘Report of the [C.I.D.] Sub-committee to consider the Military Needs of the Empire,’ 24 July
1909, quoted in Avner Offer, “Morality and Admiralty: ‘Jacky’ Fisher, Economic Warfare, and the Laws of
War,” Journal of Contemporary History 23, no. 1 (January 1988): 100. For an intimate look at the prewar
blockade policy of the British Admiralty see, Christopher Martin, “The 1907 Naval War Plans and the
Second Hague Peace: A Case of Propaganda,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 5 (October 2005): esp.
843-851.
84
Denys P. Myers, “The Legal Basis of the Rules of Blockade in the Declaration of London,”
American Journal of International Law 4, no. 3 (July 1910): 571.
85
History of the Naval Operations, 1926, Vol. IV, Chapter VII: Blockade of Germany, 165-166,
TNA, ADM 116/3423.
83

35

paper money, and oil.86 Additionally, any of these essential items could move from the
conditional to absolute contraband list if the blockading power felt it necessary when
prosecuting the war effort.
Each nation at the conference wanted specific concessions to protect its food
supply and maintain a basic standard of living if a global conflict were to arise. Germany
came to the table wanting to safeguard its ability to trade with northern neighbours such
as Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands. For centuries Holland functioned as
a natural entrepôt for goods entering and exiting Germany; Swedish iron ore, Norwegian
copper, and American grain and cotton were all shipped to the Reich via the bustling port
of Rotterdam.87 This helps to explain the German General Staff’s decision not to violate
Dutch neutrality during the invasion of Belgium and France in the opening days of the
war. Indeed, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger noted that trade with the Netherlands was
absolutely vital to Germany’s survival in a pan-European war: “For us, it will be of the
utmost importance to have in Holland a country whose neutrality will assure imports and
exports. It will have to be our windpipe that enables us to breathe.”88
British strategic planners also recognized the importance of neutral countries, but
many were unsure how to seize contraband without violating their rights and the principle
of freedom of the seas. For John Fisher, however, the decision was quite simple. In
private correspondence with fellow diplomat Ernest Satow, senior conference delegate
Sir Eyre Crowe recounted a frank conversation with the admiral:
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Sir J. Fisher told me personally three days ago that in the next big war, our
commanders would sink every ship they came across, hostile or neutral, if it
happened to suit them. He added, with characteristic vehemence, that we
should most certainly violate the Declaration of Paris and every other treaty that
might prove inconvenient.89
The Foreign Office was aware of the Admiralty’s determination not to squander the
economic and military advantages of a blockade of Germany. Yet Grey could not
disregard international law so easily. He pressed for the participating nations to ratify the
London Declaration, thereby binding the leading maritime powers, including Britain, to a
strict code of what could and could not be seized in war. The treaty passed through the
British House of Commons with little controversy. It required, however, the approval of
the House of Lords, who collectively refused to ratify a document that clearly
subordinated the Royal Navy’s command of the sea to the rights of neutral countries.
Without the support of these powerful lords in the upper chamber of Parliament, Britain
was forced to leave the naval treaty unsigned, as did the other nine countries invited to
the conference proceedings.90
When war broke out on 4 August 1914 the Asquith government adopted neither
Fisher’s proposal to sink all ships, nor Grey’s insistence on adhering to the conventions
set forth in the London and Paris Declarations. Instead, the Liberal cabinet passed
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several Orders in Council (most notably two on 21 September and 29 October 1914),
which stated that goods initially safeguarded under the Declaration’s non-contraband free
list could be arbitrarily seized. Moreover, neutral countries previously not subject to
search and seizure on the high seas had to prove that their cargo was not bound for the
Central Powers. Finally, in retaliation for Germany’s decision to declare a war zone
around the British Isles, Britain extended the blockade on 11 March 1915 to cover all
items passing through the Atlantic, North, and Mediterranean Seas.91
The Short War Illusion and Business as Usual
Prewar expectations of a short war undeniably conditioned the Foreign Office and Board
of Trade’s attitude to economic warfare. Despite recent protracted conflicts such as the
American Civil War (1861-1865), the “short war illusion” prevented politicians and
military leaders from conceiving war plans beyond the first five months of combat.92 It is
not surprising then that brokers in the City of London and businessmen throughout the
country were given so little direction on economic policy if the war was to be over by
Christmas.93
The government encouraged companies to adopt a policy of “business as usual,”
which entailed maintaining trade relations with countries that were not members of the
Central Powers and establishing even friendlier relations with countries known to trade
with Germany. “This war will have a most excellent effect,” proclaimed Liberal M.P. and
economist Leo Chiozza Money, “upon [the] British economy and British enterprise. The
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British trader, therefore… may confidently count upon several years [of] freedom from
German competition.” The war, in short, provided a rare opportunity to supplant with
British goods some of Imperial Germany’s and Austria-Hungary’s estimated £400
million in annual trade. 94 Yet many companies grew ambivalent about cutting off
supplies to Germany – Britain’s largest trading partner – once the expectations of a short
war proved illusory.
Morality did not figure in most businessmen’s discussion of Germany in the early
war years nor was it a lack of patriotism that caused British businesses to continue
trading with the enemy. Pragmatism, rather, informed their day-to-day mindset.95 Trade
between the Allies and Central Powers was also made easier by the accepted laissez-faire
attitude of the Board of Trade. The Board’s president Walter Runciman openly
supported free trade, while the War Trade Department, whose task it was to issue trade
licenses to export aboard, was woefully understaffed and often hurried the investigation
process to facilitate greater trade.96 Justices of the Peace had to notarize these licenses
and ensure that the applicant sufficiently detailed a cargo manifest and specified a final
destination for the goods. It was not uncommon, however, for magistrates to preauthorize trade licenses or even permit an applicant to write in pencil, thereby allowing
companies to submit doctored papers whose contents and destination were never
officially verified.
These trade violations were innocuous at first, beginning with the magistrates’
expeditious licensing of British goods, but they were nonetheless indicative of a laxness
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in the blockade administration. The Home Office, who oversaw the war effort on the
home front, ultimately came to a similar conclusion in a report to the C.I.D. in early
1915: “… these instances seem to throw considerable doubt upon the efficiency of such
declaration as a safeguard against enemy trading.”97 Recent research suggests though
that the Home Secretary Reginald McKenna would have resigned had the practice of
business as usual fallen by the wayside in August 1914. Like Runciman at the Board of
Trade, McKenna was a devout free-trader who believed that stopping all trade to
Germany would do more harm than good to the British economy.98
Indirect Trade and the Northern Neutrals
As a result of this haphazard administration and the liberal capitalist tendencies of
Asquith’s cabinet, raw materials and foodstuffs still reached German ports in 1914-1915
and continued unimpeded until mid-1916. In fact, large quantities of Dutch meat,
potatoes, butter, and eggs were imported to Germany throughout 1915 at five times the
prewar rate. The Dutch were without question the “windpipe” that enabled Imperial
Germany to breath, especially after the 11 March 1915 British Order in Council
stipulated that food was now contraband.99
Why did neutral countries continually break the Allied blockade and risk
unnecessary involvement in the First World War? This question is not only vital to
understanding the varying motives of neutral powers, but also sheds light on the early
inefficacy of the blockade machinery. Perhaps Grey articulated this transatlantic
quandary best when he addressed the House of Commons on 26 January 1916: “You
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have no right to deprive neutrals of goods which are genuinely intended for their own
use… You cannot take over the administration of neutral countries… It is not in our
power to do that under whatever system you have, whether you call it blockade, or
whatever name you give to it.”100 There were several objections to Grey’s viewpoint, but
he persisted in arguing that Germany was bound to receive supplies via the neutrals and it
would be far more advantageous to offer them trade incentives than a public rebuff or,
worse yet, a heavy-handed threat.101 This was a common assumption in Asquith’s
government; the United States notwithstanding, neutral countries were geographically
situated between hegemonic land and sea powers. Britain and Germany demanded
respect and economic cooperation in their quest for victory. Germany, however, was
more willing to resort to coercion.
The sinking of the RMS Lusitania off the Irish coast on 7 May 1915 stands as one
of the defining moments of the war. The ocean liner was bound for New York when a
German submarine (Unterseeboot or U-boat) torpedoed and sank the ship, killing nearly
1,200 people onboard, including 80 children and 128 Americans.102 The Imperial
German Navy (Kaiserliche Marine) reasoned that the British passenger liner was
carrying war matérial to the Entente powers and was thus fair game. This act marked the
midway point of Germany’s initial use of unrestricted submarine warfare to offset its
commercial shipping losses inflicted by the Allied blockade at the start of the war. Yet
the main difference between the two modes of blockade – the Allied surface blockade
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versus the German U-boat – was that the Royal Navy did not sink enemy or neutral
vessels without warning and citizens of neutral countries were not deliberately killed to
demonstrate one’s naval superiority.103
The long-term ramifications of U-boat warfare will be discussed in greater detail
in the next chapter. In the short term, however, these reprisals had the effect of scaring
neutral countries into compliance with German trade demands. Consequently, most
neutrals felt “bound to give Germany the largest quantity of foodstuffs they could, as
otherwise the Germans would… torpedo their vessels without mercy.”104 The sinking of
the Lusitania did not immediately compel the United States to enter the war. It did,
however, temporarily undercut Allied trade with ambivalent neutrals and reinforce the
fact that this was a total war where morality could be subordinated for the “good” of the
war effort.105 This was both a costly and dangerous precedent to set.
French Economic Tactics: Too Little, Too Late?
From August 1914 to April 1917 the naval blockade of the Central Powers was ostensibly
a British affair. But this should not diminish the supporting role of the French. The
Third Republic was stretched both financially and militarily by the German invasion and
subsequent race to the sea that bogged down the Deutsches Heer and solidified the 724
km stretch of Franco-Belgian territory known as the Western Front. Unlike Asquith’s
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Britain, the centrist government of President Raymond Poincaré could not devote
considerable time or resources to a program of economic warfare when the need was
much greater at the front. From the outset of the war the blockade tactics of the French
were clearly meant to support British policy rather than being developed in tandem with
it.106
Very little has been written about France’s role in the Allied blockade, but the
work that does exist – both in French and English – is certainly worth considering. The
closest one gets to an official history is Louis Guichard’s The Naval Blockade, 19141918. Published in 1930 with the aid of documents from the historical section of the
French Navy, the monograph is sympathetic to the predicament of French policymakers,
who were consistently thwarted by the British policy of business as usual.107 Where the
French wanted to isolate Germany economically, the British second-guessed this strategy
for the sake of diplomatic appearances. Where the British were lenient with companies
caught trading with the enemy, the French advocated decisive policies to eradicate trade
leakages. This is the tone of Guichard’s narrative for the early war years. The author
was a lieutenant in the French Navy during the Great War, which partly explains his
frustrations with inter-Allied diplomacy and the blockade machinery as a whole.
Guichard is not wrong to suggest that the blockade was “marked by two years of
infirmity of purpose born of fear of offending the neutrals.”108 Yet he is incorrect to
assume that the machinery’s flaws and inefficacy were entirely British in design. In fact,
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France’s difficulty in mounting an effective program of economic warfare had little to do
with the size of the French Navy or their headstrong ally across the Channel. From the
war’s outset the government discussed what economic options were available to it. In
November 1914, Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé proposed that an inter-ministerial
committee be established to handle all matters pertaining to the blockade. He used as an
example the British model of the Restriction of Enemy Supply Committee to gain
Parliament’s assent.109 Moreover, he discussed the committee in detail with
representatives from the Ministries of War, Finance, Justice, Commerce, Agriculture, and
Foreign Affairs, who all agreed to share departmental resources with the creation of the
Comité de Restriction des Approvisionnements et du Commerce de l’Ennemi (more
commonly known as Comité R.).
Delcassé’s plan, while not wholly original, was a practical option that could have
centralized the French blockade effort. The committee initially investigated the reexportation of goods from neutral Switzerland to Germany, while Britain concentrated
their efforts on the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. In early 1915, the
French determined that Italy, a country rich with olive trees, was suddenly importing a
vast amount of olive oil from Spain. When cross-referenced with their prewar imports,
the Comité could see that Italy did not typically purchase olive oil from Spain or any
other country for that matter. Further investigation revealed that the Italians were
importing the oil only to re-export it to Germany via Switzerland. The cooking oil was
then used by the German army as a substitute for gasoline, which was considered
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“conditional” contraband under both the Declaration of London and more extensive 11
March Order in Council.110 This is merely one example of the kind of work undertaken
by the French Foreign Ministry to eradicate trading with the enemy. The Italian case was
partially rectified with its declaration of war against the Central Powers in May 1915.
Indeed, with Italy joining the war on the Entente side, exports to Switzerland dried up,
leaving the Reich to fend for itself in both the production and distribution of oil.111
Despite the Comité proving to be an efficient and reliable means of curtailing
trade with the enemy, Parliament and the War Ministry vehemently resisted any attempt
to expand its discretionary powers. For instance, Delcassé appropriately advocated
preclusive purchasing of neutral goods bound for the Central Powers. This policy
entailed monitoring closely what items Germany regularly purchased from neutral
countries – be it cattle from Switzerland or sulfuric acid from Norway – and stockpiling
them to deprive the enemy of essential goods. Admittedly, it would have required a
substantial commitment from the government to finance such a project. The War
Ministry cried foul, claiming that francs should not be needlessly diverted from the front
to sponsor preclusive purchasing of “random” goods. Parliament, meanwhile, baulked at
the thought of its prerogative powers being usurped by an inter-ministerial body, even
though the Comité possessed no decision-making rights.112 One can see that France’s
greatest problem with the blockade in 1914-1915 was financial in nature, made worse by
inter-service rivalry that hampered a viable policy of economic warfare.
It is telling that interest in preclusive purchasing was revived in February-March
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1916 at the behest of French Premier Aristide Briand and General Joseph Joffre.113
Joffre, as Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, experienced devastating losses at the
Battle of Verdun (roughly 140,000 deaths over a two month period), as the Fifth German
Army attempted to “bleed the French white” and knock them out of the war altogether.
The brutal fighting continued for an additional eight months with total death figures
exceeding 300,000 men on each side.114 Briand looked to the Comité to facilitate a trade
deal with the Netherlands, whereby France would purchase meat from the Dutch above
market value to deprive Germany of a vital source of protein. By 1916, the war of
attrition as experienced daily at Verdun and the Somme was now waged over the
distribution of food on the home front.115
American Neutrality and the Moral Predicament
The United States was the most powerful country to proclaim its neutrality at the start of
the First World War, much to the consternation of the Allies who struggled to persuade
the Americans as to the “righteousness” of their respective blockades. U.S. neutrality
was a hard fought principle dating from George Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality
in April 1793, which gave Congress the right to decide when to go to war.116 The
Proclamation and more extensive Act of Neutrality (1794) made plain that the United
States’ neutrality was non-negotiable and their loyalty not for sale in the ongoing AngloFrench wars of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century.
Farrar, “Preclusive Purchases,” 120.
Keegan, 179. These figures represent the number of French and German deaths at the Battle of
Verdun, not the number of casualties. It is worth noting that the Allies broadly used the term “casualties”
to denote both those ‘killed’ or ‘wounded’ in action. The Germans, however, reserved the term only for
those killed in action. Therefore, the casualty figures for the French at Verdun would far exceed 300,000.
See, James McRandle and James Quirk, “The Blood Test Revisited: A New Look at German Casualty
Counts in World War I,” Journal of Military History 70, no. 3 (July 2006): 667-701.
115
Farrar, “Preclusive Purchases,” 121.
116
Nils Ørvik, The Decline of Neutrality, 1914-1941, with special reference to the United States
and the Northern Neutrals (London: Frank Cass, 1971), 18.
113
114

46

Woodrow Wilson echoed Washington’s sentiments upon Germany’s violation of
Belgian neutrality and the Entente’s declaration of war against the Central Powers. The
Democratic President publicly stated that although “the United States is on terms of
friendship and amity with the contending Powers,” the government would not tolerate
acts of war on American territory or in their jurisdiction and, equally, forbade U.S.
citizens and companies from participating in the European war.117 Wilson’s speech
outlined the nature of American neutrality by identifying specific acts that were
considered tantamount to violating U.S. sovereignty. Broadly, they were:
(1) Accepting a commission or post in a belligerent’s land or sea force.
(2) Enlisting to serve in a belligerent’s land or sea force.
(3) Hiring or retaining a person to enlist in said belligerent’s military.
(4) Procuring arms for a belligerent.
(5) Aiding in any way a vessel known to be a ship of war.
(6) Engaging in privateering.
The President concluded by noting that America would not permit belligerent vessels to
frequent its waters for the purposes of engaging in hostile activity. He referenced the
likelihood of a naval blockade in the Atlantic and cautioned Americans to avoid, at all
costs, transporting soldiers or contraband of war.118
Wilson’s Proclamation of Neutrality did not distinguish between a legal versus
paper blockade, but critics of the Allied blockade policy certainly did. The State
Department told the U.S. ambassador in London on 26 September 1914 to remind Grey
that the Declaration of London was not a document of convenience. Its principles ought
to be adhered to rather than enforcing certain ones acceptable only to the British
Admiralty. The Americans believed Britain was flagrantly violating articles in the
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declaration that ran counter to their long-distance blockade of Germany. In particular,
the State Department objected to Britain’s liberal application of the doctrine of
“continuous voyage,” which permitted the Royal Navy to seize a neutral ship’s cargo on
the presumption that it was destined for the Central Powers. Here, the British did not
have to prove that the ship’s captain had foreknowledge of the contraband (i.e.
establishing intent to transport sensitive matérial), or that all of the cargo was bound for a
belligerent power.119 Thus neutral ships were more likely to be seized under the current
British blockade system.
Did the Royal Navy aggressively apply the doctrine of continuous voyage and, in
the process, seize many neutral goods unintended for enemy use? The answer is
affirmative in both cases. Yet, as the papers of Admiral M. W. W. P. Consett, a British
naval attaché stationed in Sweden and Denmark, and Rear-Admiral Dudley De Chair,
Commander of the Tenth Cruiser (Blockade) Squadron attest, there were many instances
where contraband passed undetected in 1914-1915.120 Moreover, the Americans were not
entirely in a position to criticize Great Britain’s right to blockade. Throughout these
early diplomatic talks the United States held firm that Britain was enforcing a large scale
paper blockade, which had been outlawed in the Declaration of Paris nearly six decades
prior. But the problem was that the Americans, like the other delegates at the naval
conference, never ratified the London Declaration. Furthermore, unlike Britain, France,
and Prussia, the United States was not a signatory of the Declaration of Paris, and was
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thus unable to invoke its provisions.121
There was also the issue of historical precedent to take into consideration. On 2
April 1915, the State Department took exception to Britain’s Order in Council that
declared the entire North Sea and Atlantic a war zone. There is little doubt that American
statesmen such as presidential advisor Colonel Edward M. House and Walter Hines Page,
the U.S. ambassador to Britain, were sympathetic to the Allied cause. What they
objected to, though, was the stoppage of American vessels carrying non-contraband items
and the cordon of Royal Naval Reserve cruisers restricting neutral ports.122 Even the
sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915 did not lessen the State Department’s opposition to
the Allied blockade, which Secretary of State Robert Lansing denounced in November as
totally “ineffective, illegal, and indefensible.”123
Recent history, however, played in Britain’s favour. The British had experienced
similar economic injury under the Union blockade of the Confederate states during the
Civil War, during which the English cotton industry was decimated without supplies
from the American South. In 1861 President Abraham Lincoln stated that neutral trade
would not be interfered with, but any ship – regardless of nationality – caught running the
blockade would be stopped and its cargo potentially seized. Additionally, the North
would not permit merchant vessels to come within a certain radius of a blockaded port or
coast.124 To circumvent the Northern blockade British merchants began trading in greater
volume in the West Indies, particularly in Bermuda and the Bahamas, which lay
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strategically close to the Confederate ports of Wilmington, North Carolina, Charleston,
South Carolina, and Savannah, Georgia.125 British and Confederate vessels repeatedly
ran Lincoln’s blockade in an attempt to maintain trade relations with one another and, in
the case of the former, reaffirm their naval superiority in the age of Pax Britannica.
Despite Britain’s neutrality and the Paris Declaration that prohibited blockading
neutral ports, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that blockades did not have to be enforced at
close range to be legally effective. This caveat was decided in the heat of battle to give
the North greater latitude in their fight against the South. It was done without consulting
international maritime law yet it established a precedent that allowed navies to more
efficiently deploy their fleet at strategic points rather than forming a ring around a single
port or body of water.126 Ultimately, the Union blockade of the American South
demonstrated the ideal way to establish a blockade at a safe distance, which better suited
modern navies equipped with new weapon systems and wireless technology.
This caveat placed the United States in a unique moral predicament throughout
1914-1916. The Royal Navy, after all, was employing the American practice of a distant
blockade but on a grander scale. When the situation had been reversed during the Civil
War, the United States redefined the parameters of belligerency – legally and
geographically – by expanding the blockade radius to cover up to 1,000 miles off the
southern U.S. coast.127 There, the Northern fleet could lie in wait for neutral or
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belligerent vessels attempting to run the blockade. The irony was not lost on British
journalists and intellectuals who spoke openly about the hypocrisy of American opinion
on the Allied blockade.
In a tense exchange in the pages of The Atlantic Monthly, Oxford classicist
Gilbert Murray rebuked American journalist and, later, Committee on Public Information
(CPI) propaganda expert Arthur Bullard for his belief that “We have apparently started ‘a
wholesale repudiation of legal restraints [and] decided that there is no sea law’.”128
Bullard, of course, argued that neutral countries ought to have greater control over their
transatlantic trade and, secondly, that an international prize (naval) court should be
established to protect neutrals from the vagaries of belligerents’ war aims. This is what
Grey asked of the Great Powers at the London Declaration in 1909. Thus the failure to
ratify the naval treaty and establish a prize court129 led Bullard to wonder whether, “he
[Grey] has been effaced by the British Junkers and, no longer directing British policy, is
now reduced to the rôle of registering it and trying – not very successfully – to justify
it?”130 His accusations spoke to the prevailing opinion among U.S. nationalists that
America alone shouldered the burden of freedom and democracy while old world Europe
was tearing itself apart.
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These moralistic sentiments did not sit well with Professor Murray and other
British writers who put pen to paper to remind the United States that they, too, neglected
freedom of the seas in favour of a wartime blockade against the enemy.131 Moreover,
these writers invoked history to discredit the official German claim that Britain was
willfully starving women and children on the home front to hasten an Allied victory.
Doubt was cast, for example, on Germany’s adherence to international law with the
“rape” of Belgium in the opening days of the war. The extent of the German army’s
cruelty and cowardice was recounted in popular verse with the 1915 poem In The Trail of
the Hun:
Women screen your firing-line/Villages burned down to dust/
Torture, murder, bestial lust/Filth too foul for printer’s ink/
Crimes from which the apes would shrink/Strange the offers that you press/
On the God of Righteousness!132
In pamphlets published for both British and American readership writers continued to
juxtapose British morality with the seeming inhumanity of the German High Command
or Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL), who sacrificed innocent lives – be they Belgian,
French, German or American – for the sake of an additional three hundred feet of
territory or one less ship carrying potential war matérial.133
This increasing disregard for civilian lives and the greater need to assert one’s
national rights, in the end, pushed neutral countries towards a more active form of
131
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participation in the First World War. For the United States it was a thirty-two month
evolution from neutral to belligerent, while Scandinavia and the Netherlands continued to
moderate a fine line between proud neutrality and collaboration with Allies and the
Central Powers with often varying degrees of success. Britain entered the First World
War with definite assumptions concerning the nature and scope of the conflict in
Europe.134 What appeared to be a war for dynastic power and territorial aggrandizement
in the Balkans turned into a global conflagration. Prewar expectations were quickly
replaced and tempered with limited victories and high mortality rates.
Ultimately, Asquith’s Liberal government experienced a steep learning curve with
the naval blockade of the Central Powers and spent the first two years of the war
placating neutrals and British businessmen. Taken together, the blockade policy of the
Allies c. 1914 to early 1916 lacked a coherent strategy and an inter-departmental
administration to implement necessary changes. Yet 1916 was a year in which
belligerents and neutrals were tested like never before. Verdun and the Somme
completely disavowed the Great Powers of the short war illusion and helped to remind
them “… we are now proceeding on the assumption that this will be a long war,” 135
where business as usual would no longer suffice.
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CHAPTER 3
BEYOND A “NEEDLESS SACRIFICE”: TOTAL WAR AND THE
TIGHTENING OF THE BLOCKADE, 1916-1918
New Players, New Approach
By early 1916 there was a widespread belief in the British Parliament that the current
prosecution of the war was simply not enough to achieve victory at the front.
Commenting on the difficulty of breaking the strategic deadlock, Britain’s Secretary of
State for War, Lord Kitchener, said in dismay: “I don’t know what is to be done. This
isn’t war.”136 After nearly eighteen months of continuous fighting, and seeing no clear
end in sight, politicians scrambled to reassure soldiers and civilians that their sacrifices
were not in vain. The British public and the Press demanded more accountability of
Prime Minister H. H. Asquith’s government and, in return, more was expected of the
country in its fight against Imperial Germany.137 Ultimately, 1916 was the year in which
the Entente and the Central Powers ratcheted up the military, political, and socioeconomic stakes in a process that military historian Alan Kramer has aptly referred to as
the “radicalization of warfare” between 1914 and 1918.138
This chapter explores the crucial ways in which the naval blockade of Germany
was increasingly tightened during the last three years of the war (i.e. January 1916 to
November 1918). It argues that drastic changes were made to the existing machinery of
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the blockade after 1915, which fostered greater inter-allied and departmental cooperation
and wrecked havoc on German food supply and morale.
The creation of a separate Ministry of the Blockade in February 1916, for
example, provided the British government with an opportunity to more clearly define its
economic and naval policy vis-à-vis belligerent rights. Several important changes were
made by the Ministry to halt the flow of goods entering Germany, which allowed the
Foreign Office to exert more control over the commerce of neutral countries.139 It has
been said, “… that the chief achievement of the British Navy [throughout the First World
War] was to conquer the co-operation of the world.”140 At first glance, the word
“conquer” may seem misplaced because Britain did not silence its allies’ opinion or
conquer neutral countries in their fight against the Central Powers. What they insisted
on, however, was tacit cooperation to overwhelm the enemy to the point of defeat. In the
face of these new stringent demands, the United States and neutral Scandinavian
countries were forced to rethink the price of neutrality.141
The sweeping changes to Britain’s blockade policy, along with the global crop
failure of 1916, had a devastating impact on German food supply. During the “Turnip
Winter” of 1916-1917, caloric intake plummeted on the home front as scarce foodstuffs
were diverted to soldiers at the front.142 Although resourceful substitutes were found for
staple items like milk, pork, cheese, and butter, the vast majority of the country survived
on a poor diet of watery turnips and stale bread.
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In order to overcome the increasing hunger and economic isolation, Kaiser
Wilhelm II ordered the Imperial German Navy to resume the policy of unrestricted
submarine warfare. Beginning on 1 February 1917, German submarines were stationed
in the Atlantic Ocean and the North, Baltic, and Mediterranean Seas with the aim to sink
all ships – even neutral vessels – destined for Britain.143 It was a reckless gamble that
failed primarily because the German High Command (OHL) did not adequately consider
the ramifications of targeting neutral ships.144 They incorrectly believed that the loss of
neutral and Entente shipping would starve Britain long before the U.S. could mobilize its
navy or a sizable expeditionary force.145
Indeed, the United States promptly broke off diplomatic relations within two days
of the Kaiser’s declaration and cited submarine attacks on American shipping in its
declaration of war on the Kaiserreich on 6 April 1917. The entry of the United States as
an “associated power” of the Entente marked a decisive turning point in the First World
War. American intervention brought about what has been described as the third and final
phase of the conflict.146 An examination of the “hunger blockade” and its effects on
Germany c. 1917-1918 will show that this assessment could not be more accurate.
The creation of the Allied Blockade Committee (ABC) in December 1917 finally
allowed the Allies to secure an airtight blockade of the Central Powers.147 It was the
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culmination of more than three years of diplomatic manoeuvring to convince the United
States that economic reprisal was the only responsible course of action against German
belligerency at sea. In the next chapter, “Chapter 4: Print War and the Art of
Persuasion,” I discuss the lengths to which British press baron Lord Northcliffe went to
sway U.S. public opinion in favour of intervention and capitalized on their involvement
in a propaganda campaign that played on Germany’s fear of hunger and isolation.
In this chapter, however, I examine the broader implications of the hunger
blockade’s success. How did the Allies completely prohibit neutral countries from
trading with the Central Powers and what sort of physical effects did the Germans
experience as a result of sustained malnutrition? The answer to both questions will show
that Britain’s blockade underwent massive structural changes starting in early 1916,
which gradually wore down Germany’s resolve and undeniably aided in its defeat.148
Administrative Changes and the Price of Neutrality
As the war entered its second winter in December 1915, Britain’s top politicians, military
personnel, and the press took stock of the year’s successes and failures both on land and
at sea. Admittedly, there was not much success to celebrate. Highly publicized failures
like the Battle of Loos (25-28 September), where, among other tactical errors, a poorly
timed chlorine gas attack on German positions accidentally killed or wounded more than
2,500 British troops,149 and the recent evacuation of the Allies from Gallipoli (beginning
on 15 December 1915),150 confirmed for the British that even a strong numerical
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advantage, use of chemical weapons, and considerable assistance from the Dominion
countries had failed to turn the tide against the Central Powers. If more troops from farflung corners of the world was not the key to victory, what then was the answer?
The Commander of the Grand Fleet, John Jellicoe, proposed that the government
should tighten the naval blockade of Germany using whatever means possible. In private
correspondence with John Fisher, who retired as First Sea Lord over the Gallipoli fiasco
in May 1915, Jellicoe voiced his disgust with the timidity of the Foreign Office in its
handling of the Allied blockade: “I write letter after letter on the blockade questions, but
the FO seems quite imbecile. They are afraid of their own shadows and imagine that
every neutral is anxious to go to war with us and can do us harm. I don’t believe it and
never shall till I see the declaration of war.”151
Although Jellicoe’s words were harsh, he only voiced them to senior naval staff
after learning that the Foreign Office quietly permitted the Northern Neutrals to stockpile
domestic goods.152 He believed that there was only one reason why neutral countries
would import and hoard commonplace items like grain, textiles, meat, and coffee – in
order to re-export them to Germany at a much higher price. In a separate meeting
arranged by Arthur Balfour, current First Lord of the Admiralty and cousin of UnderSecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Robert Cecil, Jellicoe discussed his concerns
with the parliamentary under-secretary in early December. Above all, he believed that
greater pressure had to be applied to the neutrals; if they were not willing to voluntarily
comply with Allied trade demands, then Britain would have to force them.
Cecil, for his part, expressed how hamstrung he felt by Grey’s cautiousness and
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did not bristle at Jellicoe’s advice to clamp down on neutral trade. In fact, he welcomed
suggestions on how to better exploit the economic angle of the war. For the next several
months, Cecil sent Jellicoe several confidential documents on the government’s blockade
policy, in which he asked the admiral to critique the work of the Foreign Office.153 This
entire exchange was done without Grey’s knowledge, but that, of course, was the whole
idea.
Grey, like Asquith, increasingly found himself without many allies as the war
entered 1916. Cecil intentionally distanced himself from his superior and watched while
the criticism mounted. As Lord Beaverbrook, the Anglo-Canadian owner of the London
Evening Standard, later described the problem of Britain’s wartime leadership c. 19151916: “The politicians gave little credit to the generals. The generals denounced the
politicians. The soldiers and sailors serving in the forces had little confidence in either.
The public had no heroes.”154
By early February 1916, word had spread throughout the government that
Britain’s blockade “leaked at every seam.”155 All signs pointed to the continued
placation of the neutrals by the Foreign Office. Conservative newspapers happily seized
upon the opportunity to publish headlines denouncing the “make-believe blockade” as a
“farce” perpetrated by an overly cautious foreign minister. These were followed by
subsequent newspaper articles and a heated debate in the House of Commons on 23
February 1916 that clearly indicated Grey’s days were numbered when it came to the
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blockade.156 The foreign secretary was well aware of the criticism he was garnering both
in the media and in Parliament and wrote to Asquith to voice his concerns.
Grey told the prime minister that he was unable to devote the proper time to
effectively manage the naval blockade.157 He found that dealing with the neutrals took
too much time away from his other duties and requested that Robert Cecil oversee all
future blockade matters in his place. In fact, this arrangement suited all the parties
involved.158 The British press, Admiralty, Tory opposition, and even his colleagues in
the Foreign Office all maintained that Grey did not have the stomach for total war.
Therefore, his letter presented the government with an opportunity to reevaluate their
priorities and craft a more cogent blockade policy in regards to belligerent rights. Grey,
meanwhile, could still retain his position as foreign minister – at least until Asquith’s
government fell in December 1916 – while not compromising his stance on the
preservation of neutral rights.159
The prime minister took Grey’s advice seriously and consolidated the various
trade departments (e.g. War Trade Department, War Trade Intelligence Department, War
Trade Statistical Department, Rationing Committee, Foreign Trade Department, Section
on Financial Transactions, and the Contraband Department) into one larger Ministry of
the Blockade headed by Cecil. Although Grey may have divested himself of the day-today management of the blockade, Cecil’s workload increased exponentially. He still
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served as the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, yet was now in charge of a
complex new portfolio that answered directly to the Foreign Office. As Minister of the
Blockade, he also represented that department as well as the Foreign Office in
Parliament, which brought with it another level of public visibility that ensured his work
would – for better or worse – not go unnoticed.160
News reports of Cecil’s appointment were overwhelmingly positive. For
example, an editorial piece in The Spectator, Britain’s oldest politically independent
magazine, remarked that:
His appointment is a very important one. It marks a new stage in the
highly delicate business of managing the blockade… What Robert Cecil
is required to do, and we are perfectly confident [he] will do, is to
remember in every act that the blockade is a naval engine of war, and
cannot be employed as though it were an engine of peace. The object of
the blockade must never be lost sight of for a moment.161
Both the British press and the government agreed in rare unanimity – the naval blockade
of Germany desperately needed tightening and Robert Cecil was considered the most
capable politician for the job.
A lawyer by profession, Cecil was well aware of the various legal constraints
facing the Allies in their haste to end the policy of “business as usual.”162 Unlike Grey,
however, he was willing to violate certain principles of international law in order to rule
the waves.163 His first task was to limit the flow of exports from the neutral Scandinavian
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countries to the Central Powers in a controversial practice known as forcible rationing –
that is, forcing the Northern Neutrals to agree to prewar level imports on “absolute” and
“conditional” contraband. Beginning in late February and early March 1916, Cecil met
with several legal advisors and trade officials regarding the status of Britain’s trade
agreements with the Northern Neutrals. Above all, he wanted to ascertain exactly how
many goods were finding their way into German hands and, secondly, if there was legal
precedent for restricting Allied exports to the neutrals.164
Cecil found the answer to both questions in a Foreign Office memorandum
written by legal expert A. Pearce Higgins. Higgins’ research into the legality of reducing
neutral trade to prewar figures revealed that a myriad of goods (food, oils, and textiles)
still passed undetected to Germany each month via Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland. The importation of American wheat, for instance,
collectively increased in the neutral European countries by over 31 million bushels from
October 1914 to October 1915.165 This discovery, along with Jellicoe’s assertion that the
forcible rationing of neutrals was the only solution for a tighter blockade, ultimately
compelled Cecil to find a legal basis for such action.
Independent of Cecil’s request, Higgins studied countless documents on maritime
and international law in order to find a legal precedent. Try as he might though Higgins
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could not find a suitable justification for forcible rationing. Part of the problem stemmed,
of course, from the fact that Britain had been a champion of the rights of neutral countries
since 1856.166 After the March 1915 Order in Council that stipulated all goods destined
for Germany were considered contraband, the neutrals agreed to voluntarily ration
exports of raw materials and foodstuffs.167 But that was as much as the neutrals were
willing to concede; they still refused to commit to specific amounts of exports and would
most certainly baulk at the mention of limited imports from the Allies.
Nevertheless, it was Higgins’ recommendation that Britain should disregard the
neutrals’ concerns in this particular instance. He believed that the introduction of forced
rations could be “morally justified” because the sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915 and
the use of floating mines in international waters proved that Germany was not adhering to
the same moral code of conduct.168 The neutrals were involved at this point whether they
liked it or not. Forced rations were seen as a small price to pay for ending the war as
quickly as possible.169
In addition to the introduction of forced rations in neutral countries, the Ministry
of the Blockade undertook two other measures to tighten its economic stranglehold
against the Central Powers. Starting in late February 1916, and continuing until the
ratification of the Treaty of Versailles in July 1919, the British compiled a list of
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international companies with known ties to German banks and businesses. These
companies were publically blacklisted; their names were published on a “Statutory List”
and distributed to foreign governments worldwide.170 To associate with a blacklisted
firm was to endure the ultimate form of bureaucratic red tape. Embassies in neutral
countries were notified that all ships suspected of carrying blacklisted cargo would be
immediately detained and subjected to a lengthy search and seize process.171
The blacklist system was implemented by Cecil to dissuade the neutrals from
trading with the enemy. But he also realized that the neutrals required an incentive to
completely suspend trade with such a lucrative and sizable market.172 In return for
adhering to prewar levels of imports and limiting trade with the Central Powers, Britain
did its best to expedite “legitimate” (i.e. permissible) trade between the United States,
Entente, and the Northern Neutrals. Beginning on 4 March 1916, American exporters
were given the opportunity to ship goods through the Allied blockade zone without any
interference from the Royal Navy. They simply needed to apply to the British embassy
in Washington, D.C. two weeks beforehand for what was called a “navicert” – a
commercial passport that guaranteed the ship free passage to its destination.173
Cross-referenced with the Statutory List, the embassy would either grant or deny
the request for a navicert based on the applicant’s answers to six pertinent questions. The
Ministry of the Blockade wanted to know: (1) the name of the ship, (2) name of the
170
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steamship line responsible for shipping the goods, (3) anticipated date(s) of shipment, (4)
name and address of the American consignor, (5) name and address of the consignee in
Britain, France, or the neutral Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, and, most
importantly, (6) a list and detailed description (with exact figures) of the goods requested
for shipment. If the items did not notably exceed prewar levels and both the steamship
line and U.S. consignor were not on the blacklist, then the certificate was usually
granted.174
The addition of navicerts made it far easier for goods to flow unimpeded across
the Atlantic provided that they were sanctioned beforehand via the blacklist, while the
introduction of forcible rations in neutral Europe ensured that extra food and other
contraband did not fall into enemy hands.175 Statistics compiled by the Foreign Office in
the first six months of the Ministry of the Blockade’s existence revealed that trade
between the neutrals and Germany decreased as a result of these more stringent measures.
For instance, the figures in Table 1 indicate that Danish exports to Germany
dropped considerably between the summer of 1915 (i.e. prior to the introduction of
forced rations and the Statutory List) and the autumn of 1916 (i.e. after their
implementation). Conversely, Danish exports to Britain steadily increased during the
same period due to newly cemented trade agreements with the Entente and the influx of
American goods expedited by the navicerts.176 The chart below is merely an example of
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A Sample of Danish Exports to Britain and Germany, July 1915 – October 1916
Goods Exported from Denmark
(measured in metric tons)
Butter:
July – December 1915
January – May 1916
June – July 1916
August 1916
September – October 1916

To Britain

Bacon:
July – December 1915
January – May 1916
June – July 1916
August 1916
September – October 1916

To Germany

4,380
4,720
5,143
4,844
5,140

4,048
3,529
3,378
3,639
2,796

7,353
7,284
7,216
6,938
8,264

2,514
1,751
721
1,773
1,345

[Table 1] Source: Archibald C. Bell, A History of the Blockade of Germany and the Countries Associated
with Her in the Great War, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, 1914-1918 (London: H. M. Stationary
Office, 1937), 476.

the quantities and type of foodstuffs imported by the British and the Germans from
Denmark; the trends were similar with Swedish, Dutch, and Norwegian exports.177
Despite the fact that neutral exports were still reaching Germany into late 1916, the
Ministry of the Blockade was actively working to stem the tide. The salient point to
remember is that these figures are representative of the deliberate and wholesale
tightening of the blockade of Germany by the British in 1916.178
Germany and the Turnip Winter of 1916-1917
As early as October 1914, when the price of potatoes rose for the first time since the
beginning of the war, Germans displayed “significant unrest” at the difficulty of
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affording the food they readily consumed in peacetime.179 Yet it was not until the socalled “Turnip Winter” (Kohlrübenwinter) of 1916-1917 that the food situation in
Germany could be truly classified as dire.180 An early frost in the autumn of 1916
destroyed the majority of the potato crop and ushered in an extraordinarily cold winter
with average temperatures ranging from 0° to –32° Celsius.181
In place of potatoes as a staple item in the German diet, people on the home front
reluctantly turned to the swede turnip (rutabagas) for their daily source of carbohydrates.
Unlike potatoes, Germans rarely ate turnips prior to 1916. In fact, they were widely used
as pig fodder before the war,182 but the exceptionally poor harvest, harsh weather, and the
simultaneous tightening of the naval blockade by the British183 were all factors that
combined to make the winter of 1916-1917 a very challenging time for German
civilians.184
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The war diaries of Princess Evelyn Blücher, an educated Englishwoman who
married into German nobility, were one of the first sources in English to describe the
blockade’s impact on the day-to-day life of Germans who lived under its grip.
Commenting on the precarious food situation in Berlin during the Turnip Winter, she
states:
We are all growing thinner everyday, and the rounded contours of the
German nation have become a legend of the past. We are all gaunt and
bony now, and have dark shadows round our eyes, and our thoughts are
chiefly taken up with wondering what our next meal will be…185
Blücher’s work is of unique interest to historians of the naval blockade and home front
Germany c. 1914-1918. Given that her ties to Lancashire were not entirely severed, she
was an English lady living in enemy territory that had been her permanent home for more
than a decade. Far from being the poetic musings of a wealthy woman, Blücher’s
writings attest to the fact that Allied success was achieved at a substantial cost to
Germans on the home front.
Initially, the slow denial of foodstuffs to the Central Powers had the effect of
producing a tenacious and thrifty mindset in the German people. Not content to live
without basic items, ersatz items or substitutes were to be had for almost every
conceivable good. According to the German War Food Office (Kriegsernährungsamt or
KEA), butchers could make over 800 “certified” varieties of sausage that substituted
various items for protein and fat, while ground walnut shells and corn served as viable
substitutes for coffee (the Germans were used to drinking ground chicory before the war)
185
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and coarse Kriegsbrot or rationed bread was made from a combination of rye and wheat
flour mixed with several substitute items (including turnips, of course).186
But as the naval blockade tightened, conditions on the home front greatly
deteriorated and substitutes became far more dubious in quality. The government
instituted more meatless days to conserve what little supplies of protein it had left.187 As
one housewife from Leipzig wryly noted in her diary, she was quite content to eat the
substitute for chicken or beef, which was rat. It was only when the Germans were
reduced to eating “substitute rat” that she truly felt aggrieved.188 To make matters worse,
the War Food Office devised a new system of rationing in the autumn of 1916 that
assigned extra meat and carbohydrates to skilled labourers and munitions workers, while
“weak Germans”189 had their rations of meat and milk drastically reduced. Although 50
percent of all the work done in the munitions industry was carried out by women in 1917,
the loss of rations for “weak” children and the elderly (i.e. those who did not work in the
war industry) made for hungrier, more desperate families overall.190
In 1913, a study conducted by doctors with the British Royal Society found that
the average man expended approximately 3,000 calories a day. Ideally, he should
consume a minimum of 3,300 calories per day in order to account for a 10 percent loss in
digestion. Similarly, the study revealed that the average woman expended 2,300 calories
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a day and, therefore, required roughly 2,650 calories to maintain proper nutrition. The
German government guaranteed its citizens at least 1,985 calories a day as late as April
1916.191 Yet during the Turnip Winter the average middle to lower class German
subsisted on only 1,000 calories a day. Government rations could be supplemented, of
course, but with the price of common foodstuffs increasing by nearly 800 percent on the
black market over the course of the war, very few people ever had enough to eat.192
In contrast to wartime Germany, the standard of living improved for the average
working class British family over the course of the war. Social and military historian Jay
Winter aptly describes this phenomenon as the “paradox of the Great War.”193 His
research, along with other studies on Britain’s food supply 1914-1918, shows that while
British civilians were not immune to rations, long food lines, and minor civil unrest in
early 1918, they did not experience hunger or serious deprivation. In fact, wage increases
and temporary demographic shifts caused by soldiers being employed and fed by the
state, women working long hours in factories, and a decline in the birth rate, meant that
the average family’s buying power actually increased. Overall, this “…is why even
though aggregate food supply declined during the war, nutritional levels rose.”194
Conversely, by 1917 in Germany, the search for food consumed the majority of
people’s free time on the home front. Most days began the same way. The household
awoke early to frigid, damp air, having chosen to conserve their supply of coal for
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cooking. Breakfast, however, left much to be desired; usually a stale piece of Kriegsbrot
and, depending on the age of the children, a small glass of watered down milk or ersatz
coffee.195 If a person was employed in the munitions industry, they were forced to work
seven days a week for fifteen hours a day.196 This grueling work schedule denied them
the opportunity to stand in line for rations, which had become a fulltime job – typically
ten hours a day – during the last two years of the war. In place of their parent(s), children
began skipping school in order to stand in breadlines from dusk to dawn. Truancy rates
skyrocketed, although very little could be done to enforce attendance because “hunger,
exhaustion, cold, inflation, mass conscription, and emotional trauma had uprooted the
traditional relationships of authority in nuclear families.”197
Many Germans simply resorted to theft when the monotony of queuing for rations
became too time-consuming. In fact, the term “self-help” was coined late in the war as a
euphemism to describe the increasing theft of everyday items like coal, food, and
clothing.198 Butcher shops and grocers were routinely looted and groups of
schoolchildren (some as young as twelve-years-old) took to robbing freight trains and
tram/passenger cars en route to urban areas. Stealing was not just a young person’s game
either. Theft rates among women increased by 82 percent from 1914 to 1918.199 Many
farmers and food purveyors refused to sell their products at urban market stalls because
gangs of women and children repeatedly stole from them.200
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Types of Crimes Committed by Women in Berlin, 1913-1918

[Figure 1] Source: Statistics from Belinda J. Davis, Home Fires Burning: Food Politics, and Everyday
Life in World War I (Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 223. Chart
from David A. Janicki, “The British Blockade during World War I: The Weapon of Deprivation,”
Student Pulse: International Student Journal 6, no. 6 (2014): 5.

For example, Figure 1 shows the correlation between Germans’ standard of living
on the home front and the rise in the number of thefts perpetrated by women in wartime
Berlin. Incidences of fraud, forgery, and embezzlement remained virtually unchanged
from their prewar rate, which is important to note in relation to the massive increase in
female theft convictions starting in 1916, when the Allies effectively tightened their
blockade against the Central Powers, peaking in 1918 with 50,000 convictions after two
years of a starvation diet. Meanwhile, the police regularly sent informers to stand in
ration lines as a way to measure the “mood of the people” in major German cities.
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Informants reported hearing chants of “finish up with that ridiculous war, we’re croaking
of hunger!” and “enough with that murder at the front… we don’t want to starve any
longer!”201
Given that material goods were in short supply both at home and on the
battlefield, German police were known to enter homes unannounced throughout 1917 and
search for “excess” goods to be sent to the front. Policemen typically raided closets in
search of spare and mismatched bits of clothing.202 By the end of the brutal Turnip
Winter, it was obvious to the authorities that Germans on the home front were hungry,
exasperated, and slowly starving to death. How long could the home front realistically
hold out given these extreme conditions? That was the question on everyone’s mind.
The Imperial German government ultimately decided that it, too, should ratchet up its
naval operations in an effort to end the war as quickly as possible.
U-Boats, American Intervention, and the Allied Blockade Committee
Tired and hamstrung by the increasing “strategic passivity” of the Imperial German
Navy, Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff was convinced that his country could defeat
the British by waging a more aggressive counter-blockade against Allied merchant
shipping. The head of the German Admiralty Staff became a vocal proponent of
reinstituting unrestricted submarine warfare – the sinking of enemy and neutral vessels
without warning – after the Allies took steps to tighten the blockade against Germany
in early 1916.203
Using statistics compiled by the influential German banker Dr. Richard Fuss,
Holtzendorff wrote several proposals over a ten-month period in which he advocated the
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German navy attack all merchant ships bound for Great Britain. Given the British Isles’
dependence on seafaring trade, he wagered that if the German navy sank 600,000 tons of
goods en route to Britain each month, the Allies would be forced to sue for peace no later
than August 1917.204 Holtzendorff wrote more than half a dozen versions of the same
memorandum espousing the advantages of unrestricted submarine warfare, but it was his
22 December 1916 report that finally convinced Kaiser Wilhelm II to proceed.
It was this now-or-never mentality that appealed to the German High Command at
the end of 1916 (especially the new Chief of the General Staff, Paul von Hindenburg, and
First Quartermaster General, Erich Ludendorff). Crop failure and colder temperatures
were widespread throughout Western Europe during the latter half of the year. However,
the Allied naval blockade exacerbated the poor living conditions in Germany by denying
civilians the opportunity to offset their meager food supply with imports from around the
world. Although the Germans were facing their coldest and leanest year in recent
memory, Holtzendorff truly thought that Germany could turn the tables on Britain with
its “strategic” use of U-boats and win the war.205 Even Chancellor Theobald von
Bethmann Hollweg, who was Holtzendorff’s biggest critic regarding the use of
unrestricted submarine warfare begrudgingly stated, “… if the military authorities
consider the U-boat war essential, I am not in a position to contradict them.”206
Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare on 1 February 1917. The
controversial decision violated international law and further isolated Germany from the
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international trading community. Woodrow Wilson, for instance, immediately severed
all diplomatic communication with the Kaiserreich and encouraged other neutrals to
follow suit.207 The real turning point came less than a month later when a British ocean
liner (RMS Laconia) was sunk off the coast of Ireland. The Laconia was traveling from
the United States back to England when a German U-boat torpedoed the ship on 25
February 1917, killing two American citizens – a woman and her young daughter – four
British civilians, and six British crewmembers.208 In his 2 April address to Congress on
the eve of America’s entry into the war, President Wilson referenced the incident,
arguing: “that neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is
involved… and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic
governments… We have seen the last of neutrality under these circumstances.”209
Even before the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) saw combat on the
Western Front, it was the United States’ economic contribution to the Allied war effort
that helped turn the tide against the Central Powers.210 As the most powerful neutral in
the world, America’s decision to abandon its neutrality forced other neutrals to rethink
their position on the war. Geography was a key factor for neutrals on both sides of the
Atlantic. South American countries like Brazil, Guatemala, and Bolivia were very quick
to side with the United States and promptly joined the Allied embargo of the Central
207
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Powers in April 1917.211 The Northern Neutrals, however, were far more reluctant to
sever all ties with Germany given their proximity to Central Europe and longstanding
history of commercial trade.
Germany’s resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare further compounded the
problem of allegiance.212 Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian ships, in fact, refused to sail
across the North Sea to Britain for fear of being attacked by German U-boats. As
Minister of the Blockade, Lord Cecil openly chided the Northern Neutrals for not
complying with pre-existing trade agreements stating: “if you go on playing the game of
the Germans, you will be starved [too]. We’re going to apply some very drastic
measures.”213 This was no idle threat on Cecil’s part. He was frustrated with neutral
Europe and seriously considered reneging on Britain’s promise to expedite sanctioned
trade between Europe and North America.
American intervention ultimately ensured that the Allies could adopt an even
harsher stance with Germany and the European neutrals with virtually no
repercussions.214 The goal was to make the blockade as airtight as possible and the
United States had very definite ideas on how to best achieve economic and naval
predominance in the final years of the war. In addition to joining the naval blockade of
the Central Powers, the U.S. State Department announced a partial embargo of U.S.
exports to the Northern Neutrals in the summer of 1917 for staple items like steel, iron,
minerals, oil, meat, fodder, fertilizer, and grain.215
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The Wilson administration also insisted on the creation of a new inter-allied
council to oversee the day-to-day running of the blockade. Knowing full well that the
Ministry of the Blockade was answerable only to the British prime minister and the
Foreign Office, the U.S. government was reluctant to impose such harsh economic
measures without an equal say in the formation of policy.216 France was the first country
to broach the idea of creating a blockade council compromised of British and French
policymakers in September 1915. The Asquith government immediately rejected the idea
and France grudgingly agreed to leave the day-to-day organization of the blockade
primarily to the British.217 Two years later, though, and facing the German U-boat
menace alone, Britain realized that it needed to cooperate more with its allies.
Therefore, in December 1917, the British Foreign Office called a meeting with
Robert Cecil and various trade officials from the United States, Italy, and France to
discuss the creation of a joint council known as the Allied Blockade Committee
(ABC).218 Using the Ministry of the Blockade for its administrative framework, the ABC
named Lord Cecil its chairman, appointed war trade officials from each of the Allied
countries, and also included a representative from the Foreign Office. It is important to
note that even after the U.S. entered the war, with three out of six committee members
hailing from Britain, there was no denying that the British were still in charge of the
Allied naval blockade.219 In theory, this joint venture provided the Allies with a unified
voice in matters of economic and naval policy. In practice, however, the Allied Blockade
Committee merely continued the work of the Ministry of the Blockade under a more

216

Parmelee, 115.
Farrar, Conflict and Compromise, 24-28.
218
Bell, 619-620.
219
Osborne, 174-175.
217

77

palatable name.
The first major initiative passed by the ABC made it more difficult for
German U-boats to openly attack Allied shipping.220 The U.S. Navy advocated creating a
vast minefield in the North Sea that would stretch from the Scottish Highlands to the
southern tip of Norway and act as a buffer between the British Isles, Allied and neutral
commerce, and enemy submarines. Construction of the “Northern Barrage,” as it was
called, began on 3 March 1918 under the direction of U.S. Mine Force Commander
Joseph Strauss. The joint Anglo-American project took eight months to complete. In
total, the Allies painstakingly laid 70,000 mines packed with a combined weight of 21
million lbs. of dynamite.221 Official estimates from the U.S. Navy reckoned that the
mines were responsible for destroying four U-boats and damaging twelve others.222
In an excerpt from a poem written by several members of Mine Force Squadron
One, the main group tasked with completing the Northern Barrage, the men proudly
characterized their role in the Allied war effort as follows:
At fall of dusk we softly steal/From out each firth; and forth/
Seeking the aid of night’s dark tide/To strike hard from the North…
Until the world is safe again, And each Boche crime set is right/
The Hun shall know no mercy from the ‘Raiders of the Night.’223
The Northern Barrage was the final nail in Germany’s coffin when it came to neutralizing
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the U-boat menace. American intervention galvanized the British to seal any remaining
leaks in the naval blockade via the Northern Neutrals and fiercely guard its commercial
interests in the North Sea and the Atlantic.224
Deprivation, Illness, and Defeat
Despite the evidence in the British official history on the blockade, various memoirs and
first-person accounts of the level of deprivation on the German home front – including
startling reports from Allied army officers stationed in Germany after the Armistice225 –
there has been some debate among scholars over the actual severity of the food crisis.
Avner Offer and Gerd Hardach, two economic historians writing in the late 1970s and
1980s, rejected the idea that any non-combatants starved as a result of the Allied naval
blockade.226 The majority of academic research since the mid-1980s, however, largely
supports the contention that the Allied naval blockade not only played a significant role
in the collapse of the Kaiserreich, but also directly contributed to the deaths of several
hundred thousand enemy civilians.227 A postgraduate scholar at the University of
Oxford, in fact, discovered new evidence that sheds light on the veracity of the “hunger
blockade” claim.
Mary Elisabeth Cox, a researcher studying trends in the black market in wartime
Germany, recently uncovered several documents at German state libraries and archives
224
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that confirm “… the [Allied] blockade inflicted severe nutritional deprivation on children
and other non-combatants.”228 Specifically, she found a book that contained a list of the
height and weight of German schoolchildren gathered by the Imperial Statistical Office
(Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt) over a ten-year period from 1914 to 1924.229 There are
nearly 600,000 measurements in total; the vast majority deal with children from lower
and working class backgrounds (350,695 to be exact), although statistics were compiled
for children of the upper and middle class as well.
The documents show that even prior to the war the average height of German
children varied slightly depending on their families’ income. In 1914, for example, the
average height of a ten-year-old girl in Stuttgart was 130 cm (4’2”) at the lower end of
the social spectrum (this label encompassed everything from the poorest segments in
society to the average working class family) compared to 133 cm (4’4”) for middle class
ten-year-olds and 136 cm (4’5”) for girls from more prosperous families. Young German
males experienced a similar growth trend at the start of the twentieth century. The
average ten-year-old boy stood at 130 cm (4’2”) if he was from a poor or working class
family compared to 132 cm (4’3”) from a middle class family and 134 cm (4’4”) from a
more affluent background.230
The outbreak of the First World War continued this German prewar trend of
height discrepancy in childhood relative to household income and greatly exacerbated it
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as the conditions on the home front deteriorated for the first time during the Turnip
Winter of 1916-1917. Applying this growth metric, it should come as no surprise that
German children from lower socio-economic classes lost far more weight over the course
of the war than children from wealthier families. The raw data indicates though that all
three social classes – upper, middle, and working/lower class – were directly impacted by
the lack of food and poor living conditions relative to their age, gender, and household
income. By 1917, the Imperial Statistical Office determined that the median height of
ten-year-old boys and girls measured 2 cm shorter than their 1914 counterparts.231
Growth discrepancy was even more pronounced in terms of overall weight loss. For
instance, following German unification in 1871, children routinely submitted to
anthropometric measurements as part of a government initiative to record the height and
weight of all school age children.232
The figures collected at the end of 1917 revealed that children weighed between
1.8 and 3.6 kg, or between 4 and 8 lbs. less than they had before the war.233 This
information ultimately provides a useful timeline to view the cumulative effects of
malnutrition on the German civilian population. A fifteen-year-old child should
theoretically weigh more than their twelve-year-old self provided that they have
sufficient food. Government rations of 1,000 calories a day were certainly not enough to
promote growth in children or maintain proper weight in adults.234 Drastic weight loss
was indicative of the level of deprivation on the German home front following the failed
crop harvest of 1916 and significant changes to the administration of the Allied naval
231
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[Figure 2] A doctor examines German children during the war. The boys are clearly underweight and showing obvious signs of malnourishment. Source: Andrew Donson, Youth in
the Fatherless Land: War Pedagogy, Nationalism, and Authority in Germany, 1914-1918
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 128.

blockade under Cecil.
Indeed, the Germans only referred to the economic sanctions as a “hunger
blockade” after Britain, France, and the U.S. restricted indirect trade with Germany via
the neutrals in 1916-1917.235 Although the Allied press denounced these “exaggerated
reports of the food shortages” as a “masterstroke by the psychologists in Germany… to
appeal to the heart and pocketbook of [the neutrals],”236 the loss of neutral imports and
dwindling domestic resources proved that the “hunger” label was entirely apt. Moreover,
the figures quoted by Mary Elisabeth Cox do not even take into consideration that many
children stopped going to school after 1915 because they were either too sick to attend or
forced to stand in long ration lines throughout the day. In fact, in order to accommodate
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the grueling daily search for food, German school administrators shortened the school
day by half.237 Yet the truncated school day only encouraged more families to pull their
children from the classroom. The height and weight of these “truant” children may well
differ from the official measurements given that malnutrition and related health issues
increasingly prevented more children from attending school and, thus, regularly being
weighed in the first place.238
Lastly, there is the issue of the deadly 1918 influenza pandemic to consider. The
influenza of 1918, known colloquially as the “Spanish Flu,” was a variant of the H1N1
virus that swept the globe in a matter of six months and infected more than 25 percent of
the world’s population.239 Although estimates vary, historians and the medical
community generally agree that at least 50 million people (i.e. 4 percent of those
infected) died as a result of contracting the virus.240 Unlike other influenza outbreaks
either before or after the First World War, the 1918-1919 flu was especially deadly, as it
attacked otherwise healthy individuals in the prime of life. Political scientist Andrew T.
Price-Smith recently described the unique killing pattern of the Spanish Flu as forming
the letter “W” – with deaths occurring across all segments of society but particularly
among children, healthy younger adults (twenty to forty-year-olds), and older people – as
opposed to traditional influenza outbreaks that typically kill only the very young and the
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elderly.241
The influenza virus spread across Europe in three waves. The first wave (spring
1918) primarily affected soldiers when newly infected American troops and Chinese
Labour Corps members arrived in Britain and France via North America in March 1918.
Incidences of death were rare during this period, however, as those who became infected
experienced normal flu-like symptoms. Yet the second (late summer 1918) and third
(autumn 1918) waves were much deadlier than the first and affected soldiers and civilians
alike. The 1918 flu proved exceptionally lethal in densely populated areas like Southeast
Asia, where 17 million people died in India from the disease, and in major urban centres
across Europe and North America.242 Individuals who contracted the virus in the late
summer – early autumn waves died not so much from the virus itself, but rather a
secondary infection from pneumonia, tuberculosis, or through massive blood loss. The
lack of oxygen to the lungs and heart caused victims to turn a distinct bluish colour in the
final hours of their life, which has been described by one historian as a hallmark of “this
strange and terrifying epidemic.”243
The Spanish Flu thrived in city centres and areas with poor sanitation and
hygiene, and the virus particularly wreaked havoc on people with compromised immune
systems and soldiers stationed in trenches along the Western Front. Take, for example,
the high mortality rate of infected Allied soldiers; one British solider died from the
influenza virus for every ten British soldiers killed on the battlefield, while the ratio was
241
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one out of six for French troops and, notably, one flu related death for every American
soldier killed on the battlefield. In comparison to the Allies, though, the German army
fared even worse with infection rates as high as 80 percent in some units (1.5 million
infected in total). The number of critically ill patients overwhelmed German army
hospitals to the point that staff actually stopped counting flu related deaths in mid1918.244
Likewise, the nutritional deprivation experienced by Germans on the home front
led to extremely high rates of mortality from the Spanish Flu.245 An estimated 400,000
German civilians died from the influenza pandemic in 1918 and although the death toll
was higher in America (450,000 civilians), Germany suffered proportionately more flu
related deaths given the country’s smaller population of 65 million people compared to
103 million in the United States.246 Moreover, as the two charts in the chapter appendix
(Tables 2 and 3) on female and infant/adolescent mortality in Germany c. 1913-1921
illustrate, 247 there was a significant spike in civilian mortality long before the pandemic
ever struck. The year 1917 was the first time that deaths on the home front markedly
increased from previous combat years. The death rate for young adults (ages fifteen to
twenty) jumped from roughly fifteen per one thousand people in 1916 to twenty per one
thousand in 1917. Mortality was even higher for young children (ages one to five) in

244

Price-Smith, 64-70.
This was also the case in Austria. See, Dr. Böhm, “Sanitary Statistics and Mortality of the
Population of Vienna during the War, 1914-1918,” Table III, 18 March 1919, in the Ralph Haswell Lutz
Papers, HIA. Dr. Böhm was the chief medical examiner in Vienna throughout the war. The document
includes very detailed autopsy reports conducted on a cross-section of the Viennese population from midto-late 1918. Each report, regardless of the final cause of death, described the “highly lean” and “weak”
appearance of the dead due to “insufficient nourishment.” See also, Maureen Healy, Vienna and the Fall of
the Habsburg Empire: Total War and Everyday Life in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), 307.
246
Price-Smith, 61.
247
Refer to the chapter appendix on pp. 89.
245

85

1917 with twenty-two dying per one thousand than in either 1918 (roughly eighteen per
one thousand) or 1919 (thirteen per one thousand people).248 This evidence indicates that
the high rate of civilian mortality in wartime Germany cannot be solely attributed to the
virulence of the Spanish Flu in the final months of the First World War.
The Allied naval blockade was the common denominator that applied sustained
economic and political pressure to isolate Germany and its allies from the international
trading community. As discussed in Chapter 2, German cries of illegality were quickly
silenced by the might of Britain’s Royal Navy and the combined power of the French and
British economies to establish a commercial blockade of the North Sea, Mediterranean,
and the Atlantic. In practice, however, it was the neutrals – the U.S. and the Northern
Neutrals such as Denmark, Norway, and Sweden – that truly prevented the British from
ensuring that no contraband made its way to the Central Powers.
Early negotiations with the neutrals were fraught with tension and political
posturing on either side. Yet the British chose to force the neutrals’ hand at the
beginning of 1916 with the creation of a separate Ministry of the Blockade under the
direction of the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Robert Cecil.
Cecil promised to tighten the naval blockade through comprehensive trade agreements
with the neutrals, blacklisting international businesses with German ties, and lessening
the wait time involved with transporting “approved” goods from the U.S. to the Allies
and neutral Europe with the use of navicerts or commercial passports.
These new measures greatly clamped down on indirect trade with the enemy and
helped to sway the United States to the Allies’ side in April 1917 after Germany
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torpedoed multiple commercial vessels off the coast of the British Isles. Germany’s
declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare caused the U.S. to reevaluate the price of
its neutrality in light of mounting civilian deaths at sea. Indeed, the blockade of Germany
was no longer viewed as a “needless sacrifice” by cautious businessmen and politicians
looking to play both sides.249 American intervention in the First World War allowed the
British to close gaping holes in the blockade where goods from the U.S. previously
traveled unimpeded to the Northern Neutrals and, eventually, made their way to
Germany.
In a bid to flex their economic might, the U.S. War Trade Board insisted in the
winter of 1917 that Britain delegate more power to its allies in the form of the Allied
Blockade Committee to oversee all aspects of transatlantic trade. This committee
attempted to equalize the decision-making on Allied economic warfare by sharing the
responsibility of patrolling the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean through the convoy
system and the creation of an elaborate minefield between Scotland and Norway (the
Northern Barrage). It would be an understatement to claim though that the Allied
Blockade Committee was anything other than a larger Ministry of the Blockade with the
“Allied” label added largely for diplomatic reasons. Both the U.S. War Trade Board and
the French government agreed that Cecil should remain the Minister of the Blockade.250
Moreover, the ABC consisted of three representatives from Britain in comparison to two
each from the United States and France.
Germany, meanwhile, was plunged into a state of deprivation on the home front
after the Turnip Winter of 1916-1917 when average caloric intake consisted of only 1,000
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calories a day. The newly tightened Allied blockade, colder than normal temperatures,
and a widespread shortage of oil and coal meant that many homes went without heat or
an evening meal. The rest of 1917 brought little change from the hardship of the
previous winter, as American intervention ensured that the world’s most powerful neutral
country now turned its full attention to defeating the Kaiserreich.
The collapse of Imperial Germany came after four years of fighting the Allies in
Europe, East Africa, and at sea. The nutritional deprivation at home and on the Western
Front exacerbated the deadliness of the 1918 influenza in Germany. German civilians
and soldiers were affected by the totality of the First World War in a way that the Allies
never experienced. The hunger blockade proved so effective because it pitted primarily
landlocked countries in Central Europe (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria)
against the world’s strongest naval power and empire (Britain) with committed allies in
France, Italy, and the United States.251 Hunger and deprivation were daily impediments
that wore away Germany’s resolve and, as will be explored in the next chapter, aided in
the defeat of the Central Powers with timely hunger-themed propaganda.252
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Chapter 3 Appendix

Infant and Adolescent Death Rates in Germany / 1,000, 1913-1921
Year
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921

Under 1
year old
151
164
148
140
149
158
145
131
134

1-5
years old
13.2
13.1
16.8
15.0
22.0
17.7
13.4
11.1
10.7

5-10
years old
5.9
6.1
8.4
7.7
8.7
11.6
7.7
6.4
5.0

10-15
years old
3.9
4.2
4.8
5.2
6.1
8.9
5.6
4.6
3.7

15-20
years old
6.5
10.1
15.1
15.1
23.1
33.1
11.5
9.4
7.2

[Table 2] Source: E. Roesle, “The Mortality in Germany, 1913-1921: The Effects of War Casualties and
Famine on Mortality,” Journal of American Statistical Association 20, no. 150 (June 1925): 168.

Female Death Rates in Germany / 1,000, 1913-1921
Year
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921

20-25
years old
4.0
4.1
4.1
4.4
5.4
11.6
6.2
5.8
4.4

25-30
years old
4.7
4.9
4.7
5.0
5.9
12.7
6.7
6.8
5.1

30-35
years old
5.3
5.4
5.4
5.7
6.6
12.4
7.2
7.0
5.5

35-40
years old
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.6
7.7
11.7
7.6
7.2
6.1

40-45
years old
6.9
7.1
7.2
7.5
8.9
11.5
8.3
7.6
6.7

[Table 3] Source: E. Roesle, “The Mortality in Germany, 1913-1921: The Effects of War Casualties and
Famine on Mortality,” Journal of American Statistical Association 20, no. 150 (June 1925): 171.
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CHAPTER 4
PRINT WARS AND THE ART OF PERSUASION:
LORD NORTHCLIFFE AND ANGLO-GERMAN PROPAGANDA
British Newspapers and the Press c. 1914
In an age where radio broadcasts and telephones were in their infancy, the printed word
was king. Newspapers were the predominant medium by which most Britons and
Europeans received their current political and socio-economic news at the start of the
First World War. The growth of the British press was due primarily to the sweeping
Elementary Education Act of 1870, which sought to spread literacy and ensure a basic
level of education for British schoolchildren between the ages of five and twelve.253
Subsequent amendments to the Act in 1888, 1891, and 1902, in addition to mandatory
attendance for children under thirteen, did much to lay the groundwork for universal
education in the decades thereafter. By 1914, children raised in this era of Gladstonian
Liberalism254 were now literate adults accustomed to reading or, at the very least,
encountering newspapers on a daily basis. Technological advances in late nineteenth
century industrialization and mass production equally made possible Fleet Street’s
meteoric rise.
Mass literacy afforded middle and lower working class Britons a window into
contemporary politics and entertainment, as newspapers could be purchased on most
urban street corners for as little as one penny. These “penny populars” reported on the
253
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latest political scandals in the country, offering salacious and up-to-date details to an
eager readership. The period from 1890 to 1910 saw a dramatic rise in newspaper
circulation throughout Europe and North America.255 This growth in circulation, coupled
with the abolition of tax on paper and advertising, meant that the Press held an enviable
position in early twentieth century Britain. Whitehall traditionally enacted legislation
with little regard for public opinion because politics were seen as “the special business of
kings, nobles, aristocratic persons[,]” and Members of Parliament (MPs).256 Yet the
popular press of Fleet Street, backed by advertising revenue and a surge in readership, did
not think twice about publishing a scathing opinion piece on the Government.
Indeed, the public’s clamour for information ensured that political parties paid
greater attention to the editorials of late Victorian and Edwardian newspapers. The
Liberal, Conservative, and Labour parties openly courted the favour of newspaper editors
and proprietors in the hopes of influencing public opinion to support their respective
agendas.257 “It was a comparatively easy task in prewar days to deal with the press,”
noted the Foreign Office’s head of Political Intelligence, Sir William Tyrrell, “[because]
the issues which presented themselves in the popular mind were mainly confined to
Anglo-German relations, and on this subject there was practical unanimity in our
Press....”258 The Kaiserreich, after all, provided a common enemy for both the Press and
Asquith’s government to focus their mutual distrust and condemnation.
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Patriotism and Propaganda: Two Sides of the Same Coin
The eighteenth century Anglo-Irish philosopher and statesman Edmund Burke argued
that along with the clergy, nobility, and the bourgeoisie, there existed another political
class or force independent of the established ranks of power – the Press or the “Fourth
Estate.”259 Much like the newly empowered Third Estate in France c. 1789-1792, the
Fourth Estate demanded a voice in political affairs. The press that Burke referred to were
conservative papers like The Times and Morning Post, which hired journalists to cover
debates in the House of Commons.260
At the outbreak of the First World War, The Times and Morning Post still
remained the reliable authority on domestic politics and foreign affairs, but now the
market was also saturated with countless other newspapers of varying journalistic quality.
While the British press was not homogeneous in its political outlook, there very much
existed a civic tradition of journalism whose goal was to report the news as it was
happening. The war then provided the Fourth Estate with an opportunity to prove itself
indispensible to the state. As historian and propaganda expert Gary Messinger aptly
notes, “the most conspicuous feature of British official propaganda… appears to have
been the extreme care taken by the British, even more than was the case in other
countries, to let nongovernmental sources do the work of opinion manipulation which the
Cabinet wanted done.”261 Patriotic journalism and official propaganda were ultimately
treated as two sides of the same coin in wartime Britain.
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In contrast to Imperial Germany where propaganda was highly regulated by the
state, the Liberal governments of H. H. Asquith and David Lloyd George actively
recruited successful authors and press barons to influence public opinion at home and in
neutral countries.262 In late 1914, the British Foreign Office established an official
propaganda department located at Wellington House in Buckingham Gate, London. Over
the course of four years the bureau published nearly 1,200 propaganda pamphlets aimed
at persuading Britons, the populations of the dominions and colonies, Americans,
Scandinavians, and allies like Russia and France to stand firm in their resolve against
German militarism. This was a war of words intended to reassure allies and neutrals that
Britain’s cause was just. Early war propaganda apportioned sole blame to Germany for
starting the war thereby justifying the need for British intervention.
A bold speech made by Asquith at Guildhall on 9 November 1914 best articulated
Britain’s war aims. Here, the Prime Minister called for the restoration of Belgium and an
end to the fighting in France. He also highlighted a respect for the rights of neutral and
smaller states and asserted that the Allies must wrest the Kaiserreich from the grips of
Prussian domination. Thus British propaganda sought to impart Asquith’s sentiments
through the release of patriotic posters and pamphlets.263 References to the German
“Hun” – a hulking and reprehensible character who had no regard for humanity – firmly
placed the enemy on the dark side of Manichean imagery of good versus evil. This type
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of literature was known as “atrocity propaganda”264 and was the specialty of Wellington
House and its famed authors like H. G Wells, Arthur Conan Doyle, Rudyard Kipling, and
Arnold Toynbee during the early war years.
However, vilification of the enemy was soon replaced by a greater need to
counteract German propaganda that charged the naval blockade was unlawful and
inhumane. The German War Press Office (Kriegspresseamt) targeted the Allies’ flagrant
disregard for international law as a means to gain support in the United States and neutral
Scandinavian countries. “The only useful slogan we have is ‘Freedom of the Seas,’”
remarked a Kriegspresseamt official in mid-1917. The Allied blockade was at the centre
of Germany’s propaganda campaign to discredit the enemy, but it ultimately proved
disastrous to their international credibility because of the inherent violence of the
submarine warfare with which Germany responded to the blockade. Wellington House
easily dispelled the German allegations by reminding Britons and neutrals that although
search and seizures were inconvenient, its intrusion on neutral rights paled in comparison
to lethal German aggression.265
The use of chemical warfare at the Second Battle of Ypres in April 1915, for
instance, or the sinking of the Lusitania the following month, and reintroduction of
unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917: these were all tactics employed by the
German High Command to achieve victory at whatever cost. It also was difficult for the
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Kriegpresseamt to decry the human cost of the naval blockade for fear of admitting its
effectiveness against the German civilian population. That would have been “tantamount
to an admission of Prussian vulnerability” and difficulty in managing domestic
resources.266 The Reich obdurately chose instead to downplay food and material
shortages for the duration of the war. By 1917, Wellington House had sufficiently
silenced German attempts to turn global opinion against the Allied naval blockade, and
by the following year the Allies were using the threat of a post-bellum blockade to hasten
the war’s end.
This chapter on wartime propaganda is part of a broader narrative on the growth
of civil-military relations in Britain during the First World War. It explores the
relationship between the tightening of the naval blockade and the intensification of antiGerman propaganda released by the British government in the later war years (i.e. 19171918). It argues that in harnessing the power of Fleet Street Lloyd George’s government
recognized the importance of the Press in controlling the flow of sensitive information.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the influential career of press baron Lord
Northcliffe. First, in his role as chairman of the British War Mission to the United States
and, later, head of Allied Propaganda in Enemy Countries, Northcliffe functioned as a
bridge between the civil and military elements in wartime Britain. His ruthless business
acumen earned him the moniker “the Napoleon of Fleet Street,” but it was his deft control
of First World War propaganda that had Adolf Hitler admitting in the interwar years:
“What we failed to do [in 1914-1918], the enemy did, with amazing skill and really
brilliant calculation… I, myself, learned enormously from this enemy war
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propaganda.”267
The Role of Censorship
Censorship was a tool that went hand in hand with Allied propaganda. Following
Britain’s declaration of war on 4 August 1914 the Foreign Office ordered the British
cable ship Teleconia to cut the underwater cables between the United States and
Germany, in effect, severing the fastest method of communication between the two
countries. This gave Britain an immeasurable advantage in the war of words to come. It
made Germany dependent on slower wireless telegraphy, where newspaper reports from
Berlin to Washington arrived considerably later than headlines from London. Secondly,
it isolated the Central Powers by forcing them to rely on often week-old press reports
from the Northern Neutrals, which made the practice of German espionage and
intelligence gathering much harder.268 It lastly provided Britain an opportunity to shape
public perception of the war at home and abroad with the help of Fleet Street and the
ever-expanding powers of DORA (Defence of the Realm Act) and Britain’s naval
blockade.
British newspaper editors were naturally loath to support any form of censorship
of the press. A January 1915 opinion piece in the left-leaning Daily Chronicle clearly
shows the influences against the success of the Asquith government’s initial calls for
voluntary cooperation: “To send an article to the Press Bureau is to invite a severity of
treatment which can easily be escaped by the simple process of not sending [it]. Some of
our contemporaries escape it in this way every day… A policy of this sort simply puts a
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premium on a newspaper not ‘playing the game.’”269 The tightening of measures under
the Defence of the Realm Act, however, made evasion of the censors much harder. The
act, amended on more than five occasions during the war, gave His Majesty’s
Government wide-ranging powers of state control unseen in peacetime. Under this
emergency legislation individuals, institutions, and companies were subject to
prosecution by civil courts if their actions – even indirectly – aided the enemy’s war
effort. To that end, posters or leaflets deemed unpatriotic were torn down and
confiscated, while those responsible faced potential jail time pending further
investigation by the British Home Office.270
Postal censorship was another mechanism used by the state to control the flow of
seditious and sensitive information. Letters to and from the front were routinely
scrutinized for their content – references to troop movements, war aims, and low morale
were blacked out altogether. Yet mail censorship in wartime was nothing new. Indeed,
King George III’s government tampered with mail in the American colonies in the
months leading up to the American Revolution and the practice became commonplace in
the Northern and Southern states during the American Civil War. Such measures after all
were “… necessary to check espionage, prevent merchandise entering or leaving
Germany and forestall efforts to promote uprisings by the circulation of seditious and
inflammatory literature,” argued Lord Robert Cecil.271 In an official address to the
American people in mid-1916 the Minister of the Blockade acknowledged the
inconvenience posed by mail censorship, but stated that all efforts were being made to
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return individuals’ mail within 48 hours. The implication was that innocent parties had
nothing to fear. Conversely, swift actions would be taken to shut down the business
operations of Britons and Americans who continued to trade with the enemy.272 How
were these restrictive measures met with in the U.S. and how did support for the Allied
war effort trump widespread dissent in Britain and America? To answer these questions
one must trace the storied career of press baron Lord Northcliffe.
Alfred Harmsworth: The Making of a Propagandist
Born Alfred Harmsworth in Dublin, Ireland in 1865, Northcliffe rose to prominence as a
newspaper magnate in the 1890s and first decade of the twentieth century. Known by
several biographers as the “founder of modern journalism,” he was able to reach an
unprecedented audience through his ownership of The Times, Evening News, and everpopulist Daily Mail.273 Northcliffe controlled 40 percent of the morning newspapers, 45
percent of the evening, and 15 percent of all Sunday newspapers circulating in Britain in
the opening days of the war.274 Newspaper headlines kept Britons informed about major
developments on the fighting in France and Belgium, and chances were high that those
headlines belonged to a Northcliffe-owned paper.
The press baron was a vocal proponent of British intervention in the Great War
and frequently criticized politicians and institutions that were seen as “soft” on Prussian
militarism. His censure extended to H. H. Asquith’s war leadership during the Shell
Crisis over the shortage of munitions in the spring of 1915, which helped, in part, to
topple the Prime Minister’s Liberal government and force him to take ministers from the
272
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Conservative opposition.275 Northcliffe’s continued criticism was then central to
Asquith’s replacement as prime minister by the minister of munitions, David Lloyd
George, on 5 December 1916, Lloyd George having shown in Northcliffe’s estimation a
greater determination to wage all-out war. Nevertheless, Northcliffe’s criticism with
British war policy did not stop, and his newspapers were unrelenting in their calls for
victory on the Western Front and an ever-tightening blockade of Germany in the North
Sea and Atlantic.276 While Northcliffe touted Lloyd George, to be “the man to win the
war,” he envisioned himself alongside the new Prime Minister formulating policy,
offering advice, and, ultimately shaping the peace settlement in Britain’s favour.277
Lloyd George’s War Cabinet colleagues regarded Northcliffe as the proverbial
“thorn” in their Prime Minister’s side. “Unscrupulous,” “dangerous,” and “he will not
rest until he is made [a] Dictator” was how one high-ranking advisor described him.278
The prime minister, however, saw another use for the loquacious and wily press baron –
wartime propagandist for His Majesty’s Government. From 7 June to 3 November 1917,
Northcliffe toured the United States as Chairman of the British War Mission in the hope
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of solidifying Anglo-American relations and harmonizing Allied war aims.279 Historian
J. Lee Thompson is right to argue “[that] by sending him [Northcliffe] across the
Atlantic, Lloyd George also schemed to muzzle the criticism of his newspapers and
particularly their support of the army against government ‘interference’ with strategy.”280
Thus, by appealing to Northcliffe’s patriotism and vanity, Lloyd George effectively
undercut the former’s public opposition while utilizing his vast influence and connections
abroad.
Although the U.S. had joined the Allied war effort in April 1917, Northcliffe’s
publicity campaign was a shrewd move to allay American fears of the war’s futility and
perceived ulterior motives of British policymakers. As early as January 1916, British
diplomats in Washington informed the Minister of the Blockade Robert Cecil “that there
was a growing feeling [in America] we were using the blockade for our commercial
advantage and to the injury of American trade.” This Foreign Office cable plainly
revealed the inadequacy of Britain’s pre-1917 diplomacy with the world’s largest neutral
power. When asked how to rectify the situation, Washington replied: “Get a good
publicity agent and put your case before the American people… who can understand the
legal technicalities of [the] blockade? Who is impressed by the nicely balanced phrases
of the official mind?”281 Northcliffe aimed to solve the transatlantic gap by eschewing
what he deemed the “elitist” diplomacy of Whitehall for a more transparent and open
dialogue with the United States.
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Compared to the frocked coat foreign secretary Arthur Balfour, Northcliffe was
seen as a new kind of Briton altogether. Dressed humbly in an old suit and rumpled hat,
his public addresses were impassioned speeches on the necessity of Anglo-American
cooperation. This war, he stated, “is a matter of whole nations in arms… Let every man
give to this War that concentration of thought and purpose of mind that have made his
business a success… Let everything else stand aside.”282 His speeches were also laden
with the message that Britain’s commitment to the Allied war effort was genuine and
unwavering. This last point went a long way to alleviate U.S. reticence concerning the
blockade’s wartime imposition and the notion that American Doughboys would be vainly
sacrificed for the political and commercial interests of Great Britain.283 Throughout the
First World War Northcliffe was commonly referred to on both sides of the Atlantic as
‘the Most Powerful Man in the Country.’284 He had travelled to America on more than
twenty occasions prior to his official visit in mid-1917 and was regarded by many in the
press as more American than British. While this did not endear Northcliffe to the old
guard of the War Cabinet, it firmly established his position as the British authority on
wartime public relations with the United States.
The Propaganda of Crewe House
Upon his return to England Northcliffe was appointed the Director of Propaganda in
Enemy Countries by Lloyd George in February 1918. This post, located at Crewe House
in Mayfair, suited the press baron’s talents remarkably well. He possessed an almost
uncanny ability to understand what type of propaganda would best foster dissent in the
enemy ranks and aid in shortening the war. For example, in a 10 June 1918 letter
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to foreign secretary Balfour, Northcliffe was adamant that:
Propaganda, as an active form of policy, must be in harmony with the settled
war aims of the Allies… We may be inclined to believe that every German is
something of a Junker, we have to remember that he is also a potentially
reasonable man. There is much evidence that the German people as a whole
desire above all else the cessation of the war. They are suffering more than their
opponents… [Yet] it must be made plain that we are prepared to continue a
ruthless policy of commercial blockade.285
This letter is significant for several reasons. Firstly, his rationale that Germans differed
little from their Allied combatants was in marked contrast to the propaganda released by
Crewe House’s predecessor, Wellington House. The latter agency chose to vilify the
enemy through the release of posters depicting the atrocities of the barbarous “Hun.”
Much of this imagery was based on familiar prewar stereotypes, which seemed dreadfully
outmoded to the War Cabinet by 1918. It lacked, for instance, the visceral impact of the
war’s grim reality – casualties were mounting daily while territorial gains were sporadic
and, even then, short-lived. Therefore, the principal aim of Northcliffe’s department was
to refashion propaganda in a way that would convince the enemy to lay down their arms
because the alternative seemed futile.286 Skilled in the art of marketing and mass
persuasion Lord Northcliffe was the ideal man to head this new agency.
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(a) The Balloon Post
Crewe House released its propaganda to the enemy via the Balloon Post or Luftballon.
Leaflets written in German were attached to an 8 x 20 foot air balloon and sent over the
frontlines into enemy territory. Once in mid-air the leaflets were released by a timed
spring-loaded mechanism, a process that was repeated more than a thousand times each
day and with great effect. By August 1918, Britain’s Balloon Post dropped 100,000
pamphlets per day and released a staggering 6.7 million leaflets in the last five and a half
weeks of the war. Moreover, Northcliffe ingeniously contrasted German prewar
stereotypes with its “war weary” 1918 counterpart.287 A few examples will suffice. One
highly effective leaflet entitled, “What are you fighting for, Michael?” asked German
soldiers “have you ever really thought for what you are fighting?... Your Kaiser has
decorated Hindenburg with the Iron Cross. What has he given you? Privation, sorrow,
poverty, hunger, for your wives and children, misery, sickness and tomorrow a grave.”288
This talk of Germany’s plight was followed by a cartoon leaflet in which the mythic
Germania is seen riding a chariot with a general, presumably Helmuth von Moltke the
Younger, and an admiral. The chariot is pulled by the German Volk and tempted by the
“carrot” of a quick victory in August 1914. The image is sharply contrasted with the
same figure after four years of protracted war. Now, in 1918, Germania has lost her
lustre and the German people have withered in size and are no longer content with the
ersatz or substitute victory promised by the German High Command.289 Prewar illusion
versus bleak wartime reality – that was the real genius of Northcliffe’s propaganda in
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[Figure 3] “Germania,” Hoover Institution Archives. An example of the type of propaganda released by
the Balloon Post. Note the difference between the hearty volk and High Command in 1914 and their 1918
war profiteering counterpart. Despite the withered appearance of Germania in 1918, the civil-military
leadership still managed to stockpile money in the rear of its chariot (i.e. on the backs of the German
people.)
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[Figure 4] “Seeherrschaft,” Hoover Institution Archives. Another pamphlet released by the Balloon Post
depicting Britain’s naval supremacy. The aim here was to demonstrate the impending Allied victory. It
acknowledges, for example, the German U-boat menace in the early years of the war. But using the simple
motif of compare and contrast, it effectively illustrates Germany’s reversal of fortune as the war
progressed.
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comparison to the staid, familiar images of Wellington House.
This was the first major instance where British policymakers used the blockade
for propaganda purposes by threatening its prolongation after the war. The Foreign Trade
Department had tried the previous year to “advocate exploiting the alarm already
manifested in Germany at the idea of a post-bellum trade war.”290 Yet the War Cabinet
dismissed the proposal as “a dangerous policy from which it might be difficult to draw
back [international] credit.” However, Northcliffe’s blockade related propaganda
succeeded because the threat was introduced at a time when rampant hunger and
malnutrition swept Germany and the United States was firmly aligned with Britain and
France against the Central Powers.291 Commenting on the success of Britain’s late
propaganda efforts, Northcliffe contended that “Had the German army been well fed and
provisioned, the effect might not have been [as] striking, but gradually weakened by the
merciless blockade of the Allies, German soldiers proved receptive to the insidious ideas
disseminated by the Balloon Post.”292
(b) Inter-Departmental and Allied Cooperation
Another achievement of Crewe House was its ability to coordinate and work seamlessly
with various Cabinet departments and Allied propaganda agencies in France, Italy, and
the United States. Although Northcliffe’s department was answerable only to the prime
minister, it was merely one important cog in Britain’s wartime machinery. By 1918, six
separate offices reported directly to David Lloyd George on all issues relating to
290
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propaganda.293 The Ministry of Information headed by Lord Beaverbrook (Canada’s
Max Aitken) was responsible for the distribution of British propaganda in Allied and
neutral countries, in effect, taking over the work of Wellington House in 1918.
Additionally, the Foreign Office maintained an interest in the propaganda released by
Beaverbrook and Northcliffe’s respective agencies, while the War Office’s MI7
department and the National War Aims Committee created in August 1917 focused on
domestic issues such as censorship and “counter-act[ing] war weariness and pacifism.”294
Finally, the longstanding Press Bureau continued its work under the umbrella of
the War Office to liaise with General Headquarters and soldiers at the front. Dispatches
from accredited war correspondents John Buchan and Henry Nevinson were then printed
in widely read newspapers like The Times, Daily Telegraph, and Morning Post, to name
only a few.295 “In the early days of propaganda,” bemoaned Robert Cecil when asked to
characterize the government’s relationship with the Press, “even Westminster was found
to be too far from Fleet Street.”296 One can see that this was clearly not the case by the
war’s end. Civilian involvement in the official propaganda effort was one of the
hallmarks of British civil-military relations c. 1917-1918.
All too often the web of government bureaucracy can become overly tangled.
Wellington House, for example, had very little day-to-day contact with either the War
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Office or Admiralty, yet worked closely with the Foreign Office. This division of labour
led to disorganization and inter-departmental rivalry as various departments competed for
creative control.297 No one agency held a monopoly on wartime propaganda; however,
the frequent interaction between Crewe House, the Foreign and War Office, as well as the
Ministry of Information and the Press Bureau was a significant improvement on earlier
attempts to coordinate propaganda.
Northcliffe was also keen on cooperating with the Allied and Associated Powers
to ensure that propaganda was utilized to its full advantage. On 14 August 1918 he held a
four-day long conference with foreign representatives in London to encourage a united
effort to tip the balance in the Allies’ favour.298 Various strategies were discussed to
exploit what Ludendorff termed “the black day of the German Army” – the highly
successful Allied attack at the Battle of Amiens (8-12 August). Not only did the battle
mark the end of trench warfare, it ushered in the last hundred days of the First World War
with a remarkable Allied advance of 19 km that broke up six German divisions and left
thousands of soldiers surrendering en masse.299 More than 50,000 German troops
became Allied POWs in the battle’s aftermath. Amiens was undoubtedly a turning point
for the Allies. It also provided Crewe House with some insight into the overall impact of
their campaign at a very pivotal stage in the war. Despite the German High Command’s
insistence that soldiers simply disregard the “lies” of the Balloon Post, “the large number
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of German prisoners taken with leaflets in their pockets [at Amiens] proved that these
[propaganda pamphlets] were doing their work.”300
The Success of British Propaganda and the Collapse of Germany’s Allies
What exact role did propaganda play in the enemy’s defeat? One cannot say for certain.
What is clear, however, is that the propaganda of Crewe House did one thing
exceptionally well. It ultimately reinforced the suspicions and fears of many soldiers in
the ranks of the Central Powers, where dissent and war weariness were palpable
throughout most of 1917-1918.301 By early 1918, “the Turkish resistance that had halted
[the Allies] at Gallipoli; the Bulgarians in the hills above Salonika, the AustroHungarian[s] on the Isonzo; and above all the German resistance on the Western Front
had ceased to be so formidable.”302 What follows is a detailed look at how enemy
propaganda affected each of the powers.
(a) Austria-Hungary
The political and ethnic composition of the Habsburg Empire was fragmented and fragile.
After 1867 one monarch ruled both the Austrian empire with its capital in Vienna and the
Kingdom of Hungary with its seat of government in Budapest. At its core a
constitutional monarchy, the Habsburg Empire had two distinct parliaments, each run by
its own prime minister (Karl von Stürgkh in Austria and István Tisza in Hungary). To
complicate matters further eleven major ethnic groups comprised this polyglot empire.
Nearly 53 million Germans, Czechs, Magyars, Poles, Italians, Slovenes, Romanians,
Ukrainians, Slovaks, Croats, and Serbs lived together under Habsburg rule.
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The Dual Monarchy was the name given to this multinational empire in the wake
of Austria’s defeat by Bismarckian Prussia in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. Indeed,
a political union or compromise (Ausgleich) with Hungary in 1867 was seen as the only
way to maintain Austria’s status as a Great Power in late nineteenth century Europe.303
By late 1916, the empire was entering its twilight phase. The much beloved and long
reigning monarch Franz Josef died on 21 November. His successor and great-nephew,
Karl, found himself head of an empire that was decaying from within. The young
emperor was sympathetic to the plight of Hungarian nationals who wanted autonomy
from Austria, but was ultimately in over his head.304
The structure of the Habsburg army was also flawed. “Designed not to fight a
major war but rather to maintain a delicate political balance in the empire,” is how Holger
Herwig described the cumbersome organization of their military. It consisted of three
wings – a combined Austro-Hungarian army and two national reserve forces; the
Austrian contingent or Landwehr and a Hungarian section, the Honved. Initially, German
was spoken in both the joint army and the Landwehr, while Hungarian predominated in
the Honved. Yet ethnic grievances in Bosnia and Herzegovina later forced the military to
include instruction in all eleven national languages.305 Communication between the
various wings was extremely challenging because the number of soldiers fluent in more
than three or four languages dwindled as casualties mounted and troops were reassigned
to new units.
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(b) Bulgaria
Bulgaria was a latecomer to the Central Power alliance, entering the war on 14 October
1915. Yet they were by no means new to the dynastic power struggle occurring in the
Balkans. The country’s prewar foreign policy helps to explain Bulgaria’s decision to take
up arms with an Austro-Hungarian-German-Turkish coalition against the Entente.
Tsarist Russia was all too eager to promote anti-Ottoman discord in the Balkans
following their defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856), which brought an increased
Turkish presence to the Caucasus and led Russia to again declare war on Turkey in April
1877. Emboldened by promises of Russian assistance and independence from Ottoman
rule, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania joined forces with the Romanovs to
beat back Turkish influence in the region. Their resultant victory spurred nationalist
desires and facilitated the creation of a Balkan League in 1912.306 The peace, however,
was short-lived as newly independent Bulgaria balked at the strictures imposed by the
pro-Russian League and declared war on Serbia, Romania, and Greece, sparking the
Second Balkan War (29 June – 10 August 1913). Ultimately, tensions between Greece,
Romania, and Serbia left the latter power alone in an alliance with Russia at the start of
the First World War.
Bulgaria’s decision to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers was nothing
if not pragmatic. Although Bulgaria’s King Ferdinand and Prime Minister Vasil
Radoslavov were pro-Austrian, they were in no hurry to side with one alliance over the
other. Instead, they waited until military intervention might prove fruitful. With the
Allies’ failure to capture Constantinople and secure a direct trade route to Russia, the
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Dardanelles campaign was the turning point for Bulgaria in mid-1915. Joining an
alliance with its erstwhile enemy (Turkey) was preferable to aligning with a more recent
foe in Tsarist Russia.307
The Bulgarian army made great strides in rolling back Serbian troops stationed
along its northwestern border. By December 1915, the combined forces of the German
11th Army, Austro-Hungarian 3rd Army, and Bulgarian 1st and 2nd Armies occupied
Serbia completely.308 With Serbia subdued the Central Powers turned to separate
geographical areas of interests – the Austro-Hungarians focused on the Italian and
Russian fronts, as Germany divided its attention between the Western and Eastern Fronts,
fighting for territorial control in East Africa, all the while waging a losing naval
campaign in the North Sea and the Atlantic. Bulgaria, in contrast, focused its efforts
exclusively on the Macedonian front for the remainder of the war.
On 28 September 1918, Bulgaria was the first Central Power to sue for peace and
be granted an Armistice by the Allies. The Bulgarian army simply lost its will to fight;
the country’s war aims had largely been met with the occupation of Serbia in 1915 and
important gains made by the Bulgarian 3rd Army in Romania in 1916-1917. The
German army had already transferred most of its Eastern and Southern divisions to the
Western Front in the build up to the Spring Offensive in 1918 (Kaiserschlacht), which
left only a small German presence in the region and signaled waning support for its
Balkan ally.309 A lack of support and communication from Berlin was one thing, but after
exporting the majority of its foodstuffs to Germany and Austria-Hungary for the past two
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years, Bulgaria was on the brink of starvation.310
(c) Turkey
A secret member of the Central Powers prior to the outbreak of war, Ottoman Turkey
formally entered the conflict on 29 October 1914.311 Turkey’s contributions to the war
effort were substantial, particularly against Russian and British (colonial) troops in the
Caucasus region and the remote mountains of Persia (Iran) and fighting the British
Expeditionary Force in the deserts of Palestine and Mesopotamia (Iraq), in addition to the
Gallipoli campaign of 1915-1916. Turkey’s military collapse was due more to internal
pressures stemming from the Arab Revolt beginning in the summer of 1916.312 British
and French officers stationed in Arabia, most famously T. E. Lawrence, promoted Arab
nationalism as a counterpoint to despotic Ottoman rule, a story that is outside the scope of
the present study. Indeed, Crewe House did not bother to circulate enemy propaganda
throughout the Ottoman Empire, leaving that task to Lord Beaverbrook’s Ministry of
Information.313
______
With the Central Powers overstretched both militarily and financially after three
and a half years of war, it was apparent to Crewe House that progress could be made in
attacking the enemy powers where they were most vulnerable. It is not surprising that
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Northcliffe and his chief propaganda experts H. Wickham Steed and R. W. Seton-Watson
selected Austria-Hungary, with its fragmented population and politics, as the first
destination for the pamphlets of the Balloon Post.314 The director of propaganda posed
two different options to the British War Cabinet on 24 February 1918. In the first
scenario or option “A,” Britain could work to secure a separate peace treaty with AustriaHungary. This would deprive Germany of their closest ally and show Bulgaria and
Turkey what would be gained by an early settlement, instead of waiting for a complete
military collapse at a later date. In the second scenario or option “B,” Britain would press
for the total disintegration of the Habsburg Empire.315
After careful deliberation the War Cabinet deemed that the two proposals were
not mutually exclusive. Anti-German propaganda could be used to plant the seeds of
discontent by encouraging non-German subjects to support the Allied cause, thereby
exacerbating ethnic tensions without promising the Southern Slavs their own state
following the war. This last point was vital for politicians like Arthur Balfour, who
stressed to Northcliffe the fine line between seeing an enemy vanquished and dealing
with the unwanted chaos of a fallen empire.316 Between May and October 1918 Crewe
House distributed 60 million propaganda leaflets of various languages behind AustroHungarian lines. The method of delivery varied; either the Balloon Post distributed them

314

Letter from H. Wickham Steed to Lord Northcliffe, 7 March 1918, The Times Archive,

London.
315

Letter from Lord Northcliffe to Arthur Balfour re: the benefits of a propaganda campaign
directed against Austria-Hungary, 24 February 1918, TNA, CAB 24/43, 282-283. Throughout his proposal
to the War Cabinet Northcliffe stressed the fact that of 31 million inhabitants in the Austrian empire proper,
only one-third of the population was stridently pro-German. Most inhabitants, for instance, felt more
loyalty and kinship with their cultural heritage (e.g. Magyar, Polish, Italian). Cultural affinity was even
more of a factor in the Kingdom of Hungary, where Northcliffe gathered from British intelligence reports
that half of their 21 million inhabitants were either “actively or passively anti-German.” Taken together,
the Habsburg Empire was ripe for disintegration.
316
TNA, CAB 23/5, 359(6).

114

or in a combined Franco-British-Italian effort leaflet-filled rifle grenades were shot into
the enemy’s camp. The campaign worked much the same way against the Bulgarians.
British intelligence agents stationed in neutral Switzerland, for example, reported that
Bulgarian troops were pushing for the expulsion of their king and a disassociation from
German war policy.317
Apathetic and tired from fighting the Allies on multiple fronts, “food was the
most emotive aspect of the problem” for Germany’s allies as a result of the intensification
of the hunger blockade under the Lloyd George government.318 Unlike Wilhelmine
Germany, which was dependent on foreign imports for its economic survival, AustriaHungary and Bulgaria were more agriculturally self-sufficient. Initially, they were able
to weather the effects of the naval blockade by implementing a system of rationing, on
the one hand, and through the power of the black market, on the other. Furthermore, as a
result of Russian setbacks on the Eastern Front, Austria was able to regain access to its
most significant agriculture province (Galicia) in June 1915.
The problem came, however, when plentiful Hungary found it difficult to supply
the Dual Monarchy with sufficient grain, meat, and produce. This became apparent as
early as April 1915 when, at a political protest in Vienna, the general sentiment was that
“Hungary treats us like a foreign country – like a state of the triple entente!” The
situation was compounded by the fact that while Hungary was Austria’s largest prewar
supplier of food, the Magyars were not legally bound to export goods to its imperial
counterpart.319 Shared political institutions, in short, did not necessarily make for an
equal distribution of wartime resources.
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By 1917, the same predicament was occurring throughout the Central Powers –
with a loss of manpower (i.e. labour), horses, and fertilizer to the war effort the home
front directly felt the impact of food shortages. The situation was dire in Austria, where
Viennese rations were slashed to a barely sustainable 830 calories per day in 1917.320
Similarly, the daily meat ration for Austrian troops in Italy was reduced over the course
of the war from 400g in late 1914 to 100g in early 1918. It has also been estimated that
75 percent of Bulgarian troops in Macedonia were starving throughout the winter months,
“[as] the sea blockade by the entente and the land blockade due to lack of railroad
facilities brought this about.”321
“We Were Hypnotized… as a Rabbit by a Snake”:
The Legacy of Britain’s Propaganda Campaign
Even before propaganda leaflets were found on German soldiers in the aftermath of
Amiens (August 1918) Northcliffe received intelligence reports in May and early June,
which indicated that German and Austrian POWs were regularly expressing surprise and
appreciation for how well they were fed in Allied hands. Crewe House ultimately used
this information to wear down the enemy’s resistance once and for all. The decision was
made to distribute leaflets with the price of common foodstuffs like bread, milk, potatoes,
butter, and meat in both the Pound Sterling and Reichsmark. Knowing full well the
scarcity of these items on the German home front and battlefield, this strategy capitalized
on soldiers’ malnourishment and exhaustion. It highlighted, for instance, the much
higher cost of goods in Germany than in Britain due to the Allied blockade and rampant
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German inflation, and served to remind them that unrestricted submarine warfare had
failed to starve England.
Letters accompanied these pamphlets from actual British and German soldiers to
their loved ones on the home front.322 Homesickness and a genuine desire for peace were
common elements to both letters, so as to break down enemy stereotypes and emphasize
the similarities between “Tommy” and “Jerry.” But their real purpose was to show the
great disparity between Britain’s and the enemy’s food supply. References to hunger and
appalling conditions populated German letters home, while they were noticeably absent
in British letters. The most effective leaflets though came in pictorial format. A single
image of POWs eating food or, as in the case of “Germania” and “Seeherrschaft,” two
contrasting images conveyed Crewe House’s message far better than any elaborate
text.323
Northcliffe sent a formal letter of resignation to Lloyd George on 12 November
1918 following the signing of the Armistice the previous day. Lacking his characteristic
flourish the short letter contained only two paragraphs in which he thanked the prime
minister for his continued “confidence” in the work of Crewe House. He made it clear,
however, that the department no longer served a purpose in peacetime.324 For a man who
attained great wealth and power on Fleet Street and reported directly to the prime
minister for the last two years of the war, was this resignation not in some way
premature? Did it not run contrary to everything the patriotic press baron had hoped for?
The answer, like so many aspects of Northcliffe’s career, is a complicated one.
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There is no doubt that Northcliffe sought a formal role in the peace process. Both
he and chief propagandist Wickham Steed stated as much in separate correspondence to
the War Cabinet. Steed argued that Crewe House could easily be transformed from a
propaganda department into “an agency for enlightenment” in order to procure a
favourable settlement for the Allies and the German people. Northcliffe, meanwhile,
brazenly requested that he “… be given, with the least possible delay, authority as
Chairman of the British War Mission to undertake this peace... in the closest
collaboration with the various departments of state until the final peace settlement has
been concluded.”325 This cable was sent to Lloyd George only a week prior to
Northcliffe’s resignation on 12 November. Highly suspicious of the propaganda
director’s motives the prime minister recalled in his memoirs that, “I curtly told him to go
to Hades.”326 Thus ended Northcliffe’s career in public service and, with it, his
unflagging loyalty to His Majesty’s Government. Edged out from the postwar settlement
Northcliffe remained disillusioned with Lloyd George’s Liberal-Conservative coalition
government up until his death in 1922.327
The impact of Crewe House, however, was more enduring. Newspapermen
influencing and even leading government policy was a novel concept in Britain even at
the end of the nineteenth century. It took the stalemate of the First World War for
politicians to truly harness the power of the British press. Their search for
unconventional solutions to the problem of an ill-equipped and understaffed state
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bureaucracy led to the creation of Wellington House following the outbreak of war,
followed by the Ministry of Information and Crewe House in 1917 and 1918,
respectively. In the postwar period a debate sparked around the question whether
propaganda actually helped or hindered the Allied war effort. Some Britons argued that
it prolonged the war by playing up stereotypes of the Hun and his barbarous ways. But
these sentiments were in the minority. Most contemporary British politicians and
historians have since agreed with Ludendorff’s assertion that his beleaguered troops
“were hypnotized by enemy propaganda as a rabbit by a snake.”328 Indeed, the novelty of
Crewe House was that it differed in both the tone and substance from the propaganda
released by its predecessors. Its sole purpose was to communicate directly with German,
Austro-Hungarian, and Bulgarian soldiers in order to create doubt and dissension in the
enemy’s ranks. British propaganda stressing territorial setbacks, inadequate food supply,
and mounting ethnic tensions undoubtedly contributed to the widespread malaise of the
Central Powers.
In a 1921 open letter to Lord Northcliffe the German-American journalist
Ferdinand Hansen summed up the power of the Balloon Post:
When you wished to influence the Germans you found it expedient to
resort to the truth, or to some semblance of the truth…You reported the
hardships borne by the German civilian population at home…
With the air black with aeroplanes and white with millions of leaflets,
he was not one to shut his eyes to the desperate situation in which he
found himself. When he went home on furlough he could see the woe and

328

General Ludendorff quoted in David Welch, Germany, Propaganda, and Total War, 19141918 (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2000). 250.

119

misery about him all too well. When he captured prisoners… how could
he not help contrasting their strong and well-fed appearance with his
own gauntness and that of his companions.”329
The propaganda of Crewe House did not cause Germany’s defeat in 1918, but rather
expertly exploited pre-existing grievances – the hunger blockade chief among them – to
the point that peace was seen as the only alternative to the carnage of total war.

329

Ferdinand Hansen, The Unrepentant Northcliffe: Reply to the London Times of 19 October
1920 (Hamburg: Overseas Publishing Company, 1921), pp. 10-11, BL.

120

Chapter 4 Appendix
“The Organization of Official British Propaganda, 1918”

[Figure 6] Source: Sanders and Taylor, 271. The diagram is the author’s own.
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CHAPTER 5
“AN END BY BULLETS IS PREFERABLE TO DEATH BY
STARVATION”: PEACE TALKS AND DISSENTING DIPLOMATS,
NOVEMBER 1918 - MARCH 1919
An Act of Hubris
General Erich Ludendorff realized that Germany had effectively lost the war on 28
September 1918. Unaccustomed to failure the quartermaster general suffered a mental
breakdown prior to admitting defeat.330 What troubled him most was the speed at which
the Allies were gaining strategic ground along the Somme and Meuse-Argonne rivers in
late September and the simultaneous collapse of the Bulgarian Army on the Balkan
Front.331 In addition to these critical military setbacks, the German Empire faced the
threat of widespread revolution on the home front, where calls for an immediate
Armistice came from both soldiers and citizens alike.
Rather than negotiate with France and Britain directly, the German government
contacted U.S. President Woodrow Wilson on 4 October 1918 with the aim to strike a
more lenient peace settlement based on the democratic principles of his recent Fourteen
Points address to Congress.332 The Germans hoped to capitalize on the perceived
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benevolence of Wilsonian idealism, which preached freedom of the seas and the removal
of many international trade barriers – possibilities for the postwar world that would
benefit Germany by curbing Britain’s naval predominance and foster a less Anglo-centric
world order.333 A peace settlement spearheaded by the American president was
ultimately the best-case scenario for German politicians looking to find their new “place
in the sun” post-1918.
German Foreign Secretary Paul von Hintze argued, for example, that
democratization was the key to winning over the American peace delegation and “the
best way to muffle the political aftershock that followed defeat” on the home front. What
he proposed to the German High Command (OHL) and the emperor was nothing short of
a revolution from above. This entailed liberalizing the government by extending the
franchise and amending the constitution to allow the populist Social Democrats (SPD)
greater political representation in the Reichstag.334 These reforms extended to the highest
ranks of government with the immediate resignation of Chancellor Georg von Hertling
and even von Hintze, himself.335 In von Hintze’s place, liberal-minded diplomat
Wilhelm Solf was appointed foreign minister, while known moderate Prince Maximilian
of Baden became chancellor just in time to sign the ceasefire request to the Americans.
The prince had grave reservations, however, about signing away Germany’s bargaining
power. Instead of blindly accepting Wilson’s Fourteen Points could not the German
army continue fighting until the government was in a stronger position to negotiate? By
labeling Germany the “vanquished power” on paper, did it not ensure that the Allies
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would demand further concessions in order to halt Germany’s economic progress after
the war? If recent history proved anything, as Prince Max reminded the German General
Staff in regard to Germany’s punitive treaty with Bolshevik Russia on 18 March 1918, it
was naïve to think that a victor would ever agree to a peace treaty that did not unduly
punish the losing side. Indeed, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk effectively marked Russia’s
withdrawal from the First World War and forced the country to renounce all claims to
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland, as well as arable land in the Ukraine, Russian
Poland, Belarus, and territory adjacent to the Black Sea in northeastern Georgia.336
The chancellor’s doubts were valid but the reality was that Germany had waited
too long to negotiate a better Armistice deal with the Allies. An emergency meeting on 2
October 1918 between the OHL and leaders of the interim government, including SPD
head Philipp Scheidemann and Matthias Erzberger of the Catholic Centre Party,
confirmed that Germany must immediately sue for peace: “[as] we can no longer win…
and [need to] put an end to the struggle in order to save the German people and their
allies from making further sacrifices.”337 Thus from 4 to 27 October 1918, multiple
communiqués were passed between Washington and Berlin to the exclusion of London,
Paris, and Rome. British and French politicians looked askance at this newfound rapport
between President Wilson and Prince Max. If Germany were to capitulate it ought to be
France and Britain who dictated terms rather than an American-led peace initiative. This
was the official attitude of Britain as its military and economic stranglehold of Germany
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continued in the final weeks of the war. Ultimately, certain events at sea helped
safeguard the Allies’ bargaining power at the peace table.
In a desperate bid that served no purpose other than to justify the anger of Allied
policymakers and citizens, a German U-boat torpedoed a British passenger liner off the
coast of Ireland on 12 October. More than 450 civilians were killed onboard the Leinster
as the ship sank less than fifteen miles from Dublin. Any sense of optimism that Wilson
might have had for the impending negotiations with Imperial Germany vanished that day.
He was decidedly harsher in his next communication with Germany, condemning the act
as both “illegal and inhumane.”338 Moreover, in counsel with trusted adviser, Colonel
Edward M. House, Wilson sought to distance himself from the Germans, believing that
the only hope for an equitable peace necessitated greater Allied involvement.
The sinking of RMS Leinster had a diplomatic impact similar to the Lusitania
disaster of May 1915. Both instances involved German submarines targeting civilians on
the high seas. The tragedies sparked international outrage and invariably strengthened
Wilson’s conviction to side with the Allies. Armistice talks stalled between Washington
and Berlin in late October as a direct consequence of the U-boat attack.339 Although the
president was still willing to work with Prince Max, he wanted assurances that Germany
was not simply paying lip service to American beneficence in order to launch an
offensive at a later date. He now demanded complete German acceptance of the Fourteen
Points, an admission of the military superiority of the Allies, and the promise of real
constitutional change within the Reich. A nominal cabinet shake-up was not enough
338
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proof that Germany was willing to capitulate once and for all.
Perhaps the killing of British noncombatants was justified by the OHL as the best
way to illustrate the unavoidable loss of civilian life during wartime. It is more likely,
though, that the attack was a reprisal in response to the continued presence of the Allied
naval blockade. Either way, it was an unnecessary act of violence that undermined their
initial peace overture and ensured that future German promises were met with
considerable Anglo-American skepticism.340 Foreign Secretary von Hintze was correct
to assume that a ceasefire was contingent on German adherence to the rule of law.
Subsequent Armistice talks with the Allies made this stipulation a definite requirement
for peace.
Article XXVI of the Armistice Agreement
Less than five weeks after Germany’s 4 October communiqué to President Wilson, Max
von Baden appointed Secretary of State Matthias Erzberger to negotiate a ceasefire with
the Allies. Erzberger was a liberal-minded politician and a longstanding critic of the war
among the Great Powers. He was, in short, the ideal German diplomat to negotiate with
the Allies and Associated Powers amid the chaos of war and revolution.341 A ceasefire
agreement was needed more than ever as Germany’s allies capitulated one by one in the
autumn of 1918. Ottoman Turkey, for instance, followed Bulgaria’s lead and concluded
an Armistice on 30 October, while Austria-Hungary signed a separate agreement on 3
November.342 With Germany isolated and facing imminent defeat Erzberger travelled to
Allied Headquarters to end the fighting that had ravaged much of Europe and the world
340
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for the last fifty-two months.
Convened around a small table in Ferdinand Foch’s railway carriage Allied and
German representatives signed the Armistice agreement outside the northern French town
of Compiègne at 5:00 a.m. on 11 November 1918.343 Present at the negotiations was
Supreme Allied Commander Marshal Foch, French Major General Maxime Weygand,
and British Admirals Rosslyn Wemyss and George Hope. Representatives from the
German army, navy, and foreign ministry accompanied the secretary of state, including
Major General Detlev von Winterfeldt, Captain Ernst Vanselow, and Count Alfred von
Oberndorff. When General Weygand read aloud the terms to the German delegation
there was a collective reluctance to agree to Article XXVI of the Armistice agreement.344
This controversial Article stipulated that the naval blockade would remain in
place after the Compiègne agreement, but that the Allies “would contemplate the
provisioning of Germany… to such an extent, as shall be found necessary.”345 Such
vague wording troubled Erzberger, who pleaded to Foch on the night of the Armistice:
“Article XXVI signifies the continuation, by the Allies, of an essential part of the War
during the Armistice,” and concluded by asserting, “This starvation policy of England…
The Allies will not derive any military success from that, yet the German people will
again most gravely be hurt.”346 Why did the Allies and Americans think it necessary to
include Article XXVI in the ceasefire agreement? What impact did the blockade’s
continuation have on the wider peace proceedings and the German home front? Did the
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Allied delegation have any moral or ethical reservations about allowing civilians to
starve? This chapter addresses these questions from the signing of the Armistice in
November 1918 to early March 1919 when the Allies finally began to comprehend the
dangers associated with maintaining the blockade.347
The Continuation of the Blockade after the Armistice
The prolongation of the naval blockade of Germany after 11 November has led one
historian to conclude that its retention “symbolize[s] the great lost opportunity for
postwar Europe… [where] the new reality was founded not upon Wilson’s high principle
but upon unnecessary starvation.”348 These are harsh words levelled against the Allies.
They eloquently characterize the injustice of targeting civilians in war, but the statement
lacks some historical context to accurately judge the Allies’ motives throughout the postArmistice period.
It is prudent then to reconsider Admiral John Fisher’s prewar assertion that “all is
fair in war.” This 1904 quote, which opened the dissertation, suggested that it would not
be immoral to implement a food blockade in the event of war with Imperial Germany.349
He maintained, for example, that it was necessary for the Royal Navy to quickly establish
command of the sea to prevent foodstuffs from being denied to a geographically isolated
Britain. This is understandable given that Britain on the eve of war was forced to import
more than 60 percent of its foodstuffs from overseas.350 Fisher’s argument does not take
into account the morality of targeting Germans on the home front, but neither does it
347
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promote the blockade’s continuance for strictly political ends. This was something of
uncharted territory for Allied policymakers and their respective armed forces. The Allied
naval blockade was considered a valuable instrument of war, yet how was it to be used
after the guns stopped firing on the Western Front?
(a) The French Argument
The need for retribution was a significant element in French decision-making. For
instance, centrist Premier Georges Clemenceau pushed for the economic sanctions to be
kept in place after the Armistice as a way to settle longstanding grievances over the
Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871).351 In 1871, Prussian forces annexed the provinces of
Alsace and Lorraine following France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871).
The Treaty of Frankfurt, which formally ended the conflict on 10 May, stipulated that
Prussia would take control of this strategic land. Before the treaty there was some
discussion among German policymakers about the benefits of appropriating AlsaceLorraine. In favour of the decision was General Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, who
commanded Prussian forces in the wars of German unification,352 and considered AlsaceLorraine to be more than just the requisite spoils of war.
This vast French territory, which bordered Germany and stretched from the base
of Luxembourg in the north to Switzerland in the south, represented an ideal opportunity
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for the newly unified empire to consolidate power in Western Europe. The area
encompassed the Vosges Mountains and a series of elaborate fortifications at Metz, and
was rich in iron and coal. These geographical advantages might deter France from
undertaking a war of attrition, or facilitate future military action against France.
There was also the delicate issue of nationalism to consider, as many residents in
Alsace-Lorraine spoke some form of German (either an Upper Rhenish or Alsatian
dialect).353 Thus the case could be made that territorial possession was simply following
linguistic and ethnic traditions, much like Adolf Hitler’s opaque justification for annexing
the Sudetenland in September 1938.354 Moltke and the German General Staff ultimately
wagered that the Kaiserreich only stood to gain from annexing the two provinces.
Alsace-Lorraine officially became a German imperial territory or Reichsland with the
ratification of the Treaty of Frankfurt on 10 May 1871. French census records reveal, in
total, that nearly 500,000 inhabitants emigrated from the two provinces between 1871 and
1910.355 The negative impact of Frankfurt cannot be underestimated, as deep-seated
revanchism underscored much of French foreign policy in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. The need to regain the “lost provinces” not only contributed to the
deterioration of Franco-German relations prior to the First World War, it undoubtedly
conditioned France’s terse response to German pleas for a lenient peace settlement in
November 1918.356
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The Franco-Prussian War cast a long shadow over French diplomacy, particularly
in regard to the punitive measures enforced by the German treaty (residents were forced
to legally declare their allegiance to either France or Germany; those who identified
themselves as “French” were forced to emigrate westward) and the escalation of violence
against civilians throughout the Siege of Paris. Indeed, Prussia sought to win a war by
attacking and investing the French capital in the autumn and winter of 1870-1871.357
Although Bismarck wryly predicted that, “eight days without a café au lait would suffice
to break the Parisian bourgeoisie,” it took more than five months of dwindling provisions,
the outbreak of tuberculosis, and bombardment of the city for Paris to surrender.358
Starvation was not the goal of Prussia’s attack on Paris. The siege was merely intended
to hasten victory by forcing the Government of National Defense to admit defeat. Food
queues were a daily inconvenience, with the young, elderly, and infirm suffering the most
from malnutrition. But widespread famine did not occur, as Bismarck ensured that
trainloads of food were brought in to relieve the city’s inhabitants once the peace treaty
was concluded.359
But this is not to suggest that the French Third Republic was only motivated by
long-standing revenge. Nowhere in the preliminary Armistice or peace negotiations did
Clemenceau argue it was France’s “right” to starve Germany in retaliation for 1871 or,
even the horrors of the last four years. The French premier maintained, however, that he
would be “betray[ing]” his country if the Allies relaxed their economic stranglehold of
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Germany: “Towns had been destroyed; over two million [French] men had lost their
lives; mines had been rendered unworkable; and yet what guarantees had France that
anything would be received in payment for all this destruction?”360 The latent power of
German militarism could not be trusted. To show mercy at this late stage could
jeopardize the victory won by the Allies on the battlefield and possibly the entire peace
settlement. The French, therefore, implored the British and American delegations to
maintain the Allied blockade of Germany throughout the negotiation process.
(b) The British Perspective
The idea of using the naval blockade as a political weapon was not just relegated to the
French delegation or the cunning propaganda of Northcliffe’s Balloon Post. It was also a
strategy increasingly favoured by the British Foreign Office, Admiralty, and War Office
in order to secure an early peace settlement with Germany.361 In fact, the latter
department argued throughout the negotiations:
We should retain our whip hand over Germany and obtain our peace
conditions; we should save her from Bolshevism and thus enable her to
be in a position to reorganize after peace… With the abolition of the
Blockade, and especially its machinery, we lose our power of coercion
over Germany; we run the risk of seeing Germany crumble and become
unable to pay any indemnity; we lose our trade [monopoly] to the neutrals.362
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This memorandum from the General Staff is telling in that it points to the myriad sociopolitical issues facing a vanquished Germany and briefly outlines Britain’s postArmistice blockade strategy to combat them.
Above all, the War Office wanted to ensure that there would still be a functioning
German government with which to negotiate a peace and settle on a sum of reparations.
The perceived threat of Bolshevism was a motivating factor for the Allies to insist on
“retain[ing] our whip hand over Germany…” until the ink had fully dried on the peace
settlement.363 The political collapse of the Imperial Germany in November 1918
effectively created a power vacuum where leftists (i.e. the Social Democrats) and extreme
leftists (i.e. the Independent Social Democrats) openly jockeyed for position. The impact
of the German Revolution is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, but suffice it
to say that the fear of anarchy in post-Wilhelmine Germany was very much at the
forefront of the British General Staff’s thinking in regard to the political benefits of a
post-Armistice blockade.364
Britain desired an end to the fighting and suffering of the Great War, but it was
unwilling to see Germany as the aggrieved party for several reasons. Chief among them
was the need to create a lasting peace in the spirit of the Congress of Vienna.365 The
1815 peace conference, which ended Napoleon’s reign as Emperor of the French,
established a balance of power on the Continent that lasted nearly a century. Like
Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany was viewed as the illiberal aggressor who
needed its power corralled and political destiny shaped by a coalition of liberal-minded
363
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victors. The Allies and Associated Powers, like the nineteenth century anti-Bonapartist
coalition of Prussia, Austria, Russia, and Britain, had only one chance to establish a
workable peace settlement. It was a burdensome task for all involved.
At the same time, the Treaty of Versailles was intended to be a “peace of
justice”366 – the ultimate legal proof that German provocation started the First World War
and, consequently, ought to bear sole responsibility for the war’s cost. Restitution rather
than retribution was the primary objective of the peace conference for the British
delegation.367 The retention of the Allied naval blockade was one of the surest ways for
Britain to realize this goal. In a report prepared by the Political Intelligence Department
of the Foreign Office and circulated to the War Cabinet in August 1918, Robert Cecil
noted:
Any announcement to Germany must convey a threat as well as an offer,
and it is an elementary principle that a threat should consist in facts rather
than words. What is the average German most afraid of? There can be no
question as to the answer. It is the economic predominance of the Allies…
on the other hand, what does the average thinking German hope for? The
answer follows from what we have already said and can be given in two
words – peace and plenty – and he is more and more beginning to realise
that the restoration of that domestic comfort after which his soul still hankers
depends upon the use made by the Allies of their economic control.368
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Although Cecil’s words left little room for doubt, a subsequent memorandum on
22 January 1919 listed the key advantages of continuing the blockade:
(1) The Blockade is the most effective weapon left to the Associated Powers
for speedily obtaining our peace terms; (2) The continuance of the Blockade is
calculated to secure an early peace; (3) If the Blockade is discontinued, even for
a short period, it will be impossible again to bring its machinery into operation;
(4) The Blockade means co-operation; its abolition means the most fierce trade
competition among the Associated Powers.369
It was ultimately the official opinion of the Foreign Office, in consultation with the
Admiralty, War Office, and Lord Northcliffe’s Crewe House, that the Allies should leave
the blockade in place for fear of jeopardizing their leverage at the peace table.
Lloyd George and the General Election of 1918
Political considerations similarly accounted for David Lloyd George’s decision to
announce an election in Britain twenty-four hours after signing the Armistice with
Germany. Lloyd George came to office in December 1916 when the Liberal party was
deeply divided over the war leadership of H. H. Asquith.370 Endorsed by the Fleet Street
press, including Northcliffe’s numerous publications, as “the man to win the war,”371
Lloyd George more or less managed the interests of Liberals, Labour, and Conservatives
while the war was ongoing and hoped to capitalize on the Allied victory with another
term in office.372 This election, however, was radically different than the last general
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election held in Britain in 1910.
Political allegiances had shifted during the war years to create a dynamic coalition
between the Liberals, led by Lloyd George, and Andrew Bonar Law’s Conservative
(Unionist) party. Liberal-Tory partisanship, in contrast, had not been an option for
Asquith in 1910. Locked in a fiery election battle with the Conservatives, Asquith had
been forced to rely instead on the fleeting support of the Irish Nationals and Labour in
order to win the vote. Conversely, the divisive issue of Irish Home Rule – compounded
by the violence of the 1916 Easter Rising and recent conscription crisis – precluded any
chance of Irish Republican support for Lloyd George’s 1918 election bid.373 The prime
minister, then, had two options open to him – align further with the Conservative party or
attempt to solidify his Liberal base by wooing back the disgruntled Asquithians.374 The
latter strategy was more uncertain because it involved appealing to estranged former
allies or, in some cases, enemies for their support. Thus, Lloyd George courted the
favour of Bonar Law and the Conservatives, albeit cautiously and with some hesitation.
But one question remained regardless of his political alliances: would the momentum of
the Armistice be enough to clinch the P. M. a victory at the polls?
Indeed, the social and political composition of the British electorate had changed.
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No longer was it possible to deny women the vote when many proved themselves capable
of labour-intensive factory work, courageous nursing efforts, and volunteer work with the
Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) and various other agencies. “My good lady,
go home and sit still,” was the advice of the War Office to women in late 1914.375 That
paternalistic mindset did not hold during the war and would not suffice when it came to
the postwar vote either. To reflect these changing social mores Parliament granted
women over the age of 30 the right to vote with the Representation of the People Act on 6
February 1918. The Act also enfranchised all men over the age of 21 and even allowed
19 and 20-year-old men to vote if they were servicemen. Overnight the franchise in
Britain nearly tripled in size from 8 million eligible voters to 21 million.376
Permitting women and young men to vote in the general election ensured that
voters’ concerns needed to be addressed more than ever. Labeled the “Khaki Election”
because of the government’s preoccupation with securing the veteran vote, the issues that
dominated the campaign logically focused on British postwar stability and security.
What assurances did voters have that the war would not resume at some point, and what
actions were being taken to combat the forces of German militarism and Bolshevism?
These questions were of paramount concern to Britons in the nine months following the
signing of the Armistice. The majority of Britons ultimately did not want a “soft” peace.
When voters headed to the polls on 14 December 1918 an overwhelming 47.14 percent
were willing to let Lloyd George and the Conservative wartime coalition represent their
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interests at Versailles.377
Marxist historian Arno J. Mayer has been quick to point out the groundswell of
nationalism that bookended the war years in Europe. Strident Balkan nationalism and
German autocracy sparked the initial outbreak of war. But Mayer is equally convinced
that the Allies contributed to a postwar atmosphere of self-interest and distrust by
cloaking their conservative rhetoric in the patriotism of the flag: “The British government
became the prisoner of this far from unorganized and undirected super-nationalist
impulse which packed Parliament with a majority of ‘hard-faced men.’ At the Peace
Conference Lloyd George never really dared relent on indemnities….”378 This depiction
of the prime minister’s campaign is somewhat unfair; calls to “hang the Kaiser!” did not
come exclusively from Whitehall. The coalition government merely vowed to prosecute
the peace with the same diligence and vigour that allowed the Allies to win the war.
Continuity and moral certainty was what the Lloyd George ballot represented to many
voters who saw Britain as the natural arbiter between “the punitive attitude[s] of the
French… [and] the more conciliatory approach of Wilson’s Fourteen Points.”379
Initial Relief Efforts
The Allies refused to lift the blockade of Germany for political reasons. That much is
plain. But the decision was not unanimously reached. Politicians and military personnel
377
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on both sides of the Atlantic questioned the morality of denying food to a country that
had already admitted defeat.380 Herbert Hoover, more than any other Allied official,
recognized the need to revictual Europe in a timely manner. As head of the American
Relief Administration and member of the Supreme Economic Council at the peace
conference, Hoover outlined the gravity of the “new world situation in food” in a widely
publicized address to the United States Food Administration on 12 November 1918:
“The war has been brought to an end in no small measure by starvation itself and it
cannot be our business to maintain starvation after peace.”381
He knew all too well the difficulty of provisioning war-ravaged countries as he
was Chairman of Relief Operations in Northern France and Belgium from 1914 to
1917.382 But the task of provisioning an entire continent was an enormous administrative
feat that seemed almost insurmountable to him. The population of Europe was 420
million in 1918. Denmark, Hungary, and Southern Russia had sufficient supplies to last
the winter without the help of Allied aid. That, nevertheless, still left him with 380
million mouths to feed. The population of Britain, France, and Italy stood at 125 million;
however, steps had been taken to ensure that the Allies would not go hungry. Thus, when
Hoover and his capable team of administrators set sail for Europe on 16 November 1918,
they were faced with the immediate prospect of feeding 255 million people.383
(a) The Hoover Plan
How does one begin to combat hunger on such a grand scale? Hoover’s answer was to
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prioritize aid based on political, rather than physiological necessity. In his opinion, the
Allies’ first concern must be to provision the 75 million inhabitants languishing under the
“German yoke” – Belgians, Greeks, Serbians, Yugoslavs, Czechs, and Romanians.
These people were sympathetic to the Allied cause and, as a result, ought to be helped
first in order to prevent starvation and further political dislocation. Next on the list of
those to feed were the 40 million people living in neutral countries – Sweden, Norway,
Switzerland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain, to a lesser extent.384 Neutrals had
traded informally with both the Central Powers and the Entente; however, overwhelming
pressure from the Allies and America’s entry into the war eventually compelled neutral
governments to deny foodstuffs to Germany as well. Hoover ensured that these countries
would be rewarded for their loyalty with food and essential matérial at the earliest
possible date.
His next priority involved significant aid to 50 million people in Northern Russia,
including an Allied contingent of British marines and U.S. soldiers sent to take North
Russia from the Bolsheviks in mid-1918.385 Transportation links were virtually
nonexistent in Russia due to heavy fighting on the Eastern Front.386 The rapid approach
of winter also meant “these groups are the ones that must enlist the sympathy of the
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American people and for whom we are prepared to make any necessary sacrifice.”387
Where did the Central Powers factor into Hoover’s relief plan? In his first official
statement after arriving in Europe on 1 December 1918, he detailed the plight of Germans
suffering from hunger and malnutrition under “a watertight blockade” and urged Allied
delegates to remember that although “justice requires [Germany] to make amends for
wrongs done, it cannot be accomplished through the spread of anarchy.”388 The German
civilian death rate had long overtaken the birth rate by l918 and the looming threat of a
socialist revolution did little to inspire confidence and stability in the new provisional
government. The installation of prominent socialists in Max von Baden’s government,
for example, along with the growing threat of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg’s
radical left-wing Spartacus movement, was proof enough for many Anglo-American
politicians that postwar Germany was rife with Bolshevism.389 Hoover, in short, believed
that this was neither the time nor place to use food as a weapon. The key to feeding these
people was quite obvious to him – the Allies needed to lift the blockade of the Central
Powers in order to free up more American supplies for the rest of Europe.390 He worked
throughout January 1919 to convince the Allies that the German merchant marine could
be used to transport American foodstuffs and, thereby, speed up postwar reconstruction
and the peace negotiations.
(b) Allied Obstructionism
But France and Britain were not as amenable to the Hoover plan. The French delegation
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refused to even consider Hoover’s proposal to lift the blockade, choosing, instead, to cite
the vague and debatable wording of Article XXVI of the Armistice agreement on the
need to provision the enemy.391 A certain amount of French recalcitrance was expected
after fifty-two months of fighting that resulted in 1.4 million French combat deaths. Yet
France’s apprehension had less to do with feeding Germany than how the enemy would
pay for these provisions.392 Would a line of credit be extended to Germany? If so, who
would provide the loan? Why should war-torn France offer any concessions when it was
Germany who ought to pay reparations? These were valid questions, to be sure. But they
effectively stalled Hoover’s reconstruction efforts in Central Europe until mid-March
1919.
“First one excuse after another has been found by one government after another
amongst the Allies… The uses to which the blockade on foodstuffs is being placed are
absolutely immoral,” wrote an irate Hoover to President Woodrow Wilson on 19
February 1919.393 These frustrations with the Allies are noted time and again throughout
his correspondence with Washington and professional dealings with the Supreme
Economic Council and Allied Blockade Committee.394 The American Relief
Administration particularly objected to the stalling tactics of Sir John Beale, head of the
British Food Ministry, who warned Hoover to not speak to the British press about the
‘The Fundamentals of Reconstruction,’ Book II, p.13-14, American Relief Administration,
HIA. Clemenceau insisted throughout late 1918 “… the blockade shall cease at the same moment as the
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blockade’s relaxation “until the Germans [have] learned a few things.”395 Ultimately,
Hoover balked at Beale’s suggestion, which was followed up with a dubious offer to lift
the blockade if, and only if, the U.S. agreed to lower the prices of its food exports to
Britain.396
There is little doubt that Allied obstructionism made the revictualling of Europe
much harder for Herbert Hoover and the American Relief Administration. Undercutting
their relief efforts in the hope of negotiating cheaper food for domestic consumption was
just one example. Perhaps the most unscrupulous incident involved the sale of 45,000
tons of rotten fish to Germany in return for $40 million in gold. The Allies initially
bought the fish from the Northern Neutrals as part of their preclusive purchase strategy in
1917. By mid-February 1919, though, the stockpiled shipment lay rotting in a
Scandinavian warehouse. It was the Allies’ intention to trick the German delegation into
making this tainted purchase. Fortunately, as Hoover recounts in his memoir, the
Germans notified him of the impending sale and he put an end to the “rotten” deal.397
Conditions in Germany
After representing Britain at the Armistice agreement Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss
informed Lloyd George “that the term that causes the greatest consternation among the
German delegates is the blockade, as they fear famine and sickness… Conditions in
Germany are far worse than we thought.”398 Most Britons, the War Cabinet included,
gave little thought to the daily struggle of the average German woman and her family on
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the home front. The prime minister was nevertheless compelled to send teams of British
army officers to Germany in order to assess the real health and wellbeing of its citizens.
Was Germany truly starving or were these cries for aid just clever propaganda? The War
Office’s fact finding mission began in mid-December 1918 and concluded in late
February/early March 1919 with some startling revelations that forced the Allies to
rethink the political necessity of their post-Armistice blockade.399
The first reports on the socio-economic conditions in Germany came from
Brigadier General H. C. Rees and Lieutenant A. Campbell. Stationed in Berlin between
12 and 15 December 1918, the officers declared that: “Germany appears to be completely
beaten and disorganized… The nation as a whole is on the verge of starvation… They are
hungry, very hungry… The one question in Berlin is: ‘when are the American or English
troops coming, and will they give us food?’”400 Each subsequent report from British
army officers confirmed Rees and Campbell’s initial assessment of the harsh living
conditions in Germany. For instance, the food situation was just as appalling in Saxony,
particularly in Leipzig in early January 1919, where officers were shocked by the gaunt
and sallow appearance of people walking the streets. Two weeks later, in Munich,
Captains J. E. Broad and J. R. Sommerville and Lieutenant D. Pease made three
observations to the War Office: (1) the region of Bavaria was dreadfully undernourished
(2) existing food supplies would not last more than two months and, as such, (3)
Germany needed to be provisioned by April in order to prevent the onset of famine.
Speaking broadly, “from conversation with all classes of Bavarians,” the officers reported
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that public opinion believed “the present situation would be greatly minimized by the
raising of the blockade.”401
On 2 February 1919, Captains E. Christie-Miller and E. B. Trafford spoke from
firsthand experience on the deteriorating conditions in Hanover. Both men had spent
nearly a year in the German city as prisoners of war. Thus, neither soldier was inclined
to exaggerate the plight of their former captor, which makes their analysis of the German
food situation all the more sobering. Their report focused specifically on the lack of milk
in Hanover; no one over the age of six was permitted a milk ration and dairy cows were
being systematically slaughtered for food. Desperation reached new levels when even
cows suffering from tuberculosis were eaten. The officers implored the War Office to
revictual Hanover immediately. It was their heart-felt opinion that humanitarian
considerations ought to trump short-term political gains. The blockade of Germany
needed to be lifted at once.402
General Foch, however, held the opposite view. In correspondence with the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stephen Pichon, Foch argued that “the strict
maintenance of the rules of the blockade is imperative from a military point of view…
The blockade, the severity of which can be increased or diminished according to
circumstances, will remain the best and most rapid means of obtaining respect for the
Armistice agreement….”403 Foch’s letter is significant for two reasons. First, it is dated
February 3rd – the day after the latest report from the British Expeditionary Force
officers detailing the widespread hunger and sickness of the German civilian population.
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This gives some insight into the difficulty of Allied decision-making c. 1914-1919. The
French firmly believed that the post-Armistice blockade would expedite the peace
process and lay the groundwork for a postwar economic alliance or, in the words of the
French Minister of Commerce, Etienne Clémentel, “an economic union of free peoples”
that did not include the Germans.404 As French historian Marc Trachtenberg has shown,
French economic policy c. 1918-1919 focused on promoting the political and monetary
benefits of inter-Allied cooperation after the war. Call it safety in numbers or a precursor
to the “corporatism” of the 1920s in the U.S. and Europe, Clémentel argued that France
would greatly benefit from price fixing and sharing resources with the other Allies by
reconstructing the French economy more quickly.405
Secondly, it reiterates the fact that most Allied diplomats viewed the naval
blockade as a control mechanism – akin to a light switch – that could be turned on and off
at the Allies’ will. But the problem with this line of thinking was that it did not take into
account the long and short-term implications of denying food to a country that had
already surrendered. After all, the terms of Article XXVI promised that the Allies would
“contemplate the provisioning of Germany…” after 11 November 1918.406 Four months
had already elapsed since the signing of the Armistice and the Allies were no closer to
contemplating any serious relief efforts in Germany. “I wish to preface my report on my
visit to Leipzig,” wrote Captain W. S. Roddie on 14 February 1919, “to those who have
had the opportunity of studying Germany from the inside, the policy of continuing the
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starvation of that country must appear not only senseless but utterly harmful to
ourselves.”407 At this crucial stage in the negotiations the post-Armistice blockade
proved more a hindrance to peace than anything else.
The Turn of the Tide
The flood of health reports from British officers stationed in Germany coincided with the
third and final renewal of the Armistice. German and Allied diplomats reconvened to
discuss the terms of the ceasefire at Trier in the Rhineland from 14 to 16 February. Just
as he had negotiated the initial agreement on 11 November 1918, Matthias Erzberger
headed the German delegation once more. This time, however, the Allies were met with
hostility from an embittered Erzberger who condemned their obstructionist tactics in
delaying the arrival of food to Germany:
Gentlemen… in wide circles of the German people I am asked quite
rightly: what is it the Allies want of us? We are making sacrifice after
sacrifice, and in the surrender of our resources we are going even to the
length of impoverishment. We do not want you to give us the foodstuffs
we need [for free], as we are ready to pay for them. Despite this[,] deliveries
have been postponed again and again, and we are going hungry. If the
Entente wishes to destroy us, it should at least not expect us to dig our own
graves.408
Erzberger’s words convey the atmosphere of distrust and suspicion that was clearly
mutual on the part of the Allies toward Germany and Germany toward the Allies.
Delegates on both sides left the Trier conference wondering what it would take to end
407
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this political stalemate. But two developments occurred in late February and early March
1919 that helped to turn the tide.
After pleading with the Allies to let them get on with the business of feeding
Europe, Hoover and the American delegation decided to approach the problem of food
relief in an entirely different manner. In a 20 February meeting of the Superior Blockade
Council,409 U.S. Chairman Vance McCormick chose to appear indifferent to Allied
requests for aid. He reminded the American Relief Administration beforehand that it
held the upper hand in any dealings with the Allies regarding food and finance, as the
Entente was heavily dependent on American aid. He wagered that it would only be a
matter of weeks before their feigned apathy compelled the Allies to relent. “[It] worked
like a charm,” revealed McCormick in his diary five days later, “… our policy of
indifference on the relaxation of the blockade is having the desired effect and the Allies
are now coming to us.”410 This was an important lesson for the United States to
demonstrate and an even more valuable lesson for the Allies to remember – U.S. aid to
European allies must not be taken for granted. France and Britain would ultimately need
to abandon their fixed notions of justice if they wanted to create a lasting peace.
The British delegation came to a similar conclusion based on the myriad reports
from army officers witnessing the level of deprivation on the German home front.
The officers wrote their findings independently of one another and were repeatedly left
with the same conclusion: “hunger is at the bottom of a good deal of the unrest.”411
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The tipping point came when the British Second Army, sent to occupy the left bank of
the Rhine in March 1919, was staggered at the level of chaos around them. These
soldiers fought at Ypres and contributed to the success of the Italian campaign. Indeed,
they were by no means inexperienced of the horrors of war. Their commander was
Herbert Plumer, a no-nonsense yet paternalistic general who distinguished himself as a
gifted administrator and patriotic soldier during the First World War. He commanded
equally the respect of his troops and Lloyd George’s War Cabinet. Therefore, Plumer’s
criticism of the appalling conditions in Germany could not be dismissed as simply
German alarmism or American interference in European politics.
Plumer submitted a damning report to Lloyd George by the end of his first week
in Germany: “In my opinion food must be sent into this area [Cologne] by the Allies
without delay… The mortality amongst women, children, and [the] sick is most grave
and sickness due to hunger is spreading. The attitude of the population is becoming one
of despair and the people feel that an end by bullets is preferable to death by
starvation.”412 The general went on to say that his soldiers were parting with their rations
in order to provide food to the severely malnourished civilian population. Revolutionary
turmoil was spreading throughout Germany and a deciding factor was the elusive food
promised under Article XXVI of the Armistice agreement. Furthermore, Plumer
expressed his opinion that British soldiers would either revolt or their resolve crumble, “if
children were allowed to wander the streets, half starving.”413
David Lloyd George had been reelected on a conservative pro-Versailles/German
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war guilt platform in the Khaki Election of December 1918.414 Yet he was now faced
with irrefutable proof that the post-Armistice blockade was morally questionable and
contrary to the Allies’ proposed reconstruction of Germany. After all, the aim of a
postwar peace settlement was to define new international laws and boundaries and
acclimate the vanquished power to their new, albeit checked, role in global politics. This,
as German historian Avner Offer explains, “helps to reconcile the loser to his defeat, to
accept its legitimacy and to acquiesce in his own punishment… [But] the blockade policy
after the Armistice deprived the Allies of such legitimacy.”415
For all the talk of “Allied” policy, the naval blockade of Germany was first and
foremost a British venture, and it ultimately took British intervention to lift the economic
sanctions.416 Secretary of State for War Winston Churchill wrote that these reports of
starvation in Germany were a “sudden punch”417 in the gut to Allied integrity. So much
of Allied strategy in the post-Armistice period involved the corralling of German industry
and its armed services. Yet, in doing so, the Allies were unnecessarily hindering the
postwar reconstruction of Europe. General Plumer’s report, corroborated by the findings
of other army officers, forced the British to confront the inhumanity of the blockade’s
prolongation. Subsequent meetings with delegates proved more fruitful once discussions
turned from sanctions and political leverage to talk of relaxing the blockade. One thing
became clear to all parties involved – death by starvation could not continue.
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Chapter 5 Appendix
“Hunger Map of Europe, U.S. Food Administration, 1 December 1918”

[Figure 8] Source: New York Times Current History: A Monthly Magazine, The European War, Vol. 10
(April-June 1919): 52.
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CHAPTER 6
“FAMINE IS THE MOTHER OF ANARCHY”:
PEACEMAKING, HERBERT HOOVER, AND THE END OF
ECONOMIC WARFARE, MARCH - JULY 1919
A Troubling Realization
At the start of the Armistice negotiations in November 1918 Herbert Hoover, member of
the Supreme Economic Council and head of the American Relief Administration,
estimated the cost of provisioning the “liberated populations” of the Central Powers at
$200 million.418 Aid was to be divided evenly per capita between Austria-Hungary,
Bulgaria, Turkey, and Serbia. Germany, however, was left to fend for itself. Never mind
that Kaiser Wilhelm II had abdicated the throne on 9 November, seeking refuge in the
Netherlands as his empire collapsed. The abdication of the Kaiser merely confirmed to
the Allies that a major power shift had occurred in Germany. Key members of the Social
Democratic Party (SPD) moved to replace the old authoritarian guard. Socialist
politicians such as Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann, for instance, headed the
provisional government that negotiated the Armistice with the Allies at Compiègne on 11
November 1918.419
Although the majority of the SPD members were essentially left-leaning
moderates,420 who were content to work within the bounds of a parliamentary system, the
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Allies could not easily classify them as traditional “liberals” or “democrats.” This
distinction caused Allied politicians to pejoratively lump the Socialists together with the
German Communist Party (KPD) and even the radical socialist splinter group – the
Independent Social Democratic Party or USPD. Together, these political parties
epitomized the dangers of “Bolshevism” in Allied eyes. Like a virus, one could try to
inoculate against its spread, but there was no cure for Bolshevism once the host became
infected.421 The virus could appear benign at first, yet it could easily mutate into a more
virulent strain as time progressed. In the words of British Prime Minister David Lloyd
George, revolutionary Germany was a “cholera area” to be avoided at all costs.422
In place of troops on the ground the Allied naval blockade was continued after the
Armistice in order to force the German delegation to sign the Treaty of Versailles.423
This chapter traces the fallout from the prolongation of the blockade once the Allies
became aware of the level of malnutrition and starvation on the German home front.
Official reports from British and American intelligence officers in December 1918
explicitly revealed the precariousness of the German situation. News of revolutionary
fervour and poor living conditions reached London and Washington in late February early March 1919, causing the Big Four Powers at Versailles – Britain, France, Italy, and
KPD (Communist Party) or the Spartacus League in an effort to violently overthrow Germany’s “staid”
political system.
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the United States – to reevaluate their surefire strategy to win the peace.
If the Allies could not maintain this economic stranglehold due to mounting
public health concerns and issues of morality, how could they be sure that Germany
would not resume military action once the blockade was lifted? This question confronted
the peacemakers as they sought to achieve justice for the 22 million Allied casualties of
the First World War.424 Indeed, faced with the prospect that the blockade’s retention
might be jeopardizing the viability of a stable European peace settlement, the Allies were
forced to admit that their great weapon of war proved too harsh for the intricacies of
diplomacy.
The opening paragraph of a U.S. Army report concerning the political situation in
Germany in March 1919 reads: “Germany appears to be marking time. The people are
waiting for peace, waiting for food and waiting for a constitution.” 425 But how long
could Germany realistically wait for the reconstruction process to begin? After years of
protracted warfare, where many Germans lost family members on the battlefield and
suffered chronic deprivation and illness on the home front, there was not much left for
civilians to give in terms of collective strength and fortitude.
“The Government that could to-day promise the people food could impose almost
any form of Government upon [the German] Empire which it desired.”426 That was the
assessment of Stephen Miles Bouton, an American journalist and foreign correspondent
stationed in Berlin throughout the post-Armistice period. His analysis on the necessity of
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filling the power vacuum in revolutionary Germany supports the findings of British and
American intelligence officers sent to assess the German food situation in the wake of the
Armistice. Both studies, for example, recount the daily struggle of civilians to feed
themselves and their families. Political rallies, devalued currency, long food queues, and
meager rations of little nutritional value – that was the reality of everyday life in
Germany c. 1917-1919.427 In fact, in the final year of the war and throughout the postArmistice period, it was not uncommon for residents in urban centres to slaughter a horse
in the streets or, worse still, eat meat from a cow infected with bacterial diseases like
tuberculosis or typhoid.428

[Figure 9] A photograph of Berliners standing over the carcass of a horse. By 1918-1919,
desperate and hungry Germans would eat virtually any protein they could find, including horses
and other sick or dead animals. Source: Imperial War Museum. Catalogue number: Q110883
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It is little wonder then that mortality rates in Germany skyrocketed even prior to the
global influenza pandemic of 1918-1919, which claimed an estimated 50 million lives
worldwide.429
Bouton and the Allied officers innately understood that the fragility of the nation
was determined by both its physical and political health. “I talked with very many
Germans of all classes,” stated Lieutenant A. Campbell, a British soldier in his midDecember 1918 report to the War Office. “They are hungry, very hungry; that is, all
except the superrich… They fear that food will not be given to them until all danger of a
Bolshevik movement is past.”430 Campbell was shocked by the physical deterioration of
civilians on the German home front and became convinced that the only way to contain
Bolshevism was to lift the naval blockade and allow Germany to re-enter the global
marketplace.431 It is significant to note that this recommendation was virtually identical
to the plan proposed by Herbert Hoover to the U.S. Food Administration on 12
November 1918. Yet, whereas Hoover’s initial attitude towards the German government
was reproachful in nature, even calling them “[a] group of gamblers in human life,”432
those on the ground were focused more on the immediate welfare of the civilian
population.
Despite his harsh words for the political and military leadership in Germany,
Hoover still advocated feeding the masses in order to bring stability to an ailing nation in
429
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the heart of Europe:
Unless anarchy can be put down and stability of government can be
obtained in these enemy states, there will be nobody to make peace
with and nobody to pay the bill to France and Belgium for the fearful
destruction that has been done. I would certainly approach this matter
with mixed feelings, having been witness to the long robbery of food from
women and children and the destruction of millions of tons of food at sea
and to the misery under which the millions amongst the big and little
Allies have suffered under the German yoke… [But] if we value the
preservation of civilization itself, we cannot sit idly by and see the growth
of this cancer in the world’s vitals. Famine is the mother of anarchy.433
Here was an extraordinary opportunity for the victorious democratic powers to shape
authoritarian Germany into a fledging democracy. The Allies had already committed
themselves on paper with Article XXVI of the Armistice, which agreed to “contemplate”
provisioning Germany throughout the peace process.434 Surely, a genuine offer from the
Allies to relax trade restrictions would be preferable to watching the most dominant
power in Western Europe “turn” Bolshevik.435
It was the opinion of those whose job it was to study the European food crisis that
the time had come to shelve political differences for the sake of global stability. After
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several weeks in Germany it was abundantly obvious to Hoover that, “there is no longer
any military or naval value attached to the maintenance of the blockade of enemy
territory. Its retention has political value… but these latter features require immediate
consideration because the political values may be entirely destroyed by its present harsh
condition.”436 This was a troubling realization for the leading authority on food relief to
admit. Hoover was, after all, the driving force behind the Commission for Relief in
Belgium (CRB), which supplied foodstuffs and matérial to nearly 10 million people
living in German-occupied territories in Belgium and northern France throughout 19141918.437 The CRB’s mandate was to offset the brutality and social and political
upheavals attendant with life under the “German yoke.” Therefore, it was not his first
instinct to supply the enemy with precious Allied resources. Moreover, although Hoover
realized that Germany was in desperate need of provisions, the peacemakers at Versailles
still needed some convincing.
Crafting the Peace: A Case of History Repeating Itself?
When the Allied delegates met at the French Foreign Ministry in Paris to craft the peace
settlement on 12 January 1919, they did so with the understanding that it would be a long
and divisive process. Their first order of business was to assemble the Supreme War
Council that would decide the fate of the former Central Powers. This led to the creation
of the Council of Ten, which consisted of David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau,
Woodrow Wilson, Vittorio Orlando, Japanese Prime Minister Hara Takashi, and their
respective foreign ministers: Arthur Balfour, Stéphen Pichon, Robert Lansing, Sidney
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Sonnino, and Uchida Kosai. The council meetings occurred daily throughout January
and February and were conducted primarily in English due to Clemenceau’s command of
the language and the Italian foreign secretary’s ability to speak it relatively well. Orlando
and Takashi, however, had to rely almost exclusively on the English-French translations
of the council interpreter Dr. Paul Mantoux.438
The peace negotiations officially commenced six days later in order to coincide
with the forty-eighth anniversary of the unification of Germany in the wake of the
Franco-Prussian War. In a symbolic act of power Wilhelm I, King of Prussia, was
crowned German Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors at the French Palace of Versailles on 18
January 1871.439 The Council of Ten, therefore, began the process to see Germany
stripped of its imperial glory on the historic date of the Reich’s creation. Clemenceau
and the French delegation thought it only fitting to pay back in kind the stinging
humiliation of defeat. The timing of the peace conference also reveals some significant
facts about the state of Great Power relations in 1919.
The European state system established by Napoleon’s conquerors at the Congress
of Vienna (1815) created a balance of power on the Continent that limited conflicts
between the Great Powers of Russia, Britain, France, Prussia, and Austria. Each power
acted as a counterweight to the expansionist designs of a rival power in the hopes of
mitigating territorial disputes or more general confrontation. Throughout the nineteenth
century this “Concert of Europe” aimed at preserving the status quo, that is, the existing
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power structure with Great Britain firmly at the top.440 Although Pax Britannica spanned
the century from the end of Napoleon’s reign in 1815 to the outbreak of the First World
War, British hegemony was increasingly challenged by the early 1880s.
Competition was fierce among the Great Powers over the “Scramble for
Africa”441 – the renewed push for colonial possessions that reignited imperial rivalries in
the last two decades of the century. “[In order] to remain a great nation, or to become
one, you must colonize,” argued French Prime Minister Léon Gambetta in a rousing 1881
speech.442 Gambetta’s nationalist outlook was indicative of the colonial aspirations of
many contemporary European politicians. The period was overwhelmingly characterized
by Germany’s bid for a greater imperial presence, as evidenced by Wilhelm II’s
aggressive program of Weltpolitik or “world policy.”443 There is little doubt that this
constant jockeying worsened Great Power relations prior to 1914. Indeed, the war’s
outbreak merely crystallized the previous half-century of unbridled nationalism.
Five years later the peacemakers at Versailles not only had to restore order in
Europe, they also had to create a new balance of power. The nineteenth century Great
Power system simply could not be re-imposed on the post-1918 world. Russia, for
example, was plunged into civil war with the October Revolution of 1917. Caught
between the moderate yet ineffectual leadership of Alexander Kerensky’s Provisional
440
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Government, on the one hand, and the Bolshevik-dominated Soviet councils, on the
other, the war on the Eastern Front took a backseat to the country’s bitter internal
struggles. The Bolsheviks wrested control of the government in Petrograd on 7
November (or 25 October according to the Julian calendar) with an assault on the Winter
Palace led by Vladimir Lenin and his Red Guards.444
Lenin finally broke with the Allies in early December 1917 by suing for a
separate peace treaty with Germany. Yet the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
Leon Trotsky, was reluctant to accept Germany’s “annexationist” demands without
attempting to negotiate a more favourable peace. In a bold move that surprised even
others in the Bolshevik delegation, Trotsky abruptly broke off communication with the
Germans on 10 February 1918, declaring that the two countries were in a state of limbo
with “no war, no peace.”445 The Germans did not take kindly to Trotsky’s diplomatic
antics. In order to convince the Bolsheviks to submit to their more stringent demands,
Kaiser Wilhelm ordered his troops to march eastward on 18 February. Germany’s
hardline approach ultimately worked. As First World War historian and international
relations scholar David Stevenson notes:
When it appeared that the Central Powers were no longer willing to make
peace the Bolshevik leaders were prepared in extremis to seek assistance
from the Allies, and the latter, for all their ideological distaste, would probably
have given it; but as soon as the Germans communicated their terms the
Russians accepted them, not bothering to negotiate in detail but preferring to
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swallow the medicine whole.446
Russian territorial losses notwithstanding, including Finland and the Baltic lands of
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russian Poland, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk allowed
Lenin and the Bolsheviks to consolidate domestic power, culminating in the creation of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) in December 1922.447
The transformation of Tsarist Russia into an upstart Socialist republic was just
one of the major issues facing the Council of Ten. The disintegration of the AustroHungarian Empire also challenged Allied diplomats to juggle the needs of various ethnic
groups without inadvertently pitting them against one another. The Balkan region was a
veritable powder keg of competing national interests even prior to the Russian Revolution
and the collapse of the Dual Monarchy in the final stages of the war. Thus, how were the
peacemakers to reconcile the democratic Wilsonian principal of national selfdetermination without sparking revolutionary fervour across Central and Eastern
Europe?448
The rise of the United States was another development that signaled the dawn of a
new era in international relations. It would have been inconceivable for a British
delegate at the Congress of Vienna to heed the advice of a U.S. president on European
446
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affairs. But the spectacular growth of the American economy over the next four to five
decades could not be denied. Average household wages in 1800 were one-third higher in
the United States than Western Europe. Furthermore, American industrial output in 1861
exceeded Russia and Prussia and was poised to out produce France on the eve of the
American Civil War. The United States, in short, was an undisputed economic
juggernaut by the end of the nineteenth century.449
The country had secured an enviable position in international affairs through a
shrewd combination of industrial might, strong financial markets, and a bit of
geographical luck. America’s distance from Europe meant that Woodrow Wilson could
even entertain the possibility of neutrality in August 1914 and, unlike the British
dominions, political and economic independence allowed the U.S. to remain neutral for
the majority of the war. Moreover, as the world’s preeminent financial power, American
credit largely funded the conflict, and thus American input at the peace conference would
be on par with the Great Powers.450
Yet President Wilson found it incredibly difficult to mount an effective peace
campaign once in Europe. The initial meetings of the Supreme War Council struck him
as overly formal and, at times, even frivolous. As historian Margaret MacMillan writes,
“every afternoon the doors opened and footmen carried in tea and macaroons. Wilson
was surprised and somewhat shocked that they should interrupt discussing the future of
the world for such a trivial event.”451 Beyond the obvious cultural differences, the U.S.
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president also had to overcome his own unpreparedness.
Secretary of State Robert Lansing, like many in the American delegation, was
particularly critical of Wilson’s performance at Versailles. Lansing depicts the president
in his memoirs as a high-minded, fish-out-of-water politician who failed to take charge of
the negotiations and was simply outmanoeuvred by his peers. Ultimately, despite
Wilson’s best intentions, what transpired was a series of peace talks that lacked focus and
an overall American influence:
He [Wilson] was inclined to let matters drift, relying apparently on his
own quickness of perception and his own sagacity to defeat or amend
terms proposed by members of other delegations. From first to last there
was no teamwork, no common counsel, and no concerted action. It was
discouraging to witness this utter lack of system, when system was so essential.
The reason was manifest. There was no directing head to the American
Commission to formulate a plan, to organize the work and to issue definite
instructions.452
The conference might have proceeded very differently had Wilson arrived in Paris with a
clearly defined peace agenda. But the president chose instead to tout the League of
Nations as a panacea to global strife.
The League was Wilson’s attempt to craft a sweeping solution to the major
diplomatic issues facing the Allies in a postwar world; its mandate was to resolve interstate conflicts peacefully in order to promote collective security and stability. The
organization was intended to reestablish a balance of power within a post-1918
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framework. This last point was essential to the League’s survival, as four years of world
war had clearly supplanted the nineteenth century Great Power system.453 If a new
political order was to emerge from the devastation of war, however, it needed to move
beyond generalities and good intentions. Lansing’s critique was harsh but it spoke to the
difficulty of conducting talks on a scale that would have confounded even the
peacemakers at the Congress of Vienna. Vienna was the historical model by which the
Allied and Associated Powers crafted the framework for the Paris Peace Conference.454
Peacemaking, unfortunately, is not an exact science and the study of the past could only
reveal so much to the Supreme War Council in their early meetings. The sheer scope of
Versailles – what its outcome meant for Germany’s role in postwar Europe – dictated that
the Allies look beyond a century old blueprint in order to achieve something of a lasting
peace.
The Humanitarian Argument To Feed Germany
One of the ways in which the peacemakers dealt with the broad scope of the conference
was to consolidate power in the hands of a select few. This concentration of power
occurred most sharply with the drastic restructuring of the Supreme Council when the
Council of Ten became the Council of Four in March 1919. First, the Japanese
delegation was dropped from the day-to-day proceedings. Then, the Big Four dispensed
with their foreign ministers to create a power dynamic that firmly centred on Lloyd
George, Wilson, Clemenceau, and Orlando. Dissatisfaction and resentments are naturally
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part of any negotiation process that involves the victor determining the fate of the
vanquished.455 But one issue that brought many German and Allied delegates together
was the controversy over the maintenance of the post-Armistice blockade.
The Council of Four was at a total impasse when Allied representatives met with
German delegates in the picturesque Belgian town of Spa on 4 March 1919. The
emergency meeting was called following the publication on 28 February of British army
reports in the London Times Weekly. It is still unknown who leaked the War Office files
to the press, but the article included this sobering observation made by Captain W. S.
Roddie in mid-February: “I believe that Germany at the present moment is on the brink
of a volcano[,] which may burst forth at any moment. It would be folly to suppose that
the ensuing disaster would be confined to Germany.”456 The “ensuing disaster” was, of
course, the spread of Bolshevism on the Continent in the wake of the Russian and
German Revolutions.
Roddie also highlighted the direct link between dwindling food supply and
political unrest in Germany since 11 November 1918. Although the Allies had promised
to modestly provision Germany throughout the peace process, he saw firsthand that “…
there has been no increase in the milk or fat rations since the Armistice.” The scarcity of
these everyday items placed the local authorities in a precarious situation. It could either
dole out these already meager rations on a “starvation basis” to avoid running out or,
“overapportion the supplies” in order to boost civic morale and thus avoid violence on the
streets. Both scenarios, however, presupposed that the Allies intended to fulfill their
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obligation to the Germans.457 The London Times Weekly article made it plain to British
civilians that it was in Britain’s best interest to furnish the enemy.
The British delegation finally took notice. After reading these documents it was
the opinion of Henry Wilson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (C.I.G.S.), that the
post-Armistice blockade “seems to me barbarous [because] we have no right to go on
starving the great mass of German women and children.” As Lloyd George’s top military
advisor at Versailles, he understood the desire to see Germany brought to justice, but was
not willing to achieve peace at the cost of human decency. “I am not prepared personally
to make myself responsible for defending the continuance of this system indefinitely,” he
persuasively argued in a memorandum to King George V and the British War Cabinet
after reading the full and, at the time, unpublished version of Roddie’s report. “Things
must be brought to a head, and either the war must be resumed, or conditions of peace
must be reached which are satisfactory for us and give the German people some chance
of life and work.”458
The fear of Germany plunging into a civil war like Bolshevik Russia was reason
enough for Hoover and Vance McCormick, Chairman of the American Commission to
Negotiate Peace, to advocate relaxing trade restrictions on Germany as early as
December 1918.459 Yet they would have to wait for the British to come to this realization
on their own. Ultimately, it took four months and the release of multiple army
intelligence reports to reveal that the post-Armistice blockade was an impediment to
peace. General Wilson’s memorandum was more than just an acknowledgement of this
457
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fact; it also put forth a compelling argument to lift the naval blockade based on
humanitarian considerations.
Within two days of the public release of the War Office files, Lord Robert Cecil,
in consultation with Hoover and McCormick, organized the Spa Conference for 4 March
1919. The conference began with an opening statement from Admiral George Hope,
whom the Germans regarded as a formidable negotiator at the initial Armistice talks at
Compiègne and, later, at the renewal of the Armistice terms at Trèves in January and
February 1919.460 He took the opportunity to warn the German delegation that no food
would enter German ports without the government first handing over all cargo and
passenger ships to the Allies.
Admiral Hope, in effect, demanded the use of the entire German merchant fleet
for the purpose of transporting American foodstuffs to German ports. The Allies were
prepared to give 270,000 tons of foodstuffs to the Germans. The country could also
import an additional 100,000 tons of grain from Argentina. The German delegation
expressed a willingness to relinquish the merchant fleet, but with the proviso that the
Allies agree to provision Germany until the next harvest. The Germans, after all, could
not surrender the only leverage they had at the peace table. Therefore, unless the Allies
signed an agreement to provision Germany monthly, the delegates would simply have to
agree to disagree.461
If the Germans were not ready to “bargain ships for food,” why did busy Allied
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representatives continue to meet with them?462 The diary of Samuel Shartle, a member of
the American delegation at Spa, provides a compelling answer. On the evening of 4
March, for example, he wrote: “Perhaps the League of Nations can cure Bolshevism,
perhaps not. While the League has been formulating, anarchy has spread – due to lack of
food and lack of peace. It is not an answer to say, let Germany suffer. Not only
Germany is involved… food won the war and food may win the peace – if the hungry
had more food and less promises.”463 Shartle’s assessment of the German food situation
closely mirrored that of Herbert Hoover. Both men believed that a stable, prosperous,
and well-fed Germany was a necessary bulwark against the spread of Bolshevism in
Europe.
Hoover and the American peace delegation took a practical approach to feeding
Germany by arguing that the Allies needed to rethink their strategy to win the peace. It
was in the Allies’ best interest to break with the recommendation of press baron Lord
Northcliffe and discontinue “… a ruthless policy of commercial blockade.”464
Northcliffe, of course, advocated continuing the blockade after the Armistice as a way to
highlight the “economic predominance of the Allies… [by] accentuating German fears
and hopes.” This strategy was seen as an extension of Allied propaganda released by
Crewe House in the final year of the war, when British intelligence revealed that the

British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour first used the phrase “bargaining ships for food” in a
12 January 1919 meeting of the Supreme War Council. See, Edward Frederick Willis, ‘Herbert Hoover
and the Blockade of Germany, 1918-1919,’ in the Edward Frederick Willis Papers, Box 1, HIA, 22.
463
Samuel G. Shartle, Spa, Versailles, and Munich: An Account of the Armistice Commission
(Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, 1941), 74.
464
‘Letter from Lord Northcliffe to Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour, dated 10 June 1918,’
presented at the Economic Defence and Development Committee Meeting, 18 September 1918, TNA,
MUN 4/6615.
462

170

average German yearned for two things above all else: “peace and plenty.”465
The Northcliffe plan was predicated on the assumption that the Allies could exert
more control over Germany at the peace table by exploiting the fragility of its domestic
situation. Perhaps greater concessions could be extracted from the German delegation –
higher reparations, German disarmament, and more territory – if they truly believed that
“Germany might be excluded from a future economic bloc… [because] she is excluded
from an existing bloc at the present moment… Having our club in our hands we should
be absolved from the necessity of flourishing it in print.”466 Northcliffe regarded the
post-Armistice blockade as a powerful weapon that could be used for great political and
propagandistic effect at the peace table.
This bold strategy first appealed to the Foreign Office and War Cabinet when it
received Northcliffe’s memorandum in mid-1918, and was still touted by Allied
Commander-in-Chief Ferdinand Foch in February 1919 as, “… the best and quickest
means of securing respect for the Armistice convention.”467 Yet serious problems arose
because the plan blithely treated the provisioning of Germany as a carrot that could be
dangled in front of the enemy. Although the conference failed to ratify an agreement that
satisfied both the Allies and the Germans, British and American representatives left Spa
more determined than ever to break the stalemate and lift the food blockade.
The Supreme War Council’s Response
British peace delegate and polemicist, John Maynard Keynes, viewed the deadlock at Spa
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as an opportunity to “bring matters to a head and attract the attention of the Great Ones
[at Versailles].” He suggested to Admiral Hope that the British representatives
immediately break off food talks with the Germans “and order our trains to return to Paris
that night [5 March]… so that when the Germans woke in the morning it would be to find
us flitted.” This highly “public rupture” was intended to send a message to the Big Four
politicians – and, of course, the Germans – that global access to food was a necessary
precondition of peace.468 Germany needed to relinquish its fleet and the Allies, in turn,
needed to facilitate the provisioning of Germany before any more time elapsed.
Having read in the press of Britain’s “dramatic adjournment” at Spa, Lloyd
George summoned Hoover, Cecil, and British Second Army Commander Herbert Plumer
to his office in Paris on 7 March 1919.469 The Supreme War Council was set to meet the
following day at the French Foreign Ministry and the British prime minister wanted
answers. He talked first with Plumer to see if the food conditions in Germany were as
dire as the army intelligence reports suggested. The general was not one to mince words.
Hoover vividly recounts the exchange between Plumer and Lloyd George in his
multivolume work on famine relief published in the last years of his life. As the Allied
Food Administrator tells it, the general impressed upon the prime minister that food
supplies were so scarce that “[everywhere] hordes of skinny and bloated children were
pawing over the offal of British cantonments.”470
Plumer feared for the wellbeing of the occupied civilian population, as lack of
food and Bolshevik uprisings tested the Germans’ resolve on a daily basis. He feared
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also for the wellbeing of his troops, who were torn between serving their King and
country and saving innocent people from suffering and starvation. Plumer’s main
argument to Lloyd George was that his soldiers should not have to decide which path to
follow; feeding the Germans and patrolling the Rhineland were not mutually exclusive
because the reconstruction of Germany depended on both developments occurring
simultaneously.471
Hoover was in complete agreement with Plumer that the post-Armistice blockade
was now “a constant plague to relief and reconstruction [efforts].”472 The clock was
ticking to transport American foodstuffs to European shores and any delay in the process
only risked more illness, unnecessary death, and political turmoil for Europeans. The
reality was that there were more mouths to feed than shipments of food available, which
explains why Hoover encouraged the Allies to relax the naval blockade on Germany as
soon as possible.473 Permitting the Germans access to food was not just a humanitarian
decision; it was the most prudent course of action because it would have allowed the
Allies to focus solely on crafting the Versailles settlement.
The role of food – both Germany’s access to it and the Allies’ control of it – took
on more importance than it otherwise should have during the negotiation process. The
Germans were desperate for supplies and thus highly motivated to cast off the burden of
economic sanctions, but the delegation was reluctant to give up the nation’s merchant
fleet in the event the negotiations continued into 1920. The German delegates stubbornly
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believed that possession of Germany’s merchant fleet was an insurance policy if the
peace talks stalled and the country needed to venture into blockaded waters in order to
feed the beleaguered masses. As the German Secretary of State Matthias Erzberger
noted, “… deliveries [of food] have been postponed again and again, and we are going
hungry. If the Entente wishes to destroy us, it should not at least expect us to dig our
own graves.”474 The Allies, meanwhile, regarded the naval blockade as an insurance
policy in the event that hawkish elements in the German government decided to resume
the war or refuse to sign the peace treaty.475 Either way, both decisions were motivated
by a desire to control the flow of foodstuffs into Germany as a way of leveraging the
peace. But recklessly gambling on the power of the blockade only hindered the peace
talks and bred unnecessary distrust between Germany and the Allies and even among the
Allies themselves.
Hoover informed Lloyd George “that, with the exception of Lord Cecil’s
assistance, [he] had received little cooperation since his arrival in Europe.”476 He was
stymied at every turn by the obstructionist tactics of the French, who brokered a side deal
to sell rotten fish to the Germans in February 1919 and repeatedly stalled American relief
efforts by clinging to the vague wording of Article XXVI of the Armistice agreement.477
He was equally dismayed at Britain’s extraordinary lack of foresight in continuing to
blockade Germany after the Armistice. Hoover reminded the prime minister that the
Allies blockaded Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria throughout the war, yet the bulk
of trade restrictions were lifted once each country signed a ceasefire agreement with the
474
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Allies in the autumn of 1918.478 What made the German case so radically different?
Should the country not be regarded in the same way as its wartime allies? Combat had
ended five months earlier and Allied politicians were still debating the merits of feeding
Germany. At this rate, if the French had their way, another five months would elapse and
there would still be no consensus on how to proceed.
Hoover illustrated the point by highlighting the issue of German fishing rights.
This was an issue of bitter contention for the Germans throughout 1919.479 The British
Admiralty unilaterally extended the naval blockade into the Baltic Sea on 28 December
1918. This move severed Germany’s remaining supply chain with the Northern Neutrals
and prohibited the country from even fishing for small amounts of food for domestic
consumption. The extension of the Allied blockade into the Baltic marked a line that
Hoover was uncomfortable crossing in light of Germany’s well-publicized plight. Both
he and U.S. Admiral William S. Benson thought it was an entirely “stupid strategy made
by admirals ignorant of food supply.”480 At this point in the discussion Lloyd George
asked Hoover to deliver a similar speech to the Council the next day. Hoover was taken
aback at Lloyd George’s suggestion, as he was inclined to think that the prime minister,
like Clemenceau and Foch before him, still regarded the post-Armistice blockade as an
effective weapon to ensure peace.481 Startled and “delighted” by Lloyd George’s
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reaction, Hoover ultimately agreed to attend the meeting but thought it “would carry
much more weight if it came [directly] from him.”482
Shortly after 3:00 p.m. on Saturday, 8 March David Lloyd George addressed the
Supreme War Council in the crowded office of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Fifty-nine council members attended the meeting, including the Japanese delegation, as
well as the foreign ministers of the Big Four. In addition to Hoover, Marshal Foch, John
Maynard Keynes, Étienne Clémentel, the French Minister of Commerce and Industry,
and Louis Klotz, the French Minister of Finance, were in attendance.483 The issue on
everyone’s mind was the outcome of the food talks at Spa. The abruptness of Britain’s
departure hinted at yet another breakdown in the negotiations with Germany. Lloyd
George confirmed that the trip failed to yield better results for the Allies. But what the
Supreme War Council did not know was that Britain’s hasty exit was not conducted
merely in a fit of pique. It was designed to elicit a strong reaction from the Council – be
it good or bad – to news of Germany’s plight.484
The Council members listened attentively as the prime minister described the
turmoil and despair witnessed by many Allied soldiers in Germany since the signing of
the Armistice. These publicized reports of widespread malnutrition and political
instability clearly indicated that the problems associated with blockading the Germans far
outweighed any short-term political gains. The reason for this was very simple:
The honour of the Allies was involved… the Germans had accepted our
armistice conditions, which were sufficiently severe, and they had complied
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with the majority of those conditions. But so far, not a single ton of food had
been sent into Germany. The fishing fleet had even been prevented from
going out to catch a few herrings. The Allies were on top now, but the
memories of starvation might one day turn against them… These incidents
constituted far more formidable weapons for use against the Allies than any
of the armaments it was sought to limit. The Allies were sowing hatred for
the future: they were piling up agony, not for the Germans but for themselves.
As long as the people were starving they would listen to the arguments of the
Spartacists [Bolsheviks], and the Allies by their action were simply
encouraging elements of disruption and anarchism. It was like stirring up an
influenza puddle, just next door to one’s self.485
Lloyd George invoked the imagery of Bolshevism as a contagious disease that had
infected Germany, as he had previously done in the War Cabinet.486 The aim was to
appeal to the overwhelming sense of fear among Council members that political turmoil
in key pockets of Eastern and Central Europe would spread to the rest of the Continent.
Conditions in Germany mattered a great deal to neighbouring war-torn states like
France and Italy. Their proximity to the “disease” dictated as much. But, as the British
prime minister learned, not all Allied delegates believed that the German situation was so
desperate as to warrant the removal of the naval blockade. Clemenceau, for example,
wondered why, “if the Germans were starving, as General Plumer and others said they
were, did they continue to refuse to surrender their fleet?” Could it be that “the Germans
485
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were simply trying to blackmail the Allies[?]”487 His first reaction was that Germany’s
refusal to hand over its merchant fleet indicated that their food supply was more than
adequate. Beggars, after all, cannot afford to be choosers under any circumstance.
Besides, as the French Minister of Finance reminded him, there was the allimportant issue of money to consider. It was one thing for the Allies to talk of
provisioning Germany in broad terms, but it was quite another to agree to supply the
enemy indefinitely with food transported and paid for by the Allies themselves.
Clemenceau instead recommended that:
the Germans should be made thoroughly to understand that the Allies allow
no nonsense in regard to the minute observance of the terms of the Armistice.
As soon as the Germans recognized this fact, [he] felt sure his colleagues,
M. Loucheur [the French Minister of Industrial Reconstruction], M. Klotz,
and M. Clémentel, who were ready to be guided by the feelings of humanity,
would easily arrive at an agreement in regard to the supply of food to
Germany, and the payment therefor.488
From the French perspective there was a compelling case to be made that the Allies ought
to move forward with the peace terms and worry about the reconstruction of Germany at
a later date.
Lloyd George, however, vehemently opposed the cavalier “wait and see” attitude
of the French and took the opportunity to thoroughly dismiss Clemenceau’s reservations.
Taking the floor once again, he noted: “General Plumer’s [report] disclosed a very
serious state of affairs… [which] the [Peace] Conference did not wish to create sympathy
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with Germany by a continuance of a system of starvation.” 489 Finally, he called on the
French prime minister to “stop these obstructive tactics, otherwise M. Klotz would rank
with Lenin and Trotzky [sic] among those who spread Bolshevism in Europe.”490 The
room fell silent. Clemenceau was rarely at a loss for words, but this was one of those
occasions. The meeting ended after two and a half hours with the French delegation
utterly chastened and the British having gained the upper hand in the food talks with
Germany.491
Brussels Food Agreement and the Relaxation of the Blockade
On 13 March 1919, representatives from the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and
Belgium (including Hoover, Admiral Wemyss, and European unionist Jean Monnet) met
with German diplomats in Brussels to discuss the ongoing food crisis.492 Lord Robert
Cecil, as Minister of the Blockade, used the intervening six days between the dramatic
events at the French Foreign Ministry and the opening session of the conference to devise
a payment plan in order for the Germans to receive food. Working closely with the
Supreme Economic Council, he presented a solution to the delegates right as they
departed for the Belgian capital.
Gold, Cecil believed, would break the deadlock. He informed the Allies that
Germany had not converted its gold supply into currency since before the outbreak of the
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war. Therefore, while the value of the paper mark was steadily declining, the country’s
gold reserves were still intact. The Germans had begged the Allies at Spa to provision
the country until the next harvest. What they were essentially asking for was a six-month
guaranteed food supply. The Allies had been prepared to give a single shipment of
270,000 tons of food and permit access to 100,000 tons of grain from Argentina. Yet a
thirty-day food supply was not nearly enough to eradicate hunger in Germany. There
was no way around it. The Allies would need to provision the enemy at least until 1
September 1919. A loan of £200 million would adequately cover the cost and shipment
of foodstuffs and, in turn, German gold would act as collateral for the loan.493
Admiral Wemyss presented this new financial arrangement to the Germans on 14
March. Reading the terms aloud, Wemyss informed the German representatives that the
Allies would allow Germany to import up to 370,000 tons of food per month from any
country. Germany, of course, still had to pay for the food. But now it could do so in the
following ways:
(a) by exporting commodities to neutral countries
(b) via credit in neutral countries
(c) through the sale of foreign securities or properties
(d) using foreign securities or properties as collateral
(e) by the hire of ships
(f) through the sale of gold if all other methods failed and providing that
the Allies agreed to the terms of sale 494
The signing of the Brussels accord marked a vital signpost in the overall relaxation of the
naval blockade. American delegate Samuel Shartle even went so far as to conclude,
“…the wings of the French seem to be clipped. They were when the English took charge
at Brussels in the negotiations about food. The results will have a good effect on order in
493
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Germany.”495 Within two days the German government handed over its merchant fleet
and the first of two instalments of £100 million in gold marks to the bank of a British
consul in Rotterdam as per the agreement. The Allies, in return, reinstated Germany’s
fishing privileges in the Baltic and formally began to revictual the country on 19 March
1919.496
Realizing that some critics would still object to feeding the Germans before the
Allies had even ratified the peace, Hoover released a pre-emptive bulletin worldwide on 1
April 1919. Entitled “Why We Are Feeding Germany,” the Allied Food Director wanted
to categorically dispel any doubts in the minds of naysayers. The future of Europe
mattered more to Hoover than a show of force or small victory at the peace table. He
believed that access to food was a basic human necessity, not a political promise to be
taken away or leveraged with the stroke of a pen:
From the point of view of my Western up-bringing, I would say at once,
because we do not kick a man in the stomach after we have licked him.
From the point of view of an economist, I would say that it is because there
are seventy millions of people who must either produce or die, [and] that their
production is essential to the world’s future and that they cannot produce
unless they are fed… no matter how deeply we feel at the present, our vision
must stretch over the next hundred years and we must write now into history
such acts as will stand creditably in the minds of our grandchildren.497
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The efforts of the American Relief Administration aimed to breath new life into stagnant
economies and facilitate the postwar reconstruction of Europe. But the peacemakers
needed first to step aside and allow the process to occur. Hoover feared that the Allies
were bypassing this crucial stage in the reconstruction of Germany in order to see justice
served.
His suspicions were ultimately warranted. The Brussels food agreement was the
culmination of five months of constant prodding and warnings from Hoover and various
intelligence officers detailing the famine conditions in Germany. Five months of
discussion as to whether to remove the blockade entirely or relax certain restrictions
piecemeal could have been five months better spent revictualling the country in the first
place. By early April, the British were fully aware of this miscalculation. Foreign
Secretary Balfour even sent a telegram to Second Army Headquarters asking General
Plumer to “preserve censorship” in the region over news of the partial relaxation of the
blockade. This was a last minute attempt to court the favour of the German people by
reminding them that it was Britain – not just the United States – who provided them with
food and an out-stretched hand when they were hungry: “Americans will claim that they
have been responsible for this raising of the blockade and are likely to take full advantage
of it in the Press. [But it is] desirable that H.M.G. should get equal benefit and that the
German Press should be given [the] idea that concessions are mainly due to [the] policy
of the British Government.”498
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The task of convincing the Germans was left to the British Chief of the Armistice
Commission, Richard Haking. An often-maligned figure in the historiography of the
First World War,499 General Haking agreed with Balfour that it was crucial for Britain to
take credit as a “prime mover” in the relaxation of the food blockade. He gained valuable
insight after discussing the matter further with German delegates General Kurt von
Hammerstein and Kurt von Lersner at the German Headquarters in Spa. Hammerstein
was especially quick to point out the extraordinary level of praise heaped on the
Americans by the German press; they were continually portrayed as “saviours” of the
German people. Yet the attitude of the German press towards the British government
was less clearly defined. Britain was not seen as outwardly conniving, but it certainly
was not viewed alongside Hoover and the American delegation as stalwartly
internationalist and humanitarian. But all of that could change, remarked the German
delegates, if Britain were to remove the remaining trade restrictions and honour the
Brussels agreement to provision the country until the autumn of 1919.500 It would have
undoubtedly benefitted the Allies to foster goodwill and amity with a new German
government that was both figuratively and literally indebted to it. In the end, however,
the peacemakers deemed it too risky to remove the blockade at this late stage in the peace
negotiations.
Both the diary of Vance McCormick (Chairman of the Superior Blockade
Council) and the minutes of the Supreme Economic Council reveal that the Allies, in fact,
formulated plans for the re-imposition of the blockade even after concluding the Brussels
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agreement. Spearheaded by the French economist Jacques Seydoux, the Big Four agreed
in mid-May to revoke the Brussels accord and reintroduce all trade restrictions in the
event that Germany refused to sign the preliminary peace terms.501 President Wilson
later described these council meetings as a series of “struggles with Clemenceau and
Lloyd George [in order] to hold them down to justice and reason.”502
Indeed, Wilson’s first preference was for a military occupation of Germany, as he
believed that the threat alone was enough to convince the Germans to sign the peace
treaty. What real harm would it have done to exert pressure that did not involve
leveraging the promise of food? When presented with this other option, Lloyd George
dismissed the idea as a costly and time-consuming gamble, while Clemenceau argued
that a military occupation was an insult to the Allied forces who legitimately won the
war.503 Clemenceau, unlike Lloyd George, was less concerned with the overall financial
cost in bringing Germany to justice. The Big Four could not put a price tag on achieving
the peace when honour and principle were at stake. Convinced of his moral certitude,
Clemenceau viewed the post-Armistice period as a Clauswitzian continuation of war by
other means. Why the Allies would ever consider dispensing with the blockade until the
war was truly over was beyond him. Speaking candidly to his Allied counterparts, he
thought “it may be useful to remind the Germans of the fact that the blockade shall cease
at the same moment as the state of war, and that what legally brings a state of war to an
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end is the exchange of ratifications.”504
Wilson, in his private correspondence with McCormick and Hoover, denounced
this “survival of the fittest” mentality that motivated the French delegation. He “felt
great pity for them,”505 but was resigned to the fact that there was little use in
discouraging their methods when the Allies were so close to ratifying the Treaty of
Versailles. Lloyd George felt much the same as Wilson. The most pressing issue facing
the peacemakers was to ensure that the hostilities did not resume. Their next priority was
to contain the spread of Bolshevism within Germany’s borders – steps were also being
taken to combat the Bolsheviks in Russia – before it threatened the very fabric of
European democracy. It was essential to postwar stability that these issues were resolved
as soon as possible. Then, and only then, was it time to settle the score.
The Allied and Associated Powers spent six months taking into consideration the
new role of Germany in postwar Europe. The peacemakers agreed that the country
should be stripped of its overseas possessions in Africa and the Pacific (Article 119) and
undergo a drastic reduction in its military and naval power (Article 160 and 181).506
Article 231, the so-called “War Guilt clause,” blamed Germany and her allies for starting
the war, while the reparations clause (Article 235) set the first sum of payments at 20
billion gold marks to be paid in full by April 1921.507 As short-sighted and implacable as
the treaty may seem, the peacemakers wanted to craft a system of checks and balances
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whereby Germany was held accountable for its reckless and continued aggression. But
did the peacemakers do the exact opposite in their haste to formalize a treaty? According
to many Allied participants in the peace negotiations, they certainly did.
John Maynard Keynes’ indictment of the Treaty of Versailles as a “Carthaginian
Peace” is the most obvious example. Less quoted, but equally evocative of the interwar
air of disillusionment with the peace settlement is South African general and Imperial
War Cabinet member, Jan Smuts, and his remark to Lloyd George that “such a chance
comes but once in a whole era of history – and we missed it.”508 British diplomat and
Middle Eastern expert, Harold Nicolson shared Smuts’ misgivings. In his memoir
entitled Peacemaking, 1919 (1933), Nicolson lamented the disorganization and lack of
serious political foresight by the Allied diplomats at Versailles.509
These negative perceptions of the peacemakers persisted after the Second World
War and continued until the late 1960s.510 It was only when historians gained access to
private French archives in the early 1970s (i.e. records concealed from the Nazis during
the Second World War) that a cogent revisionist argument emerged. Historians such as
Stephen A. Schuker, Sally Marks, and Marc Trachtenberg have used French documents
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to construct a more balanced narrative of the peace process.511 They argue that it was a
remarkably hard task to redraw national borders and create a new balance of power in
Europe following the war. The Big Four fared relatively well in their historical
assessment given these high stakes. There is a great deal of merit to this revisionist trend,
but one of the more significant mistakes the Allies made throughout the peace process
was in assuming that the retention of the naval blockade would hasten the peace
settlement and combat revolutionary upheaval.
In the short-term, the post-Armistice blockade made it difficult for the Germans to
refuse the Allies’ demands at the peace table, but at what cost to postwar credibility?
Herbert Hoover pondered as much in a letter to President Wilson: “I seriously doubt
whether when the world has recovered its moral equilibrium that it would consider a
[peace] obtained upon such a device as the starving of women and children as being
binding upon the German people.”512 After all, how could it be? Accepting the terms of
the Treaty of Versailles was the only means by which the Germans could guarantee
unrestricted access to food. It took five months after the signing of the Armistice for the
peacemakers to even begin to revictual the country.
The Brussels food agreement (14 March 1919) promised Germany the ability to
import up to 370,000 tons of food per month, but not a single shipment reached German
ports until the second week of July 1919 when the Treaty of Versailles was eventually
ratified. By then, hunger and disease had exacted a further toll on the civilian
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population.513 Approximately 800 civilians died from hunger each day the postArmistice blockade was maintained,514 which prompted German delegates to allege at the
peace table: “the hundreds of thousands of non-combatants who have perished since
November 11, because of the blockade, were destroyed coolly and deliberately after our
opponents had won a certain and assured victory. Remember that when you speak of
guilt and atonement.”515 This speech from Germany’s principal negotiator at Versailles,
Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, clearly illustrates the counter-intuitiveness of bargaining
food for peace.
On several occasions David Lloyd George aptly likened the spread of Bolshevism
in Germany to a festering disease – the problem needed containing before it subverted the
Allies’ genuine attempt to heal war-torn Europe. Yet how could Germany withstand the
threat of revolution when its people were waging a daily battle for survival on the home
front? The Allies ultimately realized too late in the peace process that Germany’s fragile
political state was closely tied to the overall health of the nation. The relaxation of the
naval blockade following the signing of the Armistice would not only have ameliorated
the plight of many Germans, it might also have improved Allied-German relations in the
interwar period. The ramifications associated with prolonging the hunger and suffering
of Germany would take years, even decades, to manifest. When they did, however, their
social and political impact was wide-ranging.
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CHAPTER 7
THE POSTWAR LEGACY OF THE HUNGER BLOCKADE
The Long Shadow of War
When asked after returning from the Paris Peace Conference if he was satisfied with its
overall outcome, David Lloyd George replied that, “I did as well as might be expected…
considering I was seated between Jesus Christ [Woodrow Wilson] and Napoleon
Bonaparte [Georges Clemenceau].”516 Beyond his usual withering critique of others at
the peace table, Lloyd George’s remark highlights the challenge of creating a lasting
settlement when strong personalities representing competing national interests were
forced to work together to build a new international order that could scarcely be imagined
amid the destruction of four years of war. Wilson, of course, was no New World messiah
and Clemenceau, although fiercely patriotic, was certainly not militaristic or tyrannical in
nature. Both statesmen wanted nothing less than to ratify a treaty that would guarantee
peace in Europe for the next one hundred years.
Lloyd George and the British peace delegation had a similar hope for postwar
Europe when they arrived in Paris in January 1919. But the reality of the Versailles
settlement was that no one left the peace table entirely satisfied. Alfred Zimmern, the
German-born classicist who represented Britain at the Paris Peace Conference, aptly
summed up the difficulty of constructing such a lasting and comprehensive settlement.
“Paris disgusted and depressed me more than I can say,” he revealed in a conversation
with fellow delegates Arnold Toynbee and James Headlam-Morley. “The Majestic and
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Crillion [the two hotels that housed the British and American representatives] were full of
unease and heartbroken men.”517 Headlam-Morley, who was the assistant director of the
Political Intelligence Department in the Foreign Office and author of the wartime
pamphlet, The Starvation of Germany (1917), expressed similar reservations about the
entire process: “I have not found one single person here who approves of it as a whole…
the total effect is, I am sure, quite indefensible and in fact is, totally unworkable.”518
The fact that the Allies were finally at peace with Germany – and, later, Austria,
Hungary, and Turkey upon signing separate treaties – meant that the naval blockade of
the Central Powers could be raised once and for all.519 The lifting of the economic
sanctions, however, offered no assurances that international trade and diplomatic
relations would resume along prewar lines for either the Allies or the Central Powers.
Indeed, the total cost of the war stood at $180 billion US. That staggering figure, in
conjunction with the 8.5 million soldiers killed in action, 21 million wounded, and more
than 8 million civilian casualties, clearly shows how the First World War cast a long
shadow over the twentieth century.520
France unquestionably fared the worst over the course of the war in terms of
economic strife, number of war dead, and the physical destruction of its territory.521
Although it is difficult to compile a definitive balance sheet of the war’s physical and
financial toll, the chart below, Table 4, illustrates the comparative “destruction of human
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and financial capital”522 based on prewar figures. In total, France’s war dead (1.3 million
soldiers and 350,000 civilians) accounted for just over 7 percent of the country’s
population between the ages of 15 and 49. Britain, meanwhile, lost over 3 percent of its
population ages 15 to 49 (723,000 troops and approximately 17,000 civilians),523 while
the United States suffered far fewer casualties (100,000 soldiers and 750 civilians) due to
its late entry into the war in April 1917.
Loss of Human and Financial Capital (% Prewar Assets)
Countries

Human Capital

Financial
Capital

Allies:
Britain
France
Russia
Italy
United States

3.6
7.2
2.3
3.8
0.3

14.9
54.7
-------------

Central Powers:
Germany
Austria-Hungary
Turkey and Bulgaria

6.3
4.5
6.8

54.7*
---------

[Table 4] Source: Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, “The Economics of World War I: A
Comparative Analysis, “Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association, Toronto, Canada (August
2005), 17, 31.
* This figure includes the German reparation bill and, in the case of human capital, does not include
civilian deaths attributable to the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918.
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First World War cost France more than 50 percent of its prewar assets, which persuaded
the peacemakers to offset some of the expense through German reparation payments in
the sum of 132 billion marks.524 Equalizing the monetary burden of the war was entirely
understandable. Most historians of the peace treaty have judged that John Maynard
Keynes reacted too harshly when he accused the Allies of “[not] making the future of
Europe their concern.”525
On the contrary, the Allies were concerned with the future of Europe; the
possibility that Germany would resume fighting on the Western Front and Bolshevism
would spread westward throughout Europe. But there were instances where fear trumped
other political and moral considerations. The decision to continue blockading Germany
after signing the Armistice was a prime example. In their attempt to stave off further
bloodshed and revolution, the peacemakers ultimately gave little thought to the long-term
implications of using food as a weapon against Germany.
The blockade’s retention allowed the Allies to craft a treaty that Germany had to
accept regardless of its objection to certain clauses. Hunger was, of course, a powerful
motivator that compelled the German delegation to sign the Treaty of Versailles on 28
June 1919.526 The British Admiralty, Foreign and War Office gambled that the
blockade’s continuance after 11 November 1918 would have “a hastening effect upon the
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[peace] negotiations” by forcing the Germans to summarily agree to the Allies’ peace
terms.527 Yet they clearly misjudged how the blockade’s strategic use throughout the war
and post-Armistice period would affect the peace in the years to come.
This chapter traces the postwar legacy of the Allied naval blockade and argues
that its destructive effects spurred two significant developments in international relations
over the course of the next thirty years. One major consequence of the Allies’ decision to
use food as a weapon during the First World War was a new prominence for international
relief organizations and their role in providing assistance to fragile, war-torn nations.
Several charitable organizations in Britain and America, for example, were either created
to combat hunger in Germany once the naval blockade was raised or lent their support to
the relief effort. Their initial attempts to send aid, however, were somewhat
controversial. With the economic sanctions lifted, many argued that the Central Powers
ought to take care of themselves. Although raising money for enemy children was not
regarded as an especially patriotic activity, the thought of “watching children starve to
death without making an attempt to save them”528 proved powerful enough for
organizations such as Save the Children and the Quakers to override the bitterness of the
war years.
Malnutrition was rampant throughout Europe in 1919, but Germany and Austria
were particularly affected because of the continuation of the Allied naval blockade. In
fact, more German civilians died of hunger during the eight months after the Armistice
was signed until the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles than in any single year of the
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war. A brief look at German casualty statistics over the course of the conflict shows that
nearly 350,000 civilians died from the effects of malnutrition from January 1918 to June
1919. It is remarkable to note that 40 percent of those deaths (or 140,000 civilian
casualties) occurred in the month of November 1918.529
Civilian Deaths in Germany Per Annum Since 1914-1919
* Total civilian deaths in Germany in 1913 = 945,835
Year

Military Deaths

1914

241,343

988,204

42,369

1915

434,034

954,706

8,871

1916

320,468

957,586

11,571

1917

281,905

1,000,433

68,598

1918

379,777

1,216,882

271,047

1919

14,314

1,017,284

71,449

1,671,841

6,135,095

473,905

Totals:

Civilian Deaths

Excess Deaths

[Table 5] Source: N. P. Howard, “The Social and Political Consequences of the Allied Food Blockade of
Germany, 1918-1919,” German History 11, no. 2 (1993): 166.

The second major legacy or consequence of the Allied naval blockade was the
political and psychological impact it had on German military and economic thought in
the interwar period. Access to food – either through domestic production and/or the
forcible requisitioning of goods – became an obsession with Nazi economists and
military planners in the years leading up to the Second World War. Their aim was to
ensure that Germany would never again endure the starvation, agony, and defeat of 19141919. Food experts such as the agronomist Herbert Backe, for instance, advocated that
the Third Reich should pursue living space (Lebensraum) in the East by starving millions
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of ethnic Slavs and appropriating their lands.530 Backe’s ruthless “Hunger Plan”
ultimately provided a powerful economic and racial justification for Germany to invade
the Soviet Union in June 1941.
Food and war invariably went hand-in-hand for many Nazis who had experienced
the effects of the Allied blockade as either hungry, demoralized soldiers or malnourished
children on the home front. As Adolf Hitler privately told a Swiss diplomat in early
1939, “I need the Ukraine, in order that no one is able to starve us again, as in the last
war.”531 Avoiding a repeat of the First World War, however, meant that other “less
desirable” races would have to starve in the next war. Although the Allies continued to
blockade Germany after the Armistice as a way to safeguard against renewed fighting
and the spread of Bolshevism by speeding the conclusion of peace, the political impact of
the prolonged sanctions was quite different and much longer-lived than intended.
Fight the Famine
Social activists in Britain and the United States regarded famine relief in postwar
Germany as a moral obligation. Many of them came from privileged backgrounds, were
well educated, and had a history of commitment to social reform in their own country. In
Britain, these activists had either worked or volunteered in army hospitals during the war
or were privy to the famine conditions in Europe as Members of Parliament, while ethnic
background (i.e. German heritage) and religious affiliation (the Quakers) were more
influential factors for anti-blockade activists in America. Other defining features of
the movement include the prominent role of women in famine relief work and the
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emphasis on helping children to overcome the hardships of war.
No civilian exemplified the relentless desire to feed the starving children of
Europe quite like Eglantyne Jebb. Born in Shropshire, England to a well-off Anglican
family in 1876, Jebb studied History at the first all-female college at Oxford and trained
as a primary school teacher in the late 1890s.532 Her first exposure to international relief
work came on the eve of the Second Balkan War (the spring of 1913) after learning of the
plight of Christians living in war-torn Macedonia from her brother-in-law Charles
Buxton. “Charlie” Buxton, a lawyer and former Liberal MP, had established the Balkan
Committee in 1902 with the help of Irish playwright and social activist George Bernard
Shaw, political theorist Leonard Hobhouse, and journalist and, later, government
propagandist Charles Masterman. The Committee’s objective was to draw attention to
the political instability in the Balkan region, an area that Buxton continually referred to as
“the danger point of Europe.”533
In 1903, the Committee expanded to include a charitable organization, the
Macedonian Relief Fund.534 As tensions rose again in the Balkans in 1912, Buxton
approached Jebb to personally supervise the distribution of Balkan aid. She eagerly
obliged and took up the cause, raising additional funds until her departure in February
1913.535 Her travels to Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Serbia brought her face-to-face
with strident nationalists whose religious and political zeal she found deeply troubling.
532
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She could not understand, for instance, why Catholic Albanians (a religious minority in
the region) were being massacred by Serbians simply on account of their religion.
At first, she thought the reports from British officials exaggerated the tensions
between the various ethnic groups, yet she later discovered that the Serbian military went
to great lengths to conceal the murders. Jebb’s time in the Balkans confirmed for her that
the prewar “distinctions of nationality and race had permanently lost their importance.”
What mattered more to her was an “insistence upon the unity of mankind.”536 She
approached famine relief in postwar Europe with a similar desire to rebuild the trust
between erstwhile enemies – this time, the Allies and the Central Powers.537 Jebb knew
firsthand from volunteering in the Balkans that children (and the elderly) were often the
first to suffer from the effects of war.538 The protracted and truly global nature of the
First World War meant that many more civilians fell victim to hunger, sickness, and
disease.
Both Jebb and her younger sister Dorothy, Charlie Buxton’s wife, were acutely
aware of the famine conditions in postwar Europe. In August 1915, Dorothy Buxton
began translating and publishing excerpts from French and German newspapers in order
to provide the British public with a more balanced view of the war. Readership of the
pamphlets skyrocketed and she hired additional linguists in Italian, Russian, Hungarian,
and Romanian to keep up with the public demand. Buxton’s excerpts were later
serialized in the Cambridge Magazine – a prominent intellectual publication with anti536
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war leanings.
It was obvious to the Jebbs that Britain’s blockade of the Central Powers posed a
great health risk to the people of Europe, as even countries allied with Britain
experienced serious hunger and deprivation. By early 1917, for example, reports from
the Romanian press told of the harsh home front conditions in which many froze to death
in their homes due to a shortage of coal. Meanwhile, it was not uncommon to see
children in the streets of Belgium and Luxembourg “searching dustbins [for food] like
starved dogs.”539 News that the Allies had signed a ceasefire agreement with Germany
therefore gave Jebb, Dorothy Buxton, and Buxton’s husband a sense of hope that the
worst of the famine was over. They believed that the conclusion of the Armistice was the
first step to restore peace and thereby save one more family from hunger and misery. In
the days that followed, however, Charlie Buxton’s secretary noted, “I shall never forget
the sense of crisis which pervaded the household,” when the family learned that the
Allies were continuing the blockade of Germany after the Armistice.540
The Jebb sisters were irate that the Allies would knowingly prolong the suffering
of millions for the sake of a signature on a peace treaty. Jebb, in particular, struggled to
reconcile her love of King and country with the continuance of a policy that she found
extraordinarily cruel. She further explored these themes of guilt and morality in a poem
on the post-Armistice blockade:
Now over our afternoon tea, dear friend,
Let’s consult together why
We’re starving sixty million people, between us,
You and I…
539
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Is it to make them accept terms of peace, which they otherwise wouldn’t?
Or is it to get hold of markets we otherwise couldn’t?
Do we want the food – though it’s more than
We could eat – for our own poor nations?
Or do we simply want to reduce the enemy population?
…The fact is I want to know what to say
When asked what my motives exactly were, by God, at the Judgment Day.
For I’ve an increasing suspicion,
Although hitherto I have hid it.
God will not let us off scot[-]free
When we say that the Government did it.541
Jebb wrote the piece in late November 1918 amidst the groundswell of British patriotism
that accompanied the defeat of the Central Powers and Lloyd George’s call for a general
election.542 Although the poem was never published, it clearly articulated her disgust for
the continued suffering of millions and explored the idea of personal guilt for the “sins”
or actions of a government.
Typical of both their social status and political outlook, Jebb and Buxton were
active members of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) –
a vibrant non-profit organization created in 1915 to promote a peaceful end to the war.
At a December 1918 meeting of the London chapter, the sisters decided to form a
political pressure group to raise awareness of the famine conditions in Central Europe.
Soon Marian Ellis, a founding member of WILPF and the wife of Liberal MP Lord
Parmoor, joined the cause and enlisted the help of her husband and his influential
friends.543 Parmoor’s political connections included Labour party leader Ramsay
MacDonald, G. B. Shaw, and author H. G. Wells. It was their vocal support and financial
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backing that led to the creation of the Fight the Famine Council on 1 January 1919. The
immediate goal of the Council was to convince Lloyd George’s government to raise the
post-Armistice blockade. The second and longer-term aim was to secure international
loans in order to purchase and transport food to famine stricken areas in Germany,
Austria, and Russia.544
Parallels can certainly be drawn between the monumental relief efforts of Herbert
Hoover’s American Relief Administration (ARA) and the aims of the Fight the Famine
Council in Britain. Both organizations recognized the doubly destructive nature of the
continued blockade; it possessed no military value after 11 November and forced Hoover
to divert precious foodstuffs intended for Allied, neutral, and liberated countries in order
to prevent further starvation in Germany.545 Hoover particularly resented how the Allies
– blinded by the power of the hunger blockade – repeatedly interfered with the ARA’s
ability to revictual Europe. He warned them against the long-term implications of
starving the Germans, arguing that famine-stricken areas were far more prone to political
extremism and violence than an adequately fed and well-cared-for population.546 Both
the ARA and the Fight the Famine Council knew that the only real cure for hunger and
disaffection was a massive dose of humanitarian aid administered closely by the Allies.
Save the Children
As the founder and general secretary of the Fight the Famine Council, Jebb wanted to
alert the British public to the fact that their government was starving the enemy after the
Armistice. She believed that the most compelling way to illustrate the devastating impact
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of the blockade was to graphically show the damage caused by chronic malnutrition.
Using photographs of German and Austrian children obtained by Allied medical doctors,
and given to Buxton in late 1918, Jebb distributed leaflets with a picture of a starving
baby to passersby in Trafalgar Square on 15 April 1919. The leaflets showed a small
female child in Vienna with a disproportionately large head supported by tiny limbs and a
shrunken torso (Figure 10). At first glance, the child’s body resembled that of a three to
five month old infant weighing just over 12 lbs. The leaflet stated, however, that the
child was actually two and a half years old, at least 16 lbs. underweight for her age, and
had failed to reach proper growth milestones because of severe malnutrition.547
There were millions of innocent children who were directly impacted by the
Allies’ decision to continue blockading the Central Powers. Conservative estimates, like
those listed in Table 5, suggest that Germany suffered nearly 500,000 “excess” civilian
casualties from August 1914 to June 1919. Meanwhile, Britons went about their usual
business – they shopped, went to work, raised their children, worried about their loved
ones at the front, and, of course, were grateful that the Allies finally defeated the
Germans.548
Jebb knew that she faced an uphill battle in convincing her country to look
beyond its grief and sadness in order to “save the children.” Public support would go a
long way into pressuring the government to raise the blockade, but she realized that
others either did not care what happened to the children of the enemy or simply would
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[Figure 10] A leaflet distributed by the Fight the Famine Council in Trafalgar Square in April 1919. Its
purpose was to raise awareness of the blockade’s devastating impact on the starving children of Europe,
especially those in enemy countries like Germany and Austria. Source: Clare Mulley, The Woman Who
Saved the Children: A Biography of Eglantyne Jebb, Founder of Save the Children (Oxford: Oneworld
Publications, 2009), Plate 16.
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not take the time to educate themselves. Either way, she persisted in educating the
masses, wholeheartedly believing that “… every tin of babies’ food which private effort
can send out comes as a token of sympathy and a message of new hope to some
despairing mother.”549 Thus the Fight the Famine Council tried to appeal to the kindness
and decency of most Britons, arguing it was a lack of public knowledge – not genuine
hatred of the enemy – that allowed the blockade to continue unchecked.550
Trafalgar Square, apart from being a very visible area in central London, was a
known site for public protests dating back to 1848 when the working class Chartists took
over the Square to protest parliamentary corruption. For both reasons Jebb selected the
site and she chose well, as thousands of leaflets were distributed that April afternoon. It
can be assumed that some passersby disposed of the leaflet without ever looking at its
contents, while others may have glanced at the image of the starving baby and given it no
further thought. Others, still, might have been outraged that they were being unfairly
asked to provide for the wellbeing of enemy children who “will only grow up to kill us
again in twenty-five years.”551 She nevertheless wanted to let people in Britain know that
widespread starvation was occurring at the hands of the Allies.
One particular group whose attention Jebb caught was the Metropolitan
Police. Although public protesting was not an illegal act, the distribution of “seditious”
material (i.e. the “Starving Baby” leaflets) was enough to arrest her under the Defence of
the Realm Act (DORA).552 There is no doubt that the arrest was excessive, yet it actually
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aided the Fight the Famine cause in a way that the Jebb sisters could never have imagined
possible. For instance, Jebb could have been fined £5 per pamphlet under the Defence of
the Realm Act. Several thousand were handed out in Trafalgar Square, but given that the
court could not determine exactly how many leaflets were distributed, she was only fined
£5 for the initial offense. The value of the fine was, of course, more symbolic than
punitive. Yet she still had to stand trial for sedition the following month. In front of a
packed courtroom at Mansion House, the official residence of the Lord Mayor of
London, Jebb maintained that she was innocent, brazenly telling the judge: “it never
occurred to me that a purely humanitarian plea had anything to do with the defence of the
realm.”553
The judge, however, was unmoved by Jebb’s testimony and found her guilty of
distributing political propaganda on 15 May 1919. In recounting the verdict to her
family, Jebb viewed the outcome of the trial as “equivalent to victory.” Indeed, upon
exiting the courtroom the prosecuting attorney felt compelled to reimburse Jebb the £5
and insisted she use the money for famine relief in Germany. That small yet symbolic
donation was the first of many that Jebb collected in an effort to ameliorate the suffering
of millions starving under the Allied blockade.
Capitalizing on the publicity of Jebb’s recent trial, Buxton used her husband’s
contacts to book the Royal Albert Hall as the venue to launch the creation of the Save the
Children Fund (SCF) four days later.554 “Save the children!” was the phrase Jebb yelled
to passersby as she distributed leaflets in Trafalgar Square; the name of the fund
conveyed the urgency of the cause by focusing on a large segment of the enemy
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population – young children – who were clearly not responsible for their government’s
misdeeds. The gathering at the Royal Albert Hall raised more than £30,000 for famine
relief in Central Europe. Furthermore, it brought national attention and political
legitimacy to a cause that hitherto had been considered unpatriotic in Britain.555
The next step was to bring international awareness to the humanitarian efforts of the SCF.
Undoubtedly, Jebb’s “greatest fundraising coup” occurred in the winter of 1919
when Pope Benedict XV lent his support to the Save the Children Fund with a donation
of £25,000. He had received a letter from the SCF several months before detailing the
extent of the famine and agreed to meet with Jebb in Rome. In addition to the private
donation, Pope Benedict vowed that he would write an encyclical letter to Catholic
bishops around the world asking that they take up a collection for the SCF in their
dioceses on Holy Innocents’ Day.556 Benedict’s letter marked the first time in the history
of the Catholic Church that the Vatican officially supported a non-denominational (and
humanitarian) cause. The result was impressive. Catholic parishioners worldwide gave
£400,000 – the contemporary equivalent of £13 million – to the Save the Children Fund
by the end of December 1919. As international awareness of the movement grew, so too,
did the donations. The SCF reached a landmark £1 million (more than £29 million by
today’s standards) by its first anniversary and even counted David Lloyd George’s wife
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among its more active members.557
Jebb and Buxton’s history with the Women’s International League for Peace and
Freedom, helped inspire the League’s founder, Jane Addams, to work with Hoover in
organizing a joint Quaker-ARA drive in the United States for famine relief. The
relationship with Addams sparked a very fruitful partnership with the American Friends
Service Committee (a Quaker based organization established to help civilian victims of
the First World War), which assumed the actual responsibility for feeding enemy
children.558 By late 1920, the Quakers had built more than 3,300 child-feeding centres in
88 cities throughout Germany. These centres were essentially small soup
kitchens/nutritional clinics that aimed to feed as many sick and undernourished children
as possible. Based on records from the American Relief Administration, the Quaker-SCF
child-feeding program served 293 million meals to more than 1 million hungry German
children by December 1921.559 Although the American Friends Service Committee
halted countrywide operations in 1922, the program continued for another two years
under the direction of Major General Henry T. Allen, the Commander of U.S. Army
troops in the Rhineland.560
Several conclusions can be drawn from the humanitarian relief work of
organizations such as the Fight the Famine Council, Save the Children Fund, and the
557
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American Friends Service Committee in the wake of the Allied decision to continue the
blockade after 11 November 1918. First, it points to the fact that knowledge of the
famine in Central Europe was enough to convince many high profile social activists to
protest its continuance. Time and again, they publicly risked appearing unpatriotic in
order to raise awareness of the ongoing starvation of the enemy. Second, it was their
emphasis on the needless suffering of children that struck a universal chord. Thousands
worldwide generously opened their wallets (and hearts) to a cause far greater than
vengeance or retribution. Morality was the overwhelming factor that motivated these
non-governmental organizations to feed and clothe the children of the enemy. In doing
so, they established an international tradition of postwar relief work that continues to this
day.561
But that is only part of the historical narrative. Charity was given to the Germans
primarily out of guilt over the death of civilians. Indeed, speaking as the newly
appointed Secretary of State for War, Winston Churchill was quoted in The Times as
stating: “it is repugnant to the British nation to use this weapon of starvation which falls
mainly upon the women and children, upon the old, the weak, and the poor, after all the
fighting has stopped.”562 Famine relief was too little, too late to help the elderly and
infirm. Humanitarian organizations had to prioritize which mouths to feed. Although
German children were fed first in almost every instance of postwar famine relief,
memories of the endemic hunger lingered long after the blockade was raised.
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National Socialism and the Push for German Autarky
The Allied naval blockade remained a potent “weapon of starvation” in German eyes for
years to come. Ultimately, it confirmed for German leaders how important it was to
avoid starvation in the event of another European war and catalyzed the push for
economic self-sufficiency in the 1920s and 1930s. Similar to Britain and the U.S. in the
years following the First World War, Germany turned inward after 1919 and focused on
domestic politics. This political shift – eschewing Realpolitik in favour of social and
economic concerns – reflected urgent necessity.
The Weimar Republic formally came into being after its first president, Social
Democratic Party (SPD) leader, Friedrich Ebert, quashed a series of uprisings by the far
right and the radical left.563 Ending the violence through the use of state sanctioned
paramilitary groups,564 signing the peace treaty, and a new democratic constitution, were
intended to bring much-needed stability to postwar Germany. These actions, although
well intended, nevertheless plagued the Republic with a sense of illegitimacy and
reputation for unpopular compromises.565 The new republic was also isolated within the
community of nations.
Unlike the Congress of Vienna, where the victors sat around the peace table with
the vanquished after Napoleon’s defeat, the Central Powers had deliberately been
excluded from the peace talks. Moreover, the Versailles settlement stipulated that
Germany should be denied entry to the League of Nations, the newly formed
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intergovernmental organization for collective security. Although the League later
overturned the decision in 1926 as part of a larger rapprochement with Germany, the
Republic was born of defeat and, consequently, spent the next four to five years sidelined
from international affairs.566
It took Germany until late 1925 for industrial production to function at 83 percent
of its prewar rate. The interests of German agriculture and heavy industry, as in most
countries, did not typically align.567 Prewar agricultural interests groups, such as the
conservative-minded Agrarian League, competed with the titans of German industry –
e.g. the steel company Krupp, chemical giant IG Farben, and electric company AEG – for
political favour and a greater share of gross national product. Yet the collapse of the
Kaiserreich and the inherent constraints of a fragile postwar economy provided a rare
opportunity for rural interests to finally align with the aims of big business. 568 Both
groups wanted the Weimar Republic to institute protectionist tariffs to promote the
consumption of domestic goods over foreign imports.
President Ebert and the Social Democrats, however, had already made it their
priority to reintegrate Germany into the global postwar economy. This meant promoting
free trade and pan-European cooperation; in essence, a complete reversal of the
protectionist policies of Imperial Germany and those espoused by the old Agrarian
League.569 Ultimately, two political parties were able to capitalize on the economic and
political uncertainty. Both emerged out of the rubble of the First World War and
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espoused similar extreme right-wing views on anti-Semitism, the Treaty of Versailles,
and national or völkisch pride.570
The first organization founded in 1918 was the German National People’s Party
(DNVP), who garnered much of the rural conservative vote in the 1925 Reichstag
elections.571 The second political party founded in 1920 was the National Socialist
German Workers’ Party (NSDAP, more commonly abbreviated as the Nazis), who
presented themselves as a “dynamic, modern totalitarian” movement compared to the
flagging influence and popularity of the old elites.572 Here were two clear alternatives to
the German Democratic Party (the moderate liberals), the Social Democrats, and even the
resolute Catholic Centre. Both the DNVP and the National Socialists appealed to the
more ardent of German conservatives, but only one party actually translated the people’s
discontent – both urban and rural and male and female concerns – into more electoral
votes.
The National Socialists were particularly able to capitalize on the widespread
economic and political uncertainty after the stock market crash of October 1929. They
won more than 18 percent of the popular vote in the watershed federal election of
September 1930 and became the second largest party in the Reichstag next to the SPD.
Under the fanatical leadership of Adolf Hitler, party membership rose dramatically from
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3,000 Germans in 1921 to 1.6 million in 1933.573 The appeal of National Socialism was
exceptionally broad-based; what started out as a primarily urban phenomenon quickly
developed into a full-fledged political ideology that attracted a wide cross section of
voters and devout party members.574
In his insightful study of the Weimar Republic, the late German historian Detlev
Peukert came to the conclusion that Germany’s defeat in the First World War was the
greatest factor that contributed to the nation’s “reversion to authoritarianism” in the early
1930s. Unlike previous historians of late nineteenth and early twentieth century
Germany, Peukert believed that there was no continuity in German history leading
directly from Otto von Bismarck to Hitler.575 The key to understanding the Nazis’
seizure of power (Machtergreifung), then, was in realizing that demography played a
significant and undeniable role in shaping Germany’s worldview.
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Peukert identified four separate generations who wielded power throughout the
Republic’s lifespan. First was what he referred to as the “Wilhelmine” generation. These
were contemporaries of the Kaiser and felt most akin to the Prussian conservatism of
Bismarck. President Paul von Hindenburg (b. 1847) and Foreign Minister Walter
Rathenau (b. 1867) were typical of this older generation. Next came the “Gründerzeit”
generation or those who were born in the era of unification (c. 1870). These men often
rose to positions of prominence in Weimar politics (e.g. President Ebert and Foreign
Minister Gustav Stresemann), and were unlikely to share the reactionary views of
National Socialism. Instead, Peukert maintained that it was the “wartime” generation
who had participated in the conflict (e.g. Hitler and Hermann Göring) or the
“superfluous” generation, who grew up during those years, like Heinrich Himmler (b.
1900), that were most affected by the postwar turmoil576 and most receptive to National
Socialist authoritarianism.577
Peukert’s demographic theory is by no means indisputable. The vast majority of
young German males and demobilized soldiers did not belong to violent paramilitary
organizations like the anti-communist Freikorps or Stahlhelm. Yet there is a definite
correlation between what he termed the “superfluous” generation born around 1900 and a
political tendency to align with revanchist views of Nazism. More than half of all party
members in 1933, in fact, belonged to this age category, while the next largest cohort
belonged to the “wartime” generation who “served only a limited and usually bloodless
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tour” of combat. These generations wanted to right the “wrongs” of 1918-1919 and,
unlike the postwar youth in Britain, America, and even France, only in Germany and
Austria had this generation endured mass starvation on the home front.578
The First World War had a profound impact on these impressionable youths who
formed the backbone of the Nazi Party. It was not a coincidence that they prioritized
German food supply after standing in long breadlines for small and tasteless quantities of
rations during the war:
Food shortages among soldiers on the front and civilians at home had deeply
demoralized Germany towards capitulation in 1918. It was both fear of a repeat
of the disastrous decline in civilian morale and a powerful sense of the German
people’s superior entitlement to food[,] which made the National Socialists
determined that the German population would not go hungry during the [next]
war.579
In his never published 700-page follow up to Mein Kampf (1928), Hitler envisioned that
portions of the Soviet Union would serve as the German version of the American
West.580 Although the concept of “living space” was not a Nazi invention, it was
certainly a longstanding component of Nazi ideology. Lebensraum, as a form of cultural
imperialism, entailed the confiscation of millions of acres of farmland in Eastern Europe.
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Hitler often spoke of the opportunities that awaited ethnic Germans who “heroically”
colonized the East through farming. The reality of attaining this living space, however,
was far less noble.581 In the end, it was not German farmers who secured more territory
for the Reich, but rather elite units of Wehrmacht soldiers tasked with the physical
destruction of an “undesirable” race. Once again, as in the First World War, food was
used as a powerful weapon to disarm the enemy.
Herbert Backe and the Nazi Hunger Plan
The Germany that went to war in September 1939 was a nation far more prepared to feed
its soldiers and civilians than the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm. German military planners
correctly predicted that Britain would implement a naval blockade in the event of war
with the Reich.582 Thus, they brainstormed ways to overcome the inevitable loss, as they
saw it, of global markets and access to foodstuffs. As early as October 1936, for
example, the office of the Four Year Plan was created to oversee the systematic planning
and implementation of Germany’s bid for living space in the East.583 As Agriculture
Commissioner of the Four Year Plan and State Secretary of the Reich Ministry of Food
and Agriculture, forty-year-old Herbert Backe was one of the chief architects of the
Nazis’ plan to economically exploit the Soviet Union.
Backe, like so many high-ranking Nazi technocrats, was part of the “superfluous”
generation born around the turn of the twentieth century. Too young to participate in the
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war, yet old enough to remember the stain of defeat and the Treaty of Versailles, this
generation of disaffected German youth often turned to political extremism in their
twenties. Backe first joined the SA or Stormtroopers (Sturmabteilung)584 in 1922 and
then formally joined the Nazi Party three years later. His formative years, however, were
not spent on the German home front. Instead, he was in the unique position of being born
to a German family who lived in Russia since at least the 1890s.585 As successful
German émigrés, his family found themselves the target of Russian distrust when the war
broke out in August 1914. They were immediately ostracized by the townspeople and
Backe spent the next four years in an internment camp deep in the Ural Mountains.586
His imprisonment in a country in which he had spent his entire life completely disabused
him of any loyalty towards the Russian people.
After the war, Backe’s family settled in Göttingen, Germany, where he studied
agriculture at the local university and later attended graduate school in Hanover. His
dissertation on the Russian peasantry and international grain market was considered too
radical by the deans at Hanover Technical University. They ultimately rejected his thesis
for its racially pejorative stance on the “inferiority” of the Soviet Union and denied him
his doctorate.587 Yet his views on Russian society closely mirrored those espoused by
Hitler and the Nazi Party. Backe believed that Russia, as the breadbasket of Europe, had
failed to live up to its economic potential because of inherent “Slavic backwardness” and
a parochial outlook on the world.588 He thought that Germany, in contrast, was far more
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innovative and racially “deserving” of territory presently squandered by the Russians.589
In the months before the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941
(Operation Barbarossa), Backe self-published his dissertation and copies were distributed
to the highest-ranking party members on the orders of the Führer.590 On the strength of
his Russian “expertise,” he devised a ruthless plan to secure adequate food for the
invading Wehrmacht troops and took measures to prevent Germans on the home front
from going hungry. The aptly entitled “Hunger Plan” was unveiled to senior Nazi
officials at a secret meeting in Berlin on 2 May. The plan called for the division of the
Soviet Union into smaller, separate territories based on their economic productivity (i.e.
the potential for economic exploitation).
The various regions of the U.S.S.R. were classified as follows; Belarus and
northern and central Russia were considered “deficit territories,” while southern Russia,
the Caucasus, and Ukraine were labeled “surplus territories.” The first category, as the
name implied, encompassed less profitable areas – farmland was either scarce and/or
urban centres were few and far between. The surplus zone, however, was considered the
crown jewel of the Soviet Union. These regions formed the agricultural heartland of
Eastern Europe and it was from this area that the Reich would establish an economic
stronghold powerful enough to withstand the enemy blockade.591 What was to become of
the deficit zone and how exactly did the Nazis intend to take over agricultural production
in the East?
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As was often the case with National Socialism, murderous policies were couched
in odd euphemisms and bureaucratic language. This is what the German-Jewish
philosopher Hannah Arendt called the “banality of evil”592 – countries were invaded and
lives were routinely eliminated by the Nazi regime all with the stroke of a pen. Quite
simply, it was as if items on a dinner menu were being discussed, rather than the
calculated and deliberate extermination of an ethnic or political group. The Nazi Hunger
Plan was no exception. The proposal boldly called for the deficit regions to be sealed off
from the rest of the Soviet Union. No food could leave the surplus zone unless it was
intended for German soldiers or transported back to Berlin. This effectively meant that
people in northern and central Russia were left to starve to death.
The famine in Eastern Europe was “unavoidable” because, as a 1941 Nazi
memorandum on food policy explained, “the war can only continue to be waged if the
entire Wehrmacht is fed from Russia during the third year of the war. As a result, X [10]
million people will undoubtedly starve.” Ten million was a figure that far surpassed even
the highest estimates of German casualties (750,000 civilians) on the home front from the
Allied blockade; nor did it include the projected deaths of those living in the surplus
zone.593 The population of Russia had increased by 30 million people since the outbreak
of the First World War, which has led some scholars to speculate that the Hunger Plan
intended to violently turn the clock back to when there were 30 million fewer Russians
living in the East. Regardless of which statistic was more accurate, Backe’s plan served
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as a brutal insurance policy so that Hitler could rest easy knowing that “no one can starve
us again, as in the last war.”594
Historians of the Second World War have only recently begun to examine the
influence of Herbert Backe on the broader war of extermination (Vernichtungskrieg) that
uniquely characterized Nazi occupation in the East. Currently, there does not exist a
single biography of the Reich food administrator, although he was highly instrumental in
planning the mass murder of millions on the Eastern Front.595 The experience of the First
World War ultimately brought senior Nazi officials to adopt extreme measures to
circumvent the impending British blockade. The search for Lebensraum was their
hubristic attempt to outsmart geography and avoid a calamitous repeat of 1914-1918.
Germany’s aggressive bid for autarky drove the invasion of the Soviet Union in the
summer of 1941 and marked the crossing of a “moral threshold” as its chance at victory
faded on the battlefield.596
It would be straying too far into counterfactuals and hyperbole to suggest that the
Allied blockade of Germany during the First World War directly caused the deaths of
millions in Eastern Europe twenty years later. It did, however, establish a military and
diplomatic precedent whereby food was used as a weapon to break the enemy’s will and,
later, as a form of leverage throughout the peace process. The hunger blockade
demonstrated that the lives of civilians could be subordinated to the political and military
objectives of nations in conflict. Massive collateral damage was now merely part and
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parcel of total war.597 It was a dangerous precedent especially when the defeated power
could draw murderous inspiration from the experience to aid them in a future war of
conquest.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE HUNGER BLOCKADE
On 4 August 1914, Great Britain declared war on Imperial Germany following the latter’s
“blank cheque” of support for Austria-Hungary against Serbia in the Balkans and the
subsequent invasions of Belgium and France, which sparked the First World War.598
Within two days of entering the conflict, the British Liberal government of H. H. Asquith
launched a naval blockade of Germany in the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean599 in
order to exert economic pressure on the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and
the Ottoman Empire) and lend immediate support to their allies (France and Russia) on
the Continent.
The naval blockade of Germany remained in place for the next 59½ months from
6 August 1914 to 12 July 1919 when the Treaty of Versailles was finally ratified. The
Allies maintained the economic sanctions for almost eight months after the guns stopped
firing on the Western Front and a ceasefire agreement had been reached between the
victorious Allies and the vanquished Kaiserreich. Archibald C. Bell’s British official
history of the naval blockade (1937) estimated that its retention throughout 1914-1919
caused the deaths of more than 750,000 German civilians.600
Imperial Germany, like Britain, was heavily reliant on imports. In 1913, for
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example, three-quarters of German imports arrived by sea.601 Thus, denying the Germans
access to essential goods such as oil, food, and textiles eventually caused the home front
to experience a level of hunger and deprivation that was unknown on the Allied home
fronts. In fact, the term “hunger blockade” was first coined in the winter of 1916 to refer
to the drastic reduction in German civilian rations from 1,900 calories a day to a
starvation diet of 1,000 calories.602
While pleading his case before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremburg
on 14 July 1946, Admiral Karl Dönitz quoted a passage from Archibald C. Bell’s British
official history of the naval blockade to remind the Allies that they, too, had engaged in
wartime practices, which if scrutinized during peacetime would appear unnecessarily
cruel.603 Even if one dismisses Dönitz’s claim as sensationalistic or hypocritical, it points
to the negative long-term impact of targeting civilians in war for short-term goals or
political concessions.
This thesis set out to explain how the British naval blockade “ranks first,” to
quote famed military writer Sir Basil Liddell Hart, among the reasons for the defeat of
Germany in the First World War.604 It argues that the naval blockade ultimately hastened
the Allied victory and helped make possible the historic, albeit fragile, peace that
followed. Chapter 1 provided an overview of the structure of the dissertation and
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contextualized this work against the existing literature on the Allied naval blockade. The
central argument is that much of the previous scholarship focused too heavily on the
initial decision to blockade Germany or merely analyzed the early work of Britain’s
Tenth Cruiser Squadron at the expense of examining the evolution of Allied economic
warfare over the course of the war.
The naval blockade that Britain implemented in August 1914 was far more
rudimentary and benign than the lethal “weapon of starvation” that Winston Churchill
denounced as Britain’s Secretary of State for War in March 1919.605 As discussed in
Chapter 2, it was not until an 11 March 1915 Order in Council that food was added to the
list of contraband items bound for Germany. Even then, the British Foreign Office found
itself in a legal quandary when it tried to persuade neutrals against trading with the
Central Powers. The United States and the Northern Neutrals – Sweden, Norway,
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland – did not take kindly to outside interference
from Whitehall. Neither did British businessmen whose revenue was derived from the
laissez-faire principle of a free market economy. The main obstacle that the Allies faced
in the early years of the blockade’s existence was that very few businesses wanted to turn
their backs on Britain’s largest trading partner, Imperial Germany.606 Indeed, patriotism
and morality only held so much sway when the policy of “business as usual” seemed far
more profitable and even pragmatic.
The French, meanwhile, attempted to clamp down on instances where domestic
goods and exports from other countries indirectly made their way to the Central Powers
via the Northern Neutrals. The French Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé was
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instrumental in creating an inter-departmental committee (Comité de Restriction des
Approvisionnements et du Commerce de l’Ennemi) to investigate which countries or
French corporations disproportionally traded with neutral Europe compared to prewar
trade statistics. He recommended that the French parliament should allocate a portion of
its war budget to pre-emptively stockpile certain goods from the Northern Neutrals
(foodstuffs and potential war matérial) before the Germans could even purchase them.607
However, both the French War Ministry and the parliament thought the idea was rather
tedious and spendthrift. The annual budget only stretched so far and, consequently, the
collective buying power of France was not going to be used to stockpile Dutch meat or
Swedish iron ore at the expense of aiding troops at the front.
Even the sinking of the Lusitania, a British ocean liner carrying approximately
2,000 passengers from New York to Liverpool on 7 May 1915, did not initially convince
the U.S. Congress to declare war on Imperial Germany. Ultimately, 1,200 passengers
died off the coast of Ireland, including 128 Americans, when a German torpedo hit the
ship as it approached the British Isles. Although the Lusitania disaster signalled an
intensification of the war at sea – following the introduction of unrestricted German
submarine warfare in February 1915 – President Woodrow Wilson and the U.S. State
Department were torn between maintaining America’s position of neutrality and
defending the country against wanton attacks by joining the Allies in their fight against
the Kaiserreich.608
It took another twenty-three months for the United States to enter the war and
finally join the Allied blockade of the Central Powers. During that time, as in 1914,
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Britain and France encountered a rather steep learning curve in regards to mediating
inter-departmental conflicts and forging political and economic ties with the neutrals in
order to best exploit their command of the sea. The tightening of the Allied blockade
c.1914-1916 was very much an evolutionary process of learning what legal tactics
worked and what proved too inflammatory in the eyes of the neutrals and profit-driven
Allied businesses. The growth of an efficient civil-military bureaucracy in Britain took
several campaign seasons to refine. Real change only occurred once it became clear to
all parties involved that the policy of business as usual was hampering the Allied war
effort.
Chapter 3 explored how mounting criticism of the Asquith administration’s
“timid” handling of the war effort helped refashion the blockade into a more potent
weapon of war in 1916-1917. John Jellicoe thought, for example, that the Foreign Office
under Edward Grey worried far too much about offending the neutrals when, in fact, they
should have demanded greater transparency and cooperation from them. Admiral
Jellicoe was not the only influential voice of dissent when it came to the strategic
direction of the naval blockade.609 Robert Cecil also believed that his department needed
to adopt a firmer stance on indirect trade with Germany via the Northern Neutrals.
Conservative-leaning publications such as the Daily Mail and The Spectator
capitalized on the prevailing anti-Grey sentiment by alleging that the blockade now
“leaked at every seam.”610 In response to the growing criticism, and with the realization
that his preservationist stance on neutral rights was deeply unpopular with both the
Conservatives and the Liberals, Grey asked the prime minister on 23 February 1916 to
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remove him from all matters relating to the trade war with Germany. Asquith, for his
part, was quite relieved that Grey voluntarily distanced himself from the day-to-day
management of the blockade. In his place, Asquith appointed Lord Robert Cecil to head
a separate Ministry of the Blockade with the aim to stop unnecessary trade leakages at the
source.611
Cecil immediately reversed Grey’s tactic of championing neutral rights through a
series of new policies that promoted Britain’s right to blockade the Central Powers. The
first policy (forcible rationing) insisted on rationing the Northern Neutrals to within an
“acceptable” prewar level of imports from other countries. In spite of lost imports and
widespread resentment throughout Scandinavia, Cecil maintained that was the price they
paid for neutrality in an increasingly global war. The second policy (the Statutory List)
involved compiling a list of international corporations with known ties to German
businesses and financial institutions and placing them on a blacklist for embassies
worldwide to monitor. As a result, neutral and Allied businessmen quickly learned that
blacklisted firms were far more trouble to deal with than officially permitted ones.
The final measure that Cecil enacted in the first half of 1916 was the introduction
of the navicert – a commercial passport issued to U.S. exporters in order to expedite trade
between compliant American firms and the United Kingdom. These policies signified a
tightening of the naval blockade at a time when the hope of a short war had irreparably
faded. Allied policymakers such as Théophile Delcassé, Robert Cecil, and the soon-to-be
British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, realized that they had to adjust their
expectations and try new tactics when waging total war.
For a comprehensive overview of Robert Cecil’s political career, including his appointment as
chairman of the Allied Blockade Committee and early proponent of the League of Nations, see, Gaynor
Johnson, Lord Robert Cecil: Politician and Internationalist (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013).
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Unbeknownst to the Allies, the tightening of the blockade occurred just as
Germany experienced an early frost that culminated in the widespread failure of its potato
crop. The starchy vegetable was such a staple in the German diet that its absence proved
troubling for many on the home front. Although the public grudgingly turned to turnips
as a substitute of carbohydrates, the lack of variety coupled with news of extraordinary
casualties on the Western Front (namely, at Verdun and the Somme) made for a very
weary and embattled home front. As the “Turnip Winter” of 1916-1917 progressed,
temperatures plummeted to record lows and government rations were slashed once again
from 1,985 calories to only 1,000 calories a day – nearly two-thirds less than what the
British Royal Society recommended the average adult should consume each day. 612
It was during this particularly brutal winter that Britain’s blockade of Germany
earned its notorious moniker of a “hunger blockade.” The German High Command
(OHL) responded by resurrecting the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare against
Allied seaborne trade, primarily in the western approaches to Britain, in early February
1917.613 Yet instead of starving the British into submission, Germany’s gamble
convinced the United States to abandon its entrenched position of neutrality in favour of
joining the Allies against the Central Powers. America’s entry into the First World War
on 6 April 1917 gave Robert Cecil the opportunity to tighten the naval blockade even
further. American cooperation ensured that virtually no goods passed undetected across
the Atlantic Ocean. Convincing neutral countries it was in their best moral and political
interest to suspend trade with Germany was, however, only half of the battle. The Allies
also needed to convince the Germans that it was in their best interest to capitulate.
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Chapter 4 discussed how the British press baron Lord Northcliffe skilfully
exploited the increasing malaise in Germany over the last year of the war through the
release of blockade related propaganda.614 In February 1918, Lloyd George personally
selected Northcliffe to head the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries or,
“Crewe House,” as it was more commonly known in government circles, with the sole
purpose of convincing the enemy to lay down their arms as quickly as possible. Lord
Northcliffe believed that the surest way to end the war from a propaganda standpoint was
to exploit the omnipresence of the hunger blockade. Through a series of propaganda
leaflets distributed by air balloons to enemy soldiers via the “Balloon Post,” Northcliffe
reminded the German and Austro-Hungarians troops that they were desperately hungry
and poorly equipped compared to their Allied counterparts. At its height in late August
1918, the Balloon Post delivered on average 100,000 pamphlets a day to weary enemy
troops.615 The success of this propaganda effort lay in the candour of its message. That
is to say, Crewe House would not have been as effective had it distributed leaflets based
on half-truths or fiction. It was the discontent of the Germany army and populace that
made it possible for Northcliffe’s propaganda to take hold in 1918. But if the political
and propagandistic impact of the blockade shortened the war in any way, its postArmistice retention brought the issue of morality to the forefront.
Much has been written on the cataclysmic impact of war on society in the Second
World War and it continues to be a topic of great interest for scholars of post-1945
international relations. The history of the First World War, however, has been written
614
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almost without examination of civilian casualties. Therefore, the second aim of this
dissertation in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 was to reveal why the blockade was continued after
the Armistice and examine how its retention impacted the peace conference or shaped
postwar opinion.
From the perspective of the French delegation, Germany could not be trusted to
honour the ceasefire agreement without the threat of reprisal. The blockade then was
meant to serve as a reminder that the physical suffering would end once the Germans
signed the peace treaty. The prospect of revenge for the German siege of Paris in the
winter of 1870-1871, as well as the brutality of the recent conflict, was also a motivating
factor for some French politicians, including Georges Clemenceau.616
Although not driven by the same retributive urge as the French, the U.S. and
Britain were in complete agreement that the naval blockade needed to continue after the
Armistice. In a confidential memorandum circulated by the British General Staff, the
Admiralty, Foreign and War Office made it plain that they believed, “… with the
abolition of the Blockade, and especially its machinery, we lose our power of coercion
over Germany; we run the risk of seeing Germany crumble and become unable to pay
any indemnity....”617 Intended as a cure-all to the social, political, and economic strife
facing the Allies at the peace table, the naval blockade was retained solely for political
reasons.
But the decision to prolong the blockade was not without controversy and
disagreement. Herbert Hoover was in charge of the revictualling of postwar Europe as
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the Allied Food Director and the head of the American Relief Administration (ARA).
From December 1918 to February 1919, he devised several international aid plans –
known collectively as the “Hoover Plan” – to allow foodstuffs into Germany to prevent
further revolutionary upheaval and discontent. The population of Europe stood at
approximately 420 million people in late 1918. Hoover, therefore, understood the great
urgency with which his agency needed to transport food to Europe in the wake of the
First World War. It was his rationale that the Allies ought to lift the crippling economic
sanctions against the Central Powers in order for their respective governments to
purchase food. This action, in turn, would allow Hoover to focus his efforts and that of
the ARA on feeding the rest of Europe in a timely manner.618
After witnessing the desperation and extreme hunger first hand, Second Army
Commander General Herbert Plumer informed the British P.M. that his men were giving
their rations to the enemy in order to prevent further starvation. Like Hoover, Plumer
recommended that the Allied blockade must be lifted at once. Unlike the Allied Food
Director, though, his reasoning was based on seeing the level of deprivation on the
German home front and knowing the moral dilemma that his men faced when hearing
innocent civilians say that “an end by bullets is preferable to death by starvation.”619
Plumer’s report to David Lloyd George on 8 March 1919 finally forced the British
government to see the blockade for what it had become – a regrettable “weapon of
starvation.”
Faced with undeniable proof that the continuation of the blockade was
exacerbating the poor living conditions of Germans on the home front, the Allies
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convened an emergency meeting to discuss the necessity of provisioning the enemy. On
13 March 1919, representatives from Britain, France, Italy, the U.S., and Belgium met
with German diplomats in Brussels to negotiate a payment plan in order to purchase food.
The Brussels agreement was intended to signify the end of the Allied economic warfare
in preparation for the coming peace treaty and the reconstruction of Europe after the war.
Nevertheless, Clemenceau thought it “…useful to remind the Germans that the blockade
shall cease at the same moment as the state of war [i.e. upon signing the peace treaty and
not a moment sooner].”620 True to his word, not a single shipment of food reached
German ports until after 12 July 1919 when the Treaty of Versailles was formally
ratified. Meanwhile, nearly 800 German civilians died each day the hunger blockade was
maintained after the Armistice.621
This was not what the British Admiralty or Committee of Imperial Defense
envisioned when implementing the naval blockade at the start of the war. Nor did the
blockade’s early inefficacy hint at its latent power and eventual use as a political
bargaining chip after 11 November 1918. This transformation occurred over time. The
concept of threatening starvation was first proposed in 1917 but quickly dismissed as too
dangerous. It ultimately took Northcliffe and the Balloon Post to exploit the rampant
hunger in Germany by offering an end to wartime suffering. Perhaps the Paris peace
settlement could have retained more of its legitimacy had the Allies followed Hoover’s
advice to Woodrow Wilson: “we should not be led into joining in a food blockade against
Germany as a method of forcing peace.”622 Hindsight, of course, is 20/20 and the reality
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of international relations is that prompt, definitive decision-making often takes
precedence over cautious and even-handed treatment of the enemy.
This thesis does not attempt to simply castigate British and Allied policymakers
for using food as a weapon against Germany. Rather, by highlighting the politics,
propaganda, and morality of the naval blockade, it underscores the nuances and political
considerations behind their Realpolitik decision. There is no direct line from the First
World War to the Second World War. It is therefore counterproductive to imply as
Patrick Buchanan does that Britain’s blockade irreparably damaged relations with
Germany and directly caused the rise of National Socialism.623 It is regrettable that a
traditional weapon of war was used to garner political victory in 1918-1919. But one
should be mindful, as Vincent notes in The Politics of Hunger, not to “manipulate such
findings and thereby speculate that the critically undernourished generation of children
from World War I logically grew up to become the loyal Schutzstaffeln of the 1930s.”624
Thus Chapter 7 traced the postwar legacy of the blockade in order to glean how
the rampant hunger and political instability in Germany was regarded in postwar Britain,
America, and Germany itself. The issue of morality figured quite prominently in the
Allies’ decision to finally lift the post-Armistice blockade. It also conditioned the
postwar relief efforts of Hoover’s American Relief Administration and social activists in
Britain to feed the starving mouths of Europe – be they German or otherwise. This issue
of humanitarian food relief has yet to be examined by other historians of the naval
blockade. Yet the charitable work of activists like Eglantyne Jebb and the Fight the
Famine Council, which evolved into the internationally recognized Save The Children
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organization, offered valuable insights into the prevailing March 1919 opinion that it was
needless and immoral to use food as a weapon.625
The humanitarian relief work of Anglo-American organizations like the SCF and
the ARA suggests that many people in Allied countries were compelled to donate money
and/or their time to help feed children of the enemy. Yet famine relief was offered too
late to erase the memories of the brutal Turnip Winter and endemic hunger that persisted
throughout the remainder of the blockade’s existence.
In 1992, celebrated Weimar historian Detlev Peukert identified a generational link
between one’s age (i.e. Germans born at or just after the turn of the twentieth century)
and an affiliation with paramilitary groups and high-ranking placement within the Nazi
Party. These “superfluous” youths, as Peukert termed them, were too young to
participate in the First World War yet were old enough to remember the social and
political upheaval on the home front. These young men witnessed their country’s defeat
at the hands of the Allies and became increasingly disaffected after the war.626
While there was nothing inevitable about the rise of Adolf Hitler and his
murderous Weltanschauung in the course of Germany history, the Nazi quest for living
space in the East was influenced, in part, by a conscious decision to avoid a repeat of
1914-1918. In contrast to the First World War, German military planners did not want to
engage in a two-front war with Britain, France, and the United States on the one hand and
the Soviet Union on the other.627 But it was the potential for exploiting Russia’s vast

625

Lord Parmoor, The Policy and the Work of the Fight the Famine Council. See also, Francesca
Mary Wilson, A Rebel Daughter of a Country House, 174; Mulley, 213-214.
626
Peukert, 279-280; Donson, esp. Chapters 7 and 10.
627
For an in-depth look at Nazi-Soviet relations in the lead-up to the invasion of the U.S.S.R. see,
Trumbull Higgins, Hitler and Russia: The Third Reich in a Two-Front War, 1937-1943 (New York:
Macmillan, 1966); Mark Harrison, “Resource Mobilization for World War II: The U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R.,
and Germany, 1938-1945,” Economic History Review 41, no. 2 (May 1988): 171-192; Gerhard L.

232

resources that shaped the Nazis’ approach to food policy and their overall eastern strategy
in the lead-up to the war with Russia. In fact, the Reich Minister for Food and
Agriculture, Herbert Backe, developed a ruthless “Hunger Plan” in early 1941, which
called for the division of the Soviet Union into two zones based on their potential for
economic exploitation. The Ukraine and southern Russia were ultimately identified as
prime land for the German army to violently confiscate grain and other vital resources.628
Only recently have historians of the Second World War started to analyze the
conflict through the lens of food and agrarian politics. Fine works like Lizzie
Collingham’s The Taste of War: World War Two and the Battle for Food (2011) and
Gesine Gerhard’s two articles on Germany’s aggressive bid for autarky in the 1930s and
early 1940s highlight some of the broader implications of the Allied decision to maintain
a naval blockade of Germany throughout 1914-1919. Research, of course, is still needed
to discover if the legacy of the hunger blockade influenced more contemporary historical
events. Did the origins of the Marshall Plan (1948-1952), for instance, stem from an
Allied desire to right the wrongs of the Armistice and the Paris peace settlement? What
role did the blockade play in George C. Marshall’s decision to extend aid to former
enemy countries following the Second World War? Did the U.S. Secretary of State learn
directly from Herbert Hoover’s experience that “famine is the mother of anarchy” and,
thus, prioritize food relief as a result? Only time and further enquiry will tell. Although
a century has elapsed since Britain first implemented the naval blockade of Germany,
these questions and others still remain.
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